Inman v. People, G.R. No. 277788 (July 15, 2026)

The Court resolves an Appeal Under Rule 45¹ (Appeal) and a Petition for the Writ of Amparo² (second Amparo Petition) filed by petitioner Joseph Mark Inman (Inman).³

Factual Antecedents

Inman is an asylum seeker residing in the Philippines through a Special Resident Retiree’s Visa,⁴ but he is a citizen of the State of Saint Christopher and Nevis.⁵ In 2020, he hired caretakers Marion and Edelisa Arena (spouses Arena) to live with him in a property he rented in ███████, Angeles City.⁶ He lived with his partner, Glendale Opusa (Opusa),⁷ and two minors, █████████ (PPP)* and █████████ (SSS). PPP’s and SSS’s parents executed Affidavits⁸ allowing Inman to adopt their children.

On February 1, 2024, Social Worker Jaynie David (David) and her officemate received an anonymous text message reporting that a foreigner would take a 3-year-old child to Cebu without legal documents. They asked the sender to come to their office and verify the report. After verification, they reported the matter to the local police. Then, they proceeded to Inman’s residence to ask for proper documentation justifying living with two minors who are not related to him. Inman was only able to produce the affidavits executed by the minors’ parents. David personally saw one of the children, PPP, who informed her that Inman would be taking them to Cebu.⁹ Unable to provide the required documentation, Inman was arrested in flagrante delicto and detained for child trafficking and violation of Article VI, Section 6¹⁰ of Republic Act No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.¹¹

Accordingly, a Complaint¹² for child trafficking and violation of Republic Act No. 7610 was filed against Inman before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Angeles City. Inman filed his Counter-Affidavit¹³ and explained that his live-in partner, Opusa, has custody of the children, and they were in the process of adopting the minors.¹⁴ He likewise submitted a Certification¹⁵ from his lawyer stating that he attempted to adopt SSS, but failed due to changes in the adoption rules, the COVID-19 pandemic, and changes in circumstances.

The OCP found probable cause to indict Inman for violating Article VI, Section 10(b)¹⁶ of Republic Act No. 7610 by having children in his custody who are not related to him. Inman failed to provide any proof that he adopted them. Therefore, he has no legal right to keep them in his house or to bring them to Cebu.¹⁷

An Information¹⁸ charging Inman with violating Section 10(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 was filed before Branch 10, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Angeles City, Pampanga.¹⁹ The accusatory portion of the Information is quoted as follows:

That on or about [February 1, 2024], in the City of Angeles, [Pampanga], Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Inman], without any justifiable reason therefor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously have in his company/custody the minor-victims █████ (10 year[s] old) and █████ (3 year[s] old), who are more than 10 years younger than the 44[-] year[-] old [Inman], and that the latter is not related, within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and traditions, or acts in the performance of a social, moral[,] or legal duty, with the said minor victims, thereby degrading and demeaning the minor’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a child and human being, which is contrary to the provisions of [Article VI, Section 10(b)] of Republic Act No. 7610.

CONTRARY TO LAW.²⁰

On March 22, 2024, the RTC issued an Order²¹ finding probable cause and fixing Inman’s bail at PHP 120,000.00. Upon posting bail, Inman was released from detention.²²

Pending the resolution of the case before the RTC, Inman filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo²³ (first Amparo Petition) before the Court of Appeals (CA). He argued that he was unlawfully arrested, subjected to torture as a result of an unlawful trial, and discriminated against because of his religion and ethnicity.²⁴ The first Amparo Petition named the People of the Philippines, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Head of the City Social Welfare and Development Office-Angeles City (CSWDO-AC) Edna Duaso, Presiding Judge Katrina Nora Buan-Factora (Judge Buan-Factora) of the RTC where the criminal case against Inman was pending, Public Prosecutor Oliver S. Garcia (Prosecutor Garcia), and Assistant Prosecutor Junnie T. Esplana (Assistant Prosecutor Esplana) as respondents.²⁵

The CA dismissed the first Amparo Petition primarily on procedural grounds, including Inman’s failure to have the verification notarized.²⁶

Proceedings Before this Court

Petitioner filed an Appeal Under Rule 45 before this Court on December 19, 2024. He argued that the procedural defects cited by the CA do not invalidate the substance of his claims or his entitlement to the issuance of the writ. Moreover, he has already addressed the defects by disclosing his address, submitting a self-attestation, and furnishing respondents with copies of the Petition through registered mail.²⁷

