July 7, 2019 – Leo Rey Removed as VTI President
The VTI Board of Directors (BOD), dominated by the Yanson 4, voted to remove Leo Rey as president, designating Roy V. Yanson as the new president. The Yanson 4 subsequently took control of the head office and transferred 55 VTI buses to Ricardo’s company compound (Dynamic Builders).
July 12, 2019 – Intra-Corporate Case Filed (Leo Rey)
Leo Rey filed Commercial Case No. 19-118 with the RTC, seeking to nullify the July 7, 2019 board meeting.
August 9, 2019 – Buses Retrieved
Leo Rey’s faction successfully retrieved the 55 buses from the Dynamic Builders compound.
August 19, 2019 – Special Stockholders’ Meeting Held
Leo Rey’s faction held an SSM where he was re-elected as president. The Yanson 4 later filed Commercial Case No. 19-122 to nullify this meeting.
August 29, 2019 – Criminal Complaint Filed
Nixon Banibane, authorized by the Leo Rey faction, filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Ricardo and others for carnapping, grave coercion, and violation of the Public Service Act before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP).
March 4, 2020 – OCP Finds Probable Cause (Carnapping)
The OCP found probable cause against Ricardo and recommended the filing of Informations for multiple counts of carnapping.
March 7, 2020 – Ricardo Flees the Philippines
Ricardo executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) for his lawyers (FNS) and left the Philippines, remaining outside Philippine jurisdiction ever since.
June 5, 2020 – Warrant of Arrest Issued (Carnapping)
A warrant of arrest was issued against Ricardo for the carnapping charges.
June 9, 2020 – Informations Filed (Grave Coercion/PSA)
Informations were formally filed in court against Ricardo for Grave Coercion (Criminal Case No. 20-07-34724) and Violation of the Public Service Act.
July 23, 2020 – MTCC Grants Temporary Suspension
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found probable cause for Grave Coercion and issued a warrant of arrest, but temporarily suspended its enforcement for 60 days to allow Ricardo to pursue an appeal with the Department of Justice.
August 6, 2020 – MTCC Orders Warrant Implementation
The MTCC ordered the immediate implementation of the warrant of arrest against Ricardo.
November 28, 2020 – Petition for Certiorari Filed (RTC)
Ricardo (through FNS) filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), arguing that the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion by refusing to suspend the criminal case due to a prejudicial question arising from the unresolved intra-corporate disputes.
March 1, 2021 – RTC Grants Case Suspension
The RTC GRANTED Ricardo’s petition, ruling that a prejudicial question existed. It annulled the MTCC orders and ordered the Grave Coercion case to be held in abeyance pending the resolution of the commercial cases.
November 25, 2025 – SC Ruling
The SC GRANTED the Petition of VTI/Nixon and REVERSED and SET ASIDE the RTC Orders. The Court ruled that no prejudicial question existed, as the issue of who the legitimate VTI officers were is irrelevant to the elements of Grave Coercion (which is a public crime).
The Supreme Court ruled that Ricardo is a Fugitive from Justice (having fled after an Information was filed and a warrant was issued for a related crime) and expressly adopted the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine in the Philippines. The Court held that a fugitive loses his standing in court and cannot seek judicial relief. The case was remanded to the MTCC to revive the criminal case and, if warranted by the continued absence of Ricardo, declare him a fugitive from justice.
Vallacar Transit, Inc. and Nixon Banibane v. Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr.
G.R. No. 259337, November 25, 2025
EN BANC
Gaerlan, J.
DOCTRINE:
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is adopted and practiced in the Philippines, finding basis in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence, and an accused who is a fugitive from justice loses their standing in court and is disentitled from seeking any judicial relief, as the court’s jurisdiction over their person is not acquired merely by filing a pleading but requires custody either by arrest or voluntary surrender, especially when the accused flees with knowledge that an Information has been filed and a warrant of arrest is issued.
FACTS:
The case arose from an intra-corporate dispute within Vallacar Transit, Inc. (VTI) between two factions of the Yanson family: one led by Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. (Ricardo) and his siblings (Yanson 4), and the other led by Leo Rey V. Yanson. Following a change in VTI’s leadership in July 2019, the Yanson 4 took control of the head office, and 55 VTI buses were transferred to the compound of Dynamic Builders, owned by Ricardo. While intra-corporate cases were pending to resolve the validity of the change in leadership, Leo Rey’s faction eventually retrieved the buses in August 2019. Nixon A. Banibane, on behalf of VTI (as authorized by the Leo Rey faction after a special stockholders’ meeting), subsequently filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Ricardo and his siblings for various crimes, including carnapping and grave coercion, before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Bacolod City.
