The Ruling of the Court

The Petition for Mandamus is dismissed.

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that while it exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus,⁴⁷ such jurisdiction is shared concurrently with the RTC and the CA pursuant to Sections 9(1)⁴⁸ and 21(1)⁴⁹ of Batas Pambansa Blg. No. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. By reason of this shared jurisdiction, the immediate and direct recourse to the Court is frowned upon following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

The principle of the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is not proper as the Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions. This ensures that the Court can devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of its docket.⁵⁰ The doctrine guides litigants on the proper forum of their appeals as well as the venue for the issuance of extraordinary writs. Notwithstanding the concurrent original jurisdiction of the RTC, the CA, and the Court over the latter, litigants must, as a rule, file their petitions with the lower courts and failure to do so will be sufficient for the dismissal of the case.⁵¹

The present Petition for Mandamus arises from the issuance of the assailed resolution by Presiding Judge Estrada of the MCTC in Civil Case No. 742-R. While direct recourse to the Court may be allowed in exceptional or compelling instances,⁵² none have been sufficiently established here.

To be sure, the rule is that “[a]ny party seeking a liberal application of the rules is required to present strong and compelling reasons to warrant the suspension of the rules.”⁵³ Because the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be done without any valid reason to support it,⁵⁴ the plea for exceptional treatment must, at the very least, be accompanied by an explanation as to why a liberal construction of the rules is warranted.⁵⁵

In the case, Spouses Sending did not allege, much less substantiate, exceptional circumstances that could warrant the Court’s relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. They simply filed the Petition for Mandamus directly with the Court without providing any compelling or justifying reason therefor. Their failure to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts—which requires litigants to first seek relief from appropriate lower courts—warrants the dismissal of the petition.

Even if the Court were to set aside the petitioners’ failure to abide by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the Petition for Mandamus would nonetheless fail, as it is not the proper remedy under the circumstances of the case.

As stated in Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is an appropriate remedy when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person: (1) unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. The petitioner must show that there was “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” that they could have availed of.

Case law further teaches that mandamus lies “only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty.”⁵⁶ There must be the concurrence of the petitioners’ clear legal right and a corresponding ministerial duty imposed by law upon respondents which they failed to perform.⁵⁷ To be ministerial, the duty must be clear and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law, and must not involve the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.⁵⁸

Upon review of the case, the Court finds that Spouses Sending failed to establish all the foregoing requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

First, Spouses Sending failed to demonstrate a clear legal right that was allegedly violated by respondents. A perusal of the Petition reveals that Spouses Sending primarily relied on Section 65 of the IPRA in arguing against the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The reliefs they seek is anchored on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the unlawful detainer case.

Section 65 of the IPRA states that in disputes involving ICCs and/or IPs, customary laws and practices shall be applied. While the law uses the word “shall,” indicating a mandatory tone, it must be read in conjunction with Section 66, which provides for the jurisdiction of the NCIP, viz.:

SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (emphasis supplied)

In Unduran v. Aberasturi,⁵⁹ the Court clarified that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over disputes arising between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IP, or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP. In such cases, the jurisdiction lies with the regular courts of justice, not the NCIP, to wit:

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying provision that “no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.”

The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.

Section 3 (f) of the IPRA, defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the abovesaid two conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this case.⁶⁰ (emphasis supplied)

This is precisely the case in the present controversy. While herein petitioners Spouses Sending claim membership in the KKK-Alimaong Sugbo-anon Tribe, nothing in the records show that Co Uy is also a member of the same tribe. Applying the doctrine in Unduran, subjecting a non-member to the customary laws of an ICC/IP violates the fundamental principles of fair play and due process. Accordingly, jurisdiction properly lies with the regular courts. This holds true even assuming, arguendo, that the subject property is an ancestral land⁶¹, a fact that, in any event, has not been conclusively established in this case.

Therefore, no clear legal right of Spouses Sending, as alleged members of an ICC/IP, was violated by the execution of the decision in the unlawful detainer case filed before the MCTC. The first requirement for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is clearly lacking.

Second, there is no ministerial duty on the part of respondents which they neglected to perform. In contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act is one in which an officer or tribunal performs under a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, and in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.⁶²

To recall, Spouses Sending pray that the public respondent judge be compelled to (1) “resolve the motion to dismiss and settle disputes involving Indigenous Peoples pursuant to [Sections 65 and Section 70 of Republic Act No.] 8371, UNDRIP, ILO 169 to avoid irreparable damage;”⁶³ and (2) reverse the Decision dated June 15, 2016 “considering that identified areas claimed by Datu Bontito Leon Kilat covered by Hacienda de Mandaue and United Nation of the Visayas Ancestral Domain Island Number (ADIN) 0002 including Visayas Ancestral Domain Island Number (ADIN) 0001 to Mactan Island.”⁶⁴ They also seek to enjoin prosecutors, while not impleaded as respondents thereto, from prosecuting cases involving members of ICCs/IPs.⁶⁵

Undeniably, the foregoing matters pertain to judicial adjudication and prosecutorial discretion, which are not ministerial functions. The resolution of motions, interpretation of laws, and determination of jurisdiction are inherently discretionary, requiring the respondents to act in accordance with their own judgments and consciences uncontrolled by anyone. Overall, when the law requires and grants public officers the right to decide on how they shall perform their duty, then they are vested with discretionary functions,⁶⁶ as in the case of the public respondent judge.

