This Court’s Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

The instant Petition violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Nevertheless, the application of the principle must be relaxed
considering the circumstances of the instant case

The principle of hierarchy of courts is entrenched in this jurisdiction to guide parties as to the proper venue of appeals and the appropriate forum to seek the issuance of extraordinary writs. In The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC,³⁹ this Court clearly defined the principle and its rationale as follows:

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.⁴⁰ (Citation omitted)

In Bañez, Jr. v. Judge Concepcion,⁴¹ this Court emphasized the necessity of its application:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it[.]⁴² (Citation omitted)

The rationale of the principle is that it operates as a “constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised.”⁴³

On this score, this Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is concurrent with the RTC and the CA. Thus, “[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or [the] RTC, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.”⁴⁴ In this regard, courts and lawyers must strictly observe this policy, as this Court “should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.”⁴⁴⁵

This Court adds posthaste that this principle is by no means iron-clad. As an exception, “[a] direct invocation of [this Court’s] original jurisdiction to issue those writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.”⁴⁵

Here, petitioner committed a breach of such hierarchy by coming directly to this Court to assail the Writ of Execution via a Petition for Certiorari. After all, “trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by [this] Court.”⁴⁴⁷ Upon an examination of the Petition, it is unclear why any action by the CA, which to reiterate, possesses concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari with this Court, cannot be considered as sufficient to address petitioner’s cause. While petitioner harps that her unique situation demands direct resort to this Court, as it would be burdensome for her to travel abroad to exercise her visitation rights,⁴⁸ this allegation, without more, is deficient and uncompelling to successfully invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction.

By prematurely seeking redress from this Court, petitioner appears to have disregarded judicial structure and bypassed the CA, which is empowered to resolve questions of both fact and law. In doing so, petitioner exposed herself to the “risk of presenting incomplete or dispute facts. This unduly hampers the resolution of controversies before [this] Court. Without the necessary facts, [this] Court cannot authoritatively determine the rights and obligations of the parties.”⁴⁹ It is well to mention that the ruling in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.⁵⁰ stressed the role of the CA in the judicial structure, especially in helping this Court in the discharge of its duties:

The CA stands between the RTC and the Court, and its establishment has been precisely to take over much of the work that used to be done by the Court. Historically, the CA has been of the greatest help to the Court in synthesizing the facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and in identifying errors that ordinarily might escape detection. The Court has thus been freed to better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most important work, which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, “is less concerned with the decision of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental rights.”

 

The need to elevate the matter first to the CA is also underscored by the reality that determining whether the petitioners were real parties in interest entitled to bring this appeal against the denial by the RTC of the OSG’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was a mixed question of fact and law. As such, the CA was in the better position to review and to determine. In that regard, the petitioners violate Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which demands that an appeal by petition for review on certiorari be limited to questions of law.⁵¹ (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In any event, this Court has similarly declared that “a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, as when the merit of a party’s cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of noncompliance with certain formal requirements.”⁵² Given the delicate nature of this case, this Court deems it best to abandon a mechanical application of the principle, especially if it involves the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It is worth stating that the case before this Court is not an ordinary suit involving trivial matters; rather, it is one initiated by a mother over the welfare and custody of her child, in which the State has a paramount interest. Accordingly then, this Court shall relax the strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts and resolve this case on the merits.

This court is not empowered to determine the validity or invalidity
of the Parenting Plan. The judgment declaring its validity cannot be
recognized in the Philippines for failure to conform with the
rules on recognition of foreign judgments

In the present case, petitioner argues that notwithstanding her voluntary execution of and compliance with the Parenting Plan, it should nevertheless be declared void ab initio for being contrary to law. In particular, the provision granting sole physical custody over Kaya to respondent is in direct violation of Article 176 of the Family Code, which provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother.⁵³

The Parenting Plan was executed in San Diego, California and was approved in a judgment by the Superior Court of San Diego. Thus, for this Court to determine the validity of the Parenting Plan, it is necessary that the judgment approving it must first be recognized in this jurisdiction.