The OCP found probable cause, and Informations for carnapping, grave coercion, and violation of the Public Service Act were filed against Ricardo. Ricardo, through his counsel, was furnished with the OCP Resolution finding probable cause for carnapping on March 4, 2020. On March 7, 2020, before the warrants of arrest were issued, Ricardo left the Philippines and has since failed to return. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. Ricardo, through his counsel, filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice and an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) for the grave coercion case, arguing that the pending intra-corporate cases posed a prejudicial question. The MTCC denied the suspension and ordered the release of the warrant, prompting Ricardo to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC granted the Petition for Certiorari, ruling that a prejudicial question existed due to the intra-corporate dispute questioning Nixon’s authority to sue on VTI’s behalf, and consequently annulled the MTCC Orders and held the criminal proceedings in abeyance.
ISSUE(S):
1. Does the intra-corporate dispute pending before the commercial courts pose a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for grave coercion against Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr.?
2. Does Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. lose his standing in court and his right to seek affirmative judicial relief by being a fugitive from justice?
RULING:
1. NO. Rule 111, Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure discuss the concept of prejudicial questions, to wit:
Section 6. Suspension by Reason of Prejudicial Question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in court for trial, and shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In People v. Arambulo, the Court elucidated that:
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.⁶⁴ (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, in Alsons Development and Investment Corporation v. Heirs of Confesor, the Court expounded that the rationale behind the doctrine of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions from different tribunals.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court rules that there exists no prejudicial question between the grave coercion case and the intra-corporate dispute cases. To be sure, in numerous cases, the Court has declared that the resolution in an intra-corporate dispute may be determinative of the guilt or innocence of an accused in a criminal case.
Here, the question of who the legitimate members of VTI’s BOD are does not have any relation to the grave coercion case. The intra-corporate dispute cases do not relate to any of the elements of the crime of grave coercion. Under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave coercion is committed when “any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.”
Evidently, the determination of who the legitimate officers of VTI does not relate at all to any of the elements of the crime of grave coercion. This means that the criminal case could proceed independently of the intra-corporate dispute cases, as the resolution in the latter would not have any significant impact on the criminal case. The elements of the crime of grave coercion could still be proved and established even without awaiting the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute cases.
Meanwhile, with respect to doubts as to Nixon’s authority to file the criminal case, on behalf of VTI, the Court finds the same immaterial because the crime of grave coercion, being a public crime, may be filed and prosecuted de oficio. As held in Francisco, Jr. v. People, except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the institution of a criminal action.
2. YES. While the Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao allows Ricardo’s case to proceed because he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the courts upon his filing of his Motion to Suspend Proceedings through FNS, the Court is convinced that once any judgment is rendered, there is no assurance or guarantee that the same would be enforceable against Ricardo, being a fugitive from justice. This means that the very concept of criminal jurisdiction is negated and rendered nugatory.
The Court finds it imperative to carve out an exception to the pronouncements in Miranda when the criminal case involves fugitives from justice. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused, who is a fugitive from justice, would not be acquired by the courts simply by the filing of any pleading or by participating in the case through his or her lawyers. Custody over their persons, either by their arrest or voluntary surrender, must first be secured before a case against them may proceed.
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine finds its statutory basis in Title 28, Section 2466 of the United States Code, and while the Court has not used the term “fugitive disentitlement doctrine” in this jurisdiction, both the Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize its application in the Philippine context. For an accused, due process rights include, among others, the right to a fair and impartial trial and to present evidence in his or her defense. On the other hand, for the State, due process rights pertain to a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict. Indubitably, this right of the State is curtailed if an accused can flout the law and mock it by becoming a fugitive from justice.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC.
and NIXON BANIBANE
v.
RICARDO V. YANSON, JR.
[ G.R. No. 259337, November 25, 2025 ]
DECISION
GAERLAN, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated September 23, 2021 filed by petitioners Vallacar Transit, Inc. (VTI) and Nixon A. Banibane (Nixon), assailing the Orders dated March 1, 20212 and August 12, 2021³ of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 20-15564. The RTC granted respondent Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr.’s (Ricardo) Petition for Certiorari4 and held in abeyance Criminal Case No. 20-07-34724, titled “People of the Philippines v. Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr.“5
The Antecedents
The case arose from an intra-corporate dispute involving a family corporation, VTI. One faction consists of respondent Ricardo, together with his siblings Roy V. Yanson (Roy), Ma. Lourdes Celina Yanson-Lopez (Celina), and Emily V. Yanson (Emily; the Yanson 4). Meanwhile, the other faction is led by their youngest brother, Leo Rey V. Yanson (Leo Rey), with their sister, Ginnette Y. Dumancas (Ginnette). Their mother, Olivia V. Yanson, took the side of Leo Rey and Ginnette.6
As shown in VTI’s General Information Sheet (GIS) for 2018, the Board of Directors (BOD) of VTI was as follows:
Name of Member of BOD
Position
Leo Rey V. Yanson
President
Roy V. Yanson
N/A
Emily V. Yanson
Corporate Secretary
Ginnette Y. Dumancas
N/A
Ma. Lourdes Celina Y. Lopez
Treasurer
Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr.