On January 21, 2025, the Court issued a Resolution²⁸ requiring petitioner to pay the Sheriff’s Trust Fund and submit a verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner complied on March 14, 2025.²⁹ However, on May 5, 2025, he filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion for Urgent Relief³⁰ for this Court to consider the second Amparo Petition as full procedural compliance.³¹ Petitioner named Judge Buan-Factora, Prosecutor Garcia, Assistant Prosecutor Esplana, social workers David and Laura Capili, CSWDO-AC, arresting officers Police Senior Master Sergeant Dhexter D. Guzman and Police Master Sergeant Mijares M. Reyes, Angeles City Police Station, his then caretakers spouses Arena, and Mark Arena, and his former employee, Lois Dayrit, as respondents.³²

In his second Amparo Petition, petitioner claimed that he was arrested without a warrant on February 1, 2024, based on child trafficking charges orchestrated by respondent social workers upon the report of respondent spouses Arena, even though Muslim civil practices allow guardianship without formal adoption paperwork. Furthermore, while in detention, he was subjected to psychological and physical abuse. As such, his unlawful arrest and detention amounted to psychological and physical torture.³³ He also argued that his trial is tainted with bias and procedural irregularities when respondent Judge Buan-Factora consistently ruled in favor of the prosecution. Next, he insisted that respondents CSWDO-AC and DSWD unlawfully removed his children, PPP and SSS, from his care despite the affidavits executed by their biological mothers. Further, he argued that the State’s coordinated actions constitute persecution based on ethnicity and religion. The actions of respondents, such as the fabrication of evidence, judicial bias, and unlawful detention, continue to place him at risk of further state-sponsored violence, i.e., penalty of imprisonment if he is found guilty of the charge against him.³⁴

Simply put, petitioner asserts that a writ of amparo must be issued to protect him from further psychological persecution and unlawful prosecution.³⁵

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner proved his entitlement to a writ of amparo.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court cannot overemphasize its efforts to balance the enforcement of procedural rules with the protection of the litigants’ right to a fair resolution of their cases. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. However, even if We relax the rules and apply them liberally in this case, the Petition must be denied due to procedural and substantive defects.

The Petitions are marred with procedural infirmities, warranting their outright dismissal

Section 3 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that a petition for the issuance of the writ may be filed before the RTC of the place where the threat, act, or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, the Sandiganbayan, the CA, or this Court. The final judgment or order may be appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.³⁶ However, when a criminal action has been commenced, Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo instructs that the reliefs under the writ should be filed through a motion in the criminal case. Therefore, the pendency of a criminal action bars the filing of a separate action.

Here, a criminal case for violation of Section 10(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 was already filed against petitioner before the RTC. Yet, petitioner filed the first Amparo Petition with the CA. When the CA dismissed the first Amparo Petition on procedural grounds, petitioner filed an Appeal, dated December 17, 2024, before this Court. Then, he filed the second Amparo Petition, dated May 5, 2025.

The factual backdrop of this case demonstrates several procedural defects.

First, the filing of the first Amparo Petition with the CA, despite the pending criminal action before the RTC, violated Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Section 22 explicitly provides that the reliefs under the writ should be availed of through a motion with the RTC where the criminal case is pending.

In Rev. Fr. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,³⁷ the Court dismissed the amparo petition and explained that direct recourse to this Court was inappropriate in view of the pending rebellion charge against the petitioner therein. The Court agreed with the CA that Section 22 is an affirmation of this Court’s pronouncements that once an information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of that court, to the exclusion of other courts.³⁸ The Court likewise dismissed the amparo petition in Parojinog v. Albayalde,³⁹ cited in the 2025 case of In re Castro,⁴⁰ in view of the petitioner’s pending cases for violation of the Immigration Law and pilferage of electricity.⁴¹

Second, petitioner appealed the CA’s judgment to this Court under Rule 45 without proof of service to the CA, a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the CA’s judgment, a sworn certification of non-forum shopping, and verification. Petitioner also failed to indicate in his Petition the material dates showing when the CA issued the assailed judgment and when he received it. Neither did he indicate whether he filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner only mentioned in his second Amparo Petition that the CA denied his petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice on December 13, 2024, and received it on December 18, 2024. These omissions constitute noncompliance with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in [18] copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. (Emphasis supplied)

Relevantly, Rule 45, Section 5 allows the Court to dismiss the petition for the failure of petitioner to comply with the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition. Therefore, the Court can dismiss the Petition under Rule 45 based on these procedural defects.