As borne by the records, the Parenting Plan executed between the parties cannot be recognized in the Philippines for failure to conform with the rules for recognition of foreign judgments. For this reason, this Court is not placed in a position to resolve the issue on the Parenting Plan’s disputed provisions, given that unless recognized, “courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.”⁵⁴

To begin with, while courts are not bound to mechanically give effect to judgments of foreign tribunals, it was emphasized in Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Court of Appeals⁵⁵ that foreign judgments enjoy presumptive validity “until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.”⁵⁶ This ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which clarifies that foreign judgments or final orders against a person “is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest[.]” A party seeking to assail such foreign judgment must discharge of the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity, “by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”⁵⁷

It is fundamental that before such presumption is invoked, the foreign judgment must first be recognized and proven as fact. As declared in Rivera v. Woo Namsun,⁵⁸ “it is indispensable that in order to breathe life into such foreign judgment, its authenticity must be proven as acts as contemplated under the Rules on Evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law, to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.”⁵⁹ After all, “Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of the foreign judgment in the Philippines.”⁶⁰

To prove the foreign judgment and the law on which it is founded, Rule 132,⁶¹ Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court require the presentation of the following proof:

[E]ither by (1) official publications; or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. Should the copies of official records be proven to be stored outside of the Philippines, they must be (1) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (2) authenticated by the seal of his office. If copies are offered into evidence, the attestation: (1) must state that it is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof; and (2) must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under such seal of said court.⁶²

A perusal of the records reveals that the evidence failed to adhere to the Rules. Here, what was introduced into evidence was only a copy of the Parenting Plan and three subsequent orders of the Superior Court of San Diego, namely: (1) July 6, 2023 Order to prove that petitioner was given the authority to bring Kaya to the Philippines until August 10, 2023; (2) August 15, 2023 Order to prove that petitioner violated the terms in the provisions of the July 6, 2023; and (3) September 21, 2023 Order to prove that the physical custody over Kaya is considered permanent.⁶³ More, noticeably absent from the evidence is the very judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego declaring the August 9, 2022 Parenting Plan as valid and binding on both parties. Worse, petitioner did not bother to seasonably and properly apprise the RTC or the CA of the relevant law of California and its legal effects through official publications or a copy thereof, as attested by the officer having legal custody of such documents.

It is therefore clear that there was manifest failure to demonstrate full compliance with the Rules to recognize the subject foreign judgment. Accordingly, the presumption of validity of the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego and the law from which it draws basis cannot be invoked.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity, petitioner in this case would nevertheless be unable to discharge the burden of overcoming such presumption for failure to present evidence of “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact” as required in Asiavest. Lamentably, other than her own suppositions, petitioner solely relied on a copy of the Parenting Plan and certain Orders issued by the Superior Court of San Diego, all of which prove inconclusive and insufficient to shed light on and amplify her claim to nullify the foreign judgment against her.

In sum, absence of a recognition of the foreign judgment concerning the Parenting Plan consequently failed to clothe this Court with authority to resolve the validity or invalidity of its assailed provisions.

The Writ of Execution was not issued with grave abuse of discretion.
This Court is empowered to resolve the issue of parental custody
pursuant to the best interests of the child

To recall, petitioner bewails that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Execution to enforce the RTC Decision. The assailed Decision granted custody to respondent and mere visitation rights to petitioner during school vacations. Essentially then, petitioner prays that this Court reverse and set aside the RTC Decision and grant her custody over Kaya.

While this Court concedes that it is not empowered to resolve the assailed provisions of the Parenting Plan, it shall nevertheless decide on the issue regarding the custody of Kaya, whose physical and emotional well-being is of utmost importance to the State as parens patriae. With more reason, the custodial rights over Kaya, as a Filipino citizen, are governed by Philippine law. Therefore, all issues arising from such custodial rights should be resolved by Philippine courts. According to the nationality principle, “Philippine laws continue to apply to Filipino citizens when it comes to their ‘family rights and duties . . . status, condition and legal capacity,’ even if they do not reside in the Philippines.”⁶⁴ This is embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Indeed, the fulfillment of the State’s mandate to ensure that full protection is afforded to Kaya shall not be strictly hinged on the recognition or nonrecognition of the foreign judgment providing for her care and custody. As required by no less than the 1987 Constitution, the State is enjoined to defend “[t]he right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.”⁶⁵

For another, given that the question of custody is already before this Court, it would be in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to resolve the issue, given that it would serve the “best interests of the child.”