N/A
Engr. Alfredo O. Ligo
VP for Operations
Joemarie Bermillo
VP for Finance
Hernan B. Omecillo
VP for Admin
Atty. Collin Derk Y. Isidto
VP for Legal
Danny O. Lorenton
VP for Maintenance7
Notably, sometime in June 2019, there were reports of millions of unexplained and unliquidated company expenses and cash withdrawals. Thus, a letter was sent to Leo Rey – then President of VTI – asking him to explain such cash withdrawals. However, because Leo Rey refused to explain and account for these cash withdrawals, the BOD resolved and voted to remove Leo Rey as president during the Special Board Meeting conducted on July 7, 2019, on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Roy was then designated as the new VTI president.8
The change in leadership is shown in VTI’s GIS for 2019:
Name of Member of BOD
Position
Roy V. Yanson
President
Emily V. Yanson
Corporate Secretary
Ginnette Y. Dumancas
N/A
Ma. Lourdes Celina Y. Lopez
Treasurer
Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr.
VP for Maintenance
Leo Rey V. Yanson
N/A
Jose Jonathan N. Ealdama
VP for Legal9
After the Special Board Meeting on July 7, 2019, the Yanson 4 visited VTI’s Head Office located in Barangay Mansilingan, Bacolod City, and took possession and control of the same. At this time, some 55 buses of VTI were transferred to the compound of Dynamic Builders and Construction (Dynamic), owned by Ricardo, and located at Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City.10
On July 12, 2019, Leo Rey filed an intra-corporate case11 against the Yanson 4, asking for the nullification of the July 7, 2019 Special Board Meeting, and praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI). The said case, titled “Leo Rey V. Yanson v. Roy V. Yanson [et al.],” and docketed as Commercial Case No. 19-118, was raffled to Branch 53 of the RTC of Bacolod City. Notably, Leo Rey’s prayer for injunctive relief was denied by the RTC, and to date, no injunctive writ or restraining order has been issued enjoining the Yanson 4 from carrying out their duties and functions as members of VTI’s BOD. Moreover, it must be emphasized that such case is still pending before Branch 53 of the RTC of Bacolod City.¹²
From August 6 to 9, 2019 – while the intra-corporate case was still pending and had not yet been resolved – Leo Rey and his faction attempted to recover the buses from the compound of Dynamic. Finally, on August 9, 2019, Leo Rey and his faction were able to successfully retrieve the 55 buses from the compound of Dynamic, with the help of law enforcement personnel.¹³
Interestingly, a few days after, or on August 19, 2019, a Special Stockholders’ Meeting (SSM) was conducted, where Leo Rey was re-elected as VTI’s president. The Yanson 4 refused to attend the SSM and sent their written objections thereto. The Yanson 4, likewise, filed a Petition¹⁴ for the nullification of the August 19, 2019 SSM. The said case titled “Roy V. Yanson [et al.] v. Leo Rey V. Yanson” and docketed as Commercial Case No. 19-122 was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC of Bacolod City.¹⁵
Following the SSM, Leo Rey and his faction issued a Secretary’s Certificate¹⁶ dated August 28, 2019, authorizing certain people, including Nixon, to file criminal actions against the Yanson 4. Thus, on August 29, 2019, Nixon, on behalf of VTI, filed a Complaint-Affidavit¹⁷ against the Yanson 4 and their children for: (1) carnapping; (2) violation of the Public Service Act; and (3) grave coercion, because of the supposed unlawful taking of VTI’s 55 buses. The Complaint-Affidavit was filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Bacolod and docketed as NPS Docket No. VI-03-INV-19H-0668.¹⁸
Thereafter, the Yanson 4 filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss¹⁹, arguing that: (1) Nixon has no authority from the BOD (supposedly the BOD led by the Yanson 4, as evinced by the 2019 GIS of VTI) to institute a criminal complaint on behalf of VTI; (2) the elements of the crimes charged are not present; (3) there is no probable cause to indict the Yanson 4; and (4) the pending intra-corporate cases justify, at the very least, the suspension of the preliminary investigation proceedings.²⁰
In a Resolution²¹ dated March 4, 2020, the OCP of Bacolod City found probable cause against Ricardo, and recommended the filing of Informations against him for four counts of carnapping and one count of grave coercion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned found probable cause for violation of Republic Act No. 10883 otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016 (4 counts) against respondents Emily V. Yanson, Ma. Lourdes Celina Y. Lopez, Roy V. Yanson, Ricardo V. Yanson, Jerica Leanne Y. Ramos, Jerina Louise Y. Ramos, and Ma. Judy Alcala, Ma. Lourdes Celina Y. Lopez, PB/Gen. Noli A. Romana and P/Col. Jomil John S. Tria. The corresponding Information for four (4) counts of carnapping and information for grave coercion will be filed in the proper court of Bacolod City.²²
Notably, such Resolution was furnished, not only to the Yanson 4, including Ricardo, but also to Fortun Narvasa & Salazar (FNS), their counsel of record.²³
Thus, as early as March 4, 2020, Informations²⁴ were already filed against Ricardo for carnapping, and on June 5, 2020 a Warrant of Arrest²⁵ was issued against him.
Meanwhile, for the crime of Grave Coercion, an Information²⁶ was filed against Ricardo on June 9, 2020. The Information for Grave Coercion reads:
That on or about 08 to 09 August 2019 in Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, President of Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phils.) and having general supervision, control and management of the day to day affairs of the said corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prevented and failed to release or turn-over the fifty-five (55) buses parked inside the premises of the corporation to Vallacar Transit, Inc. or its duly authorized representatives when demand was made upon him, thereby depriving or preventing the latter of its gainful and lawful use of the same from 08 August to 09 August 2019 by means of blocking the main gate of the said premises with two (2) dump trucks, said accused in doing so, has no lawful right whatsoever or authority of law and justifiable cause.
CONTRARY TO LAW.²⁷
On the same date, an Information²⁸ was also filed against Ricardo for violation of the Public Service Act.
On July 2, 2020, Ricardo – through FNS – filed a Petition for Review²⁹ before the Department of Justice to assail the finding of probable cause against him. Likewise, Ricardo – again through FNS – filed an Urgent Motion [With Alternative Prayer to Suspend Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Arrest Warrant].³⁰
On July 20, 2020, the Information for grave coercion was raffled to Branch 7 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, and the case titled “People of the Philippines v. Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr.” was docketed as Criminal Case No. 20-07-34724. Thereafter, on July 23, 2020, the MTCC issued its Order³¹, finding probable cause against Ricardo, but at the same time, granting Ricardo’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings, to wit:
Wherefore, all premises considered, this Court hereby finds that probable cause exists and there is a necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody as not to frustrate the ends of justice. Consequently, let a warrant of arrest be issued against the accused, Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr.
However, in view of the Urgent Motion (with Alternative Prayer to Suspend Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Arrest Warrant), the release and enforcement of the warrant of arrest to the legal authorities is hereby suspended for a period of 60 days from the date of filing of the Petition for Review on July 2, 2020 with the Secretary of Justice, pursuant to Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Accordingly, set this case tentatively for arraignment and pre-trial proper, after the lapse of the 60-day period of suspension, on September 25, 2020.
SO ORDERED.³² (Emphasis in the original, underscoring omitted)
On August 5, 2020, the MTCC issued an Addendum (to the Order dated July 23, 2020)³³, where it explained, among others, that: (1) no prejudicial question exists despite the pendency of the intra-corporate dispute cases between the parties; and (2) it is irrelevant whether Nixon did or did not have authority to file the criminal case on behalf of VTI because the crime of grave coercion, being a crime against security and a public crime, does not require a complaint filed by the offended party. As such, the MTCC held that the Information filed by the OCP of Bacolod City was sufficient.³⁴
The next day, the MTCC issued another Order³⁵, directing the release and immediate implementation of the warrant of arrest against Ricardo.
The warrant of arrest against Ricardo, however, was not served. Apparently, on March 7, 2020 – after the Resolution of the OCP of Bacolod City found probable cause against him for carnapping was issued, but before the Resolutions of the OCP of Bacolod City finding probable cause for the crime of grave coercion and violation of the Public Service Act were issued – Ricardo left the Philippines, per the Bureau of Immigration.³⁶ It was also discovered that, on the same date, Ricardo executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)³⁷, authorizing Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun (Atty. Fortun) and/or Atty. Sheila C. Sison, and the law firm FNS to represent him in any and all proceedings before any court in the Philippines.
Notably, Ricardo, through FNS, moved for reconsideration of the MTCC’s dispositions, arguing in the main that there exists a prejudicial question. However, in its Orders dated August 17, 2020³⁸ and August 27, 2020³⁹, the MTCC held, among others, that the criminal proceedings cannot be suspended because there is no prejudicial question despite the pendency of the intra-corporate dispute cases between the parties.
Thus, on November 28, 2020, Ricardo, through FNS, filed a Petition for Certiorari [With Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction]⁴⁰ before the RTC, primarily contending that the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the fact that there exists a prejudicial question posed by the intra-corporate dispute cases, which justifies, at the very least, the suspension of the criminal action against him.⁴¹
In response, Nixon, on behalf of VTI, filed a Comment and/or Opposition (Re: Petition for Certiorari dated November 28, 2020)⁴² dated January 14, 2021, alleging