Third, petitioner filed the second Amparo Petition on May 5, 2025. Although he manifested that it should be read in continuation and supplement to his Appeal, he still failed to attach the assailed CA judgment. Therefore, the second Amparo Petition remains noncompliant with the rules.

Even if the Court considers the second Amparo Petition as a separate petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, it remains defective because petitioner’s Appeal is still pending.

In the 2023 case of In re Castro,⁴² the Court explained that tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction when the law vests in more than one tribunal the authority to hear and decide an issue within a specific subject matter. Direct recourse to this Court is generally improper if it shares jurisdiction with another tribunal, subject to certain exceptions.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed and bestowed by law over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. Direct recourse to this Court, if it has jurisdiction concurring with another tribunal, is generally improper as the Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of its docket.

Exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts have usually been applied to petitions for certiorari. The invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.

These procedural rules in the handling of certiorari cases may be applied just as well to other extraordinary and prerogative writs, under which amparo, as well as habeas data, may reasonably be classified. These writs are: extraordinary, since, historically, they have been issued “only in extraordinary cases. . . and only when some gross injustice was being done by other authorities. They were used only sparingly and in the most urgent of circumstances. . .”; and prerogative, as “it remained the function of the King, through his court of King’s Bench, to be the judge of the necessity for their issue[.]”⁴³ (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

We are also reminded in Agcaoili v. Fariñas⁴⁴ that the concurrency of jurisdiction does not give the parties absolute freedom to choose the court where the petition will be filed. The hierarchy of courts also generally determines the appropriate forum for petitions for extraordinary writs.⁴⁵

This case does not fall under any of the exceptions that would excuse the second Amparo Petition from observing the hierarchy of courts. Besides, the CA, in taking cognizance of the first petition for the issuance of writ of amparo, acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Court may no longer exercise original jurisdiction over the second Amparo Petition before Us, pending the resolution of his Appeal.

Moreover, this Court, in Heirs of Inocentes v. Morada,⁴⁶ ruled that pursuing two or more suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action simultaneously or successively is forum shopping, which is a ground for summary dismissal, thus:

Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party’s chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. It is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice, and adds to the already congested court dockets.

. . . .

Forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of both initiatory pleadings without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned. This is a punitive measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of justice.⁴⁷ (Citations omitted)

Here, petitioner filed both a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and Appeal Under Rule 45. This is a direct violation of the rules on forum shopping. The simultaneous filing of two separate remedies exposes this Court to the risk of incompatible rulings over the same issues. Thus, both are dismissible on the ground of forum shopping.

Even if the Court overlooks these procedural defects, the Petitions must still be dismissed for being substantially flawed.

Petitioner failed to prove his entitlement to the issuance of the writ of amparo by prima facie or substantial evidence

The petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo is a remedy available to a person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.⁴⁸

The Court promulgated the rules on the writ of amparo to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.⁴⁹ In Spouses Lucena v. Elago,⁵⁰ this Court enumerated the elements of the “enforced disappearances” and what constitutes “extralegal killing” sought to be prevented by the writ, thus:

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., the Court categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, and jurisprudentially defined these two instances, as follows:

The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

The above definition of “enforced disappearance” appears in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and is as statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of [Republic Act]. No. 9851. Thus, in Navia, et al. v. Pardico, the elements constituting “enforced disappearance” are enumerated as follows:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

. . . .

Here, there is not much issue that AJ’s situation does not qualify either as an actual or threatened enforced disappearance or extralegal killing. AJ is not missing. Her whereabouts are determinable. By all accounts, she is staying with the Anakbayan and its officers which, at least insofar as AJ’s case is concerned, are not agents or organizations acting on behalf of the State. Indeed, against these facts, petitioners’ invocation of the remedy cannot pass.⁵¹ (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The extraordinary character of the writ requires that every verified petition specifies: (a) the personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) the name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or if the respondent’s name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) the right to life, liberty, and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in the supporting affidavits; (d) the investigation conducted, if any; (e) the actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) the relief prayed for.⁵²

The petitioners must also prove their allegations in the petition by substantial evidence.⁵³ However, in the 2025 case of Castro, the Court clarified that prima facie evidence, which is evidence that is good and sufficient on its face, is necessary to issue a writ of amparo, while substantial evidence, which is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required to issue the privilege of the writ of amparo.⁵⁴

Verily, in amparo proceedings, there should be, at the very least, illegal or apparently illegal State action that violates or threatens to violate an individual’s rights to life, liberty, or security. A writ shall not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds or where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.⁵⁵

Here, the Petitions before the CA and this Court failed to show any threat to or violation of petitioner’s right to life, liberty, and security arising from respondents’ unlawful acts. Petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto and detained because he was in custody of a minor who is not related to him. He availed of a preliminary investigation and filed a counter-affidavit. Still, the OCP found probable cause to hold him liable for violating Article VI, Section 10(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, and not for child trafficking. The bail was set at PHP 120,000.00.⁵⁶ The RTC ordered his release after he posted bail. Soon after, he filed a Motion to Quash Information,⁵⁷ which the RTC denied.⁵⁸ These undisputed facts do not demonstrate any clear violation of, or threat to, petitioner’s right to life, liberty, or security that a writ of amparo could address.

Petitioner may have been arrested and detained by law enforcement officers. However, the last two elements of enforced disappearance are absent. Petitioner’s location during detention is known, and respondents have no intention of depriving him of legal protection. They respected his right to due process and allowed him to avail himself of available remedies, such as a preliminary investigation, posting bail, and filing a motion to quash the information. Therefore, the circumstances of this case do not qualify as enforced disappearance.

To reiterate, the extraordinary writ of amparo was created and adopted in response to the proliferation of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This Court will not hesitate or delay in prioritizing amparo petitions to protect the people’s lives, liberty, and security. However, We cannot devote time and resources to issues outside the scope of the writ.⁵⁹ Doing so would dilute and undermine the purpose of the writ through the indiscriminate filing of petitions aimed at less than genuine relief and protection based on unsubstantiated allegations.⁶⁰

All things considered, the Court finds no unlawful state action that violates or threatens to violate petitioner’s right to life, liberty, or security. Petitioner failed to allege and prove the ultimate facts linking respondents to any clear threat to his rights that is actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. His apprehensions of being unlawfully detained again are, at best, speculative.

Lastly, petitioner’s claim of guardianship over the minors, as permitted by Muslim civil practices, is irrelevant to the question of whether he is entitled to a writ of amparo. It is a factual matter that requires the presentation of evidence. Therefore, it should be resolved in a full-blown trial.

ACCORDINGLY, the Appeal under Rule 45 dated December 19, 2024, as well as the Petition for Writ of Amparo dated May 5, 2025, are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

¹ Rollo, pp. 3–10.

² Id. at 173–205.

³ Id. at 3. Despite two names appearing on the Petition, both are aliases of a single petitioner who claims that Joseph Mark Inman is his Kititian name and birth name, while Mohammed Yusef Malek Iman is his Shariah name and noble title.

⁴ Id. at 174.

⁵ Id. at 74.

⁶ Id. at 32.

⁷ Id. at 241.

* In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 8505, the name of the private offended party, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.

⁸ Id. at 263–265.

⁹ Id. at 44–45.

¹⁰ Republic Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 6, states:

Sec. 6. Attempt to Commit Child Prostitution. – There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle[,] or any other hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

¹¹ Rollo, pp. 36–37.

¹² Id. at 35.

¹³ Id. at 48–51.

¹⁴ Id. at 48.

¹⁵ Id. at 104.

¹⁶ Republic Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(b), states:

Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –

. . . .

(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos ([PHP] 50,000.00): Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty.

¹⁷ Rollo, p. 41.

¹⁸ Id. at 38–39.

¹⁹ Id. at 38.

²⁰ Id.

²¹ Id. at 43.

²² Id. at 47.

²³ Id. at 11–28.

²⁴ Id. at 20–21.

²⁵ Id. at 11.

²⁶ Id. at 4. The Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing Inman’s petition does not form part of the records. Inman only narrated the dismissal in his Petition before this Court.

²⁷ Id. at 4–5.

²⁸ Id. at 120.

²⁹ Id. at 128–130.

³⁰ Id. at 168–172.

³¹ Id. at 170.

³² Id. at 175–176.

³³ Id. at 182–183, 185.

³⁴ Id. at 185–187.

³⁵ Id. at 202.

³⁶ AMPARO WRIT RULE, sec. 19.

³⁷ 621 Phil. 519 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].

³⁸ Id. at 533–534.

³⁹ G.R. No. 247533, July 19, 2019 [Unsigned Resolution, En Banc].

⁴⁰ G.R. Nos. 269249 and 276602, May 6, 2025 [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].

⁴¹ Id. at 7. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

⁴² 948 Phil. 666 (2023) [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].

⁴³ Id. at 673–674.

⁴⁴ 835 Phil. 405 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].

⁴⁵ Id. at 428.

⁴⁶ 888 Phil. 583 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].

⁴⁷ Id. at 592–595.

⁴⁸ AMPARO WRIT RULE, sec. 1.

⁴⁹ Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 37 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].

⁵⁰ 884 Phil. 846 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, En Banc].

⁵¹ Id. at 852–853.

⁵² AMPARO WRIT RULE, sec. 5.

⁵³ Id. at sec. 17.

⁵⁴ G.R. Nos. 269249 and 276602, May 6, 2025 [Per J. Hernando, En Banc] at 5. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

⁵⁵ Agcaoili v. Hon. Fariñas, 835 Phil. 405, 444–445 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].

⁵⁶ Rollo, p. 42.

⁵⁷ Id. at 287–293.

⁵⁸ Id. at 297–298.

⁵⁹ Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association, 577 Phil. 92, 96 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R., En Banc].

⁶⁰ Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 627 Phil. 37, 73–74 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

Case Digest

Atty. Eryel Legis Comania, LPT

Inman v. People, et al.
G.R. No. 277788, July 15, 2026
[Per J. Rosario, En Banc]

SYLLABUS

Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Writ of Amparo; Coverage of the Amparo Rule; Extralegal Killings; Enforced Disappearance; Elements of Enforced Disappearance; Quantum of Evidence in Amparo (Prima Facie and Substantial Evidence); Effect of Filing of Criminal Action (Section 22, Rule on the Writ of Amparo); Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45; Contents of Petition (Rule 45, Section 4); Hierarchy of Courts; Concurrent Jurisdiction; Forum Shopping; Republic Act No. 7610, Article VI, Section 10(b)

DOCTRINES

1. Coverage of the writ. The writ of amparo is a remedy for a person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. As it presently stands, its coverage is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats of these. The elements of enforced disappearance are:
   • (a) an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
   • (b) carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
   • (c) followed by the State’s or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person; and
   • (d) the intention for such refusal is to remove the person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
2. Quantum of evidence. Prima facie evidence, meaning evidence that is good and sufficient on its face, is necessary to issue the writ. Substantial evidence is required to grant the privilege of the writ. At the very least, there must be illegal or apparently illegal State action that violates or threatens to violate the right to life, liberty or security. The writ will not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.
3. Effect of a pending criminal action. Under Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, once a criminal action has been commenced, the reliefs under the writ must be sought through a motion in the criminal case. The pendency of a criminal action bars the filing of a separate amparo petition.
4. Hierarchy of courts and forum shopping. The hierarchy of courts applies to amparo petitions as extraordinary and prerogative writs. Concurrent jurisdiction does not give a party absolute freedom to choose the forum. Simultaneously pursuing an appeal under Rule 45 and a separate amparo petition on the same matter is forum shopping, which is a ground for the summary dismissal of both.

FACTS

Joseph Mark Inman (Inman) is a citizen of Saint Christopher and Nevis. He is an asylum seeker residing in the Philippines under a Special Resident Retiree’s Visa. In 2020, he hired caretakers, the spouses Marion and Edelisa Arena, to live with him in a property he rented in Angeles City. He lived there with his partner, Glendale Opusa, and two minors, PPP and SSS. The minors’ parents had executed affidavits allowing Inman to adopt them.

On February 1, 2024, Social Worker Jaynie David and an officemate received an anonymous text message. It reported that a foreigner would take a 3-year-old child to Cebu without legal documents. After verifying the report, they informed the police and went to Inman’s residence to ask for documents justifying his living with two unrelated minors. Inman produced only the parents’ affidavits. PPP told David that Inman would be taking them to Cebu. Inman was arrested in flagrante delicto and detained for child trafficking and for violating Article VI, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7610.

A complaint was filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Angeles City. In his counter-affidavit, Inman said that his partner Opusa had custody of the children and that they were in the process of adopting them. He also submitted a certification from his lawyer stating that his attempt to adopt SSS had failed because of changes in the adoption rules, the COVID-19 pandemic, and changes in circumstances.

The OCP found probable cause, not for child trafficking, but for violation of Article VI, Section 10(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Its basis was that Inman had in his custody children unrelated to him and had no proof of adoption. An Information was filed before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, a Family Court presided over by Judge Katrina Nora Buan-Factora. On March 22, 2024, the RTC found probable cause and fixed bail at PHP 120,000.00. Inman posted bail and was released. He later filed a Motion to Quash Information, which the RTC denied.

While the criminal case was pending, Inman filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo (first Amparo Petition) with the Court of Appeals (CA). He alleged that he had been unlawfully arrested, subjected to torture through an unlawful trial, and discriminated against because of his religion and ethnicity. The CA dismissed the petition, mainly on procedural grounds, including the lack of a notarized verification.

On December 19, 2024, Inman filed an Appeal Under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court. On January 21, 2025, the Court required him to pay the Sheriff’s Trust Fund and to submit a verification and certification of non-forum shopping. He complied on March 14, 2025.

On May 5, 2025, Inman filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion for Urgent Relief, together with a second Petition for the Writ of Amparo (second Amparo Petition). This petition named a broader set of respondents: the judge, the prosecutors, social workers, the arresting officers, the police station, his former caretakers, and a former employee. He claimed the following:

• His warrantless arrest was orchestrated by the social workers on the report of the spouses Arena, even though Muslim civil practices allow guardianship without formal adoption.
• He suffered psychological and physical abuse while in detention.
• The judge was biased in favor of the prosecution.
• The DSWD and CSWDO-AC unlawfully removed the children from his care.
• The State’s coordinated acts amounted to persecution based on his ethnicity and religion.
• He remained at risk of further “state-sponsored violence,” namely imprisonment if convicted.

ISSUES

1. Did petitioner prove his entitlement to a writ of amparo?
2. Was the filing of the first Amparo Petition with the CA proper despite the pending criminal case before the RTC?
3. Did petitioner’s Appeal under Rule 45 comply with Section 4 of Rule 45?
4. May the second Amparo Petition be given due course while the Appeal is pending, and did petitioner commit forum shopping?

RULING

1. Did petitioner prove his entitlement to a writ of amparo? — No.

On the nature and coverage of the writ:

“The petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo is a remedy available to a person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.”

The Court, through Spouses Lucena v. Elago, 884 Phil. 846 (2020), quoting Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1 (2008), restated the scope of the rule:

“The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of ‘extralegal killings’ and ‘enforced disappearances,’ its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. ‘Extralegal killings’ are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. x x x”

On the elements of enforced disappearance, Lucena, citing Navia v. Pardico, enumerated:

“(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”

On the quantum of evidence, citing In re Castro, G.R. Nos. 269249 and 276602 (2025):

“x x x prima facie evidence, which is evidence that is good and sufficient on its face, is necessary to issue a writ of amparo, while substantial evidence, which is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required to issue the privilege of the writ of amparo.”

“Verily, in amparo proceedings, there should be, at the very least, illegal or apparently illegal State action that violates or threatens to violate an individual’s rights to life, liberty, or security. A writ shall not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds or where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.”

Applying these rules to the facts, the Court held:

“Petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto and detained because he was in custody of a minor who is not related to him. He availed of a preliminary investigation and filed a counter-affidavit. x x x The RTC ordered his release after he posted bail. Soon after, he filed a Motion to Quash Information, which the RTC denied. These undisputed facts do not demonstrate any clear violation of, or threat to, petitioner’s right to life, liberty, or security that a writ of amparo could address.”

“Petitioner may have been arrested and detained by law enforcement officers. However, the last two elements of enforced disappearance are absent. Petitioner’s location during detention is known, and respondents have no intention of depriving him of legal protection. They respected his right to due process and allowed him to avail himself of available remedies, such as a preliminary investigation, posting bail, and filing a motion to quash the information. Therefore, the circumstances of this case do not qualify as enforced disappearance.”

“x x x We cannot devote time and resources to issues outside the scope of the writ. Doing so would dilute and undermine the purpose of the writ through the indiscriminate filing of petitions aimed at less than genuine relief and protection based on unsubstantiated allegations.”

“Petitioner failed to allege and prove the ultimate facts linking respondents to any clear threat to his rights that is actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. His apprehensions of being unlawfully detained again are, at best, speculative.”

On the claimed guardianship under Muslim civil practices:

“x x x petitioner’s claim of guardianship over the minors, as permitted by Muslim civil practices, is irrelevant to the question of whether he is entitled to a writ of amparo. It is a factual matter that requires the presentation of evidence. Therefore, it should be resolved in a full-blown trial.”

2. Was the filing of the first Amparo Petition with the CA proper despite the pending criminal case? — No.

“x x x when a criminal action has been commenced, Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo instructs that the reliefs under the writ should be filed through a motion in the criminal case. Therefore, the pendency of a criminal action bars the filing of a separate action.”

“First, the filing of the first Amparo Petition with the CA, despite the pending criminal action before the RTC, violated Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Section 22 explicitly provides that the reliefs under the writ should be availed of through a motion with the RTC where the criminal case is pending.”

The Court relied on Rev. Fr. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 621 Phil. 519 (2009), where a pending rebellion charge made direct recourse to the Court inappropriate:

“The Court agreed with the CA that Section 22 is an affirmation of this Court’s pronouncements that once an information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of that court, to the exclusion of other courts.”

The Court likewise cited Parojinog v. Albayalde, G.R. No. 247533 (2019), as cited in In re Castro (2025). There, the amparo petition was dismissed because of the petitioner’s pending cases for violation of the Immigration Law and pilferage of electricity.

3. Did the Appeal under Rule 45 comply with Section 4 of Rule 45? — No.

Petitioner appealed without the following:

• proof of service to the CA;
• a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the CA judgment;
• a sworn certification of non-forum shopping and verification;
• the material dates showing when the CA issued the judgment and when he received it; and
• a statement of whether a motion for reconsideration was filed.

Rule 45, Section 4 provides, in part:

“The petition x x x shall x x x (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; x x x (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo x x x; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.”

“Relevantly, Rule 45, Section 5 allows the Court to dismiss the petition for the failure of petitioner to comply with the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition. Therefore, the Court can dismiss the Petition under Rule 45 based on these procedural defects.”

4. May the second Amparo Petition be given due course while the Appeal is pending, and did petitioner commit forum shopping? — No; yes, he committed forum shopping.

The second petition remained noncompliant because petitioner still failed to attach the assailed CA judgment. Treated as a separate petition, it violated the hierarchy of courts. The Court quoted In re Castro, 948 Phil. 666 (2023):

“Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed and bestowed by law over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. Direct recourse to this Court, if it has jurisdiction concurring with another tribunal, is generally improper as the Supreme Court is a court of last resort x x x.”

“These procedural rules in the handling of certiorari cases may be applied just as well to other extraordinary and prerogative writs, under which amparo, as well as habeas data, may reasonably be classified. x x x”

Citing Agcaoili v. Fariñas, 835 Phil. 405 (2018), the Court held that concurrency of jurisdiction does not give parties absolute freedom to choose their forum. It then ruled:

“This case does not fall under any of the exceptions that would excuse the second Amparo Petition from observing the hierarchy of courts. Besides, the CA, in taking cognizance of the first petition for the issuance of writ of amparo, acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Court may no longer exercise original jurisdiction over the second Amparo Petition before Us, pending the resolution of his Appeal.”

On forum shopping, the Court quoted Heirs of Inocentes v. Morada, 888 Phil. 583 (2020):

“Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party’s chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. x x x Forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of both initiatory pleadings without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned. x x x”

“Here, petitioner filed both a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and Appeal Under Rule 45. This is a direct violation of the rules on forum shopping. The simultaneous filing of two separate remedies exposes this Court to the risk of incompatible rulings over the same issues. Thus, both are dismissible on the ground of forum shopping.”

DISCUSSION

Why did the Court deny the petitions even after saying it would relax the rules?

Because the defects ran on two tracks, and either track was enough to sink the petitions. The Court first acknowledged that rules of procedure are mere tools to attain justice. It then said that even with liberal application, the petitions failed procedurally and, more decisively, failed on substance. Liberality can cure a missing attachment. It cannot conjure a threat to life, liberty or security that does not exist.

Why was the CA the wrong forum in the first place?

Because an Information for violation of Section 10(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 was already pending before the RTC. Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not allow a separate petition once a criminal action has been commenced. The accused must file a motion in the criminal case itself.

The reason is jurisdictional respect. Following Rev. Fr. Reyes, once an Information is filed, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court where it is pending, to the exclusion of other courts. An amparo petition cannot be used to go around the trial court.

Was there an enforced disappearance? Let us test the elements.

1. Arrest, detention, abduction or deprivation of liberty — Present. Inman was arrested and detained on February 1, 2024.
2. Carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State — Present. Law enforcement officers made the arrest after social workers reported the matter.
3. Refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person — Absent. His location during detention was known.
4. Intention to remove the person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period — Absent. He underwent preliminary investigation, filed a counter-affidavit, posted bail, was released, and filed a motion to quash. Far from being placed outside the law, he used its full set of remedies.

With the last two elements missing, there was no enforced disappearance. There was also no extralegal killing or threat of one.

What about his fear of being jailed again if convicted?

The Court called it, “at best, speculative.” The writ will not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. More fundamentally, imprisonment after conviction by a competent court is the opposite of a killing “without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.” The answer to the risk of conviction is a defense at trial, not amparo.

What quantum of evidence did he fail to meet?

In re Castro (2025) draws a two-level distinction:

Inman did not clear even the first level. The Court found no unlawful State action and no ultimate facts linking respondents to any clear threat.

Why was filing both an appeal and a second amparo petition fatal?

Because it was forum shopping: two suits, the same parties, the same cause of action, filed simultaneously. This created the risk of incompatible rulings. The Court also treated the CA as having already acquired jurisdiction over the amparo matter through the first petition. As a result, the Supreme Court could not exercise original jurisdiction over a second petition while the appeal from the CA was pending. The hierarchy of courts, ordinarily discussed in certiorari cases, applies equally to amparo and habeas data as extraordinary and prerogative writs.

What remedies were open to Inman, and where?

Take note:

• The writ was denied, not the merits of the criminal case. The Court did not rule on whether Inman is guilty under Section 10(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. It also did not rule on whether his alleged guardianship under Muslim civil practices falls within the proviso of Section 10(b) on “any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition.” It said this is a factual matter for a full-blown trial.
• The charge changed. Inman was arrested for child trafficking and violation of Section 6 (attempt to commit child prostitution). The OCP, however, found probable cause only under Section 10(b). The Court used this fact as part of its showing that he received due process.
• Several allegations were not separately discussed. The Court did not individually address his claims of physical and psychological abuse in detention, judicial bias, religious and ethnic persecution, and the removal of the children by the DSWD and CSWDO-AC. It disposed of all of them under the general finding that no unlawful State action and no linkage to respondents had been shown.
• The CA’s notarization ruling was not reviewed on its merits. Footnote 26 states that the CA Resolution dismissing the first petition is not part of the records. The Court never passed on whether the CA correctly dismissed the petition for lack of a notarized verification.
• A possible defect the Court did not cite. The quoted Rule 45, Section 4(a) states that the petition should be filed “without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof.” The Appeal’s caption named Presiding Judge Buan-Factora as a respondent. The Court did not cite this as a defect.
• A separate concurring opinion exists. Senior Associate Justice Leonen wrote one, but it is not part of the text provided, so it is not digested here.

Bar takeaways

• Amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats of these. It is not a remedy against an ordinary criminal prosecution.
• Once a criminal case is filed, seek amparo reliefs by motion in that criminal case (Sec. 22). A separate petition is barred.
• Memorize the four elements of enforced disappearance. Elements (c), refusal to disclose whereabouts, and (d), intent to remove from the protection of the law, are usually the decisive ones.
• Prima facie evidence is needed for the writ; substantial evidence is needed for the privilege.
• The hierarchy of courts applies to amparo petitions.
• Filing a Rule 45 appeal and a new amparo petition at the same time is forum shopping, and both are dismissible.
• A Rule 45 petition must state material dates, attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed judgment, and carry a sworn certification against forum shopping (Sec. 4). Failure to comply is a ground for dismissal (Sec. 5).