At most, mandamus “is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.”⁶⁷ That is, a writ of mandamus may issue to direct a lower court judge to resolve a pending motion, which he or she refused to do, but it cannot be utilized to compel the judge on how to rule on the motion.⁶⁸ In the former, a writ of mandamus is proper because the judge is being directed to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law, i.e., to dispose of court business promptly and to resolve pending incidents and motions;⁶⁹ in the latter, the writ is improper because the resolution of a motion in favor of or against the movant involves the exercise of judicial discretion.

As applied to the case, a writ of mandamus could, at most, serve only to compel the resolution of the Motion to Settle First the Jurisdiction Before Notice for Hearing. The writ cannot extend to an order directing the public respondent judge to grant the motion in favor of Spouses Sending, to set aside its Decision dated June 15, 2016, and to dismiss the subject unlawful detainer suit.

Besides, in cases where mandamus lies to compel a judge to resolve a pending incident or motion, it must first be established that the magistrate refused to perform such duty. If the motion had already been resolved against the movant, then mandamus is not available. Instead, the proper remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari, as explained in Hipos, Sr. v. Bay,⁷⁰ to wit:

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.⁷¹ (Emphasis and underscoring in the Original)

Relevantly, in the assailed Resolution dated November 29, 2023, the public respondent judge resolved the Motion to Settle First the Jurisdiction Before Notice for Hearing against Spouses Sending. The Resolution categorically recognized that Spouses Sending filed the foregoing motion,⁷² but the public respondent judge determined that it cannot be entertained in view of the CA Decision, which had already become final and immutable. Following Hipos, Sr., the present petition must be dismissed outright, as the remedy of mandamus is not available.

Even if the Court exceptionally considers the Petition for Mandamus as a petition for certiorari, it must still be dismissed for lack of merit. To iterate, Spouses Sending abjectly failed to establish that the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties. Even in the Motion to Settle First the Jurisdiction Before Notice for Hearing, Spouses Sending simply claimed to be members of the Lumad KKK-Alimaong Tribal Government but did not demonstrate that Co Uy belongs to the same tribe. Hence, the MCTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 742-R.

The Court is aware that a void decision rendered by a tribunal without jurisdiction presents an exception to the rule on the finality of judgments. Still, it is equally well-established that “[e]xceptions to the immutability of final judgment are allowed only under the most extraordinary of circumstances.”⁷³ A judgment that has attained finality cannot be recklessly set aside, especially when the parties had been given the full opportunity to be heard and the decision was rendered after a careful consideration of the evidence.⁷⁴ Otherwise stated, a final judgment may be set aside only if the grounds therefor are clearly established. It is authorized only “when necessary to accomplish the ends of justice, but not when its object is to set at naught a final judgment and make a mockery of the administration of justice.”⁷⁵

In the case, Spouses Sending’s conduct demonstrates that their invocation of the NCIP’s authority is a mere subterfuge designed to evade the execution of the final judgment against them. Verily, in the proceedings before the MCTC, they never raised their purported status as members of an ICC until the execution proceedings. Even during the barangay conciliation that was held prior to the filing of Co Uy’s complaint, Spouses Sending did not claim to be indigenous peoples.⁷⁶ Spouses Sending’s unexplained silence, despite the numerous opportunities when they could have earlier asserted their supposed status as indigenous peoples and thus impugn the MCTC’s jurisdiction over the controversy, may be taken as evidence against them.⁷⁷ The fact that they submitted not only to the jurisdiction of the regular courts but also to the authority of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Yati, Liloan, without immediately invoking the applicability of the customary laws of the relevant ICC, betrays the dubiousness of their alleged status as indigenous peoples.

Moreover, case law instructs that membership in an ICC must be substantiated with facts constitutive of the ICC’s “customs, political structures, institutions, decision making processes, and such other indicators of indigenous persons nature distinct and native to them.”⁷⁸ A bare allegation of status as indigenous peoples or membership in a tribe will not suffice.⁷⁹ 

Here, Spouses Sending merely alleged that they are members of the Lumad KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Tribe without substantiating the same. There is nothing in the Petition for Mandamus or in their submissions before the MCTC in which the spouses explained their purported ICC’s customs, political structures, institutions, decision making processes, or any other indicia of the genuineness of their claimed status as indigenous peoples.

Even more, the records show that the NCIP had issued an Advisory⁸⁰ dated August 8, 2019, in which it notified the public that the Lumad KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Tribe is “NOT one of the indigenous cultural communities duly validated and recognized by the NCIP.” Given the situation, Spouses Sending’s alleged membership in the Lumad KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Tribe is doubtful at best. As such, it cannot serve as basis to set aside the final judgment in Civil Case No. 742-R.

All told, the present petition must be dismissed for being a wrong remedy. In the absence of a clear legal right on the part of petitioners and a corresponding ministerial duty imposed by law upon respondents that has been neglected or refused, the issuance of a writ of mandamus is unwarranted. Even if the Court exceptionally considers the petition as one for certiorari, it must still be dismissed because Spouses Sending failed to demonstrate that there are valid grounds to set aside the final judgment in Civil Case No. 742-R.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated November 29, 2023 of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 742-R, is AFFIRMED. Petitioners Spouses Elvin Sending (Datu Gibo) and Jocelyn Sending (Bae Orange) are ORDERED to vacate the subject property and voluntarily remove all improvements built thereon within 30 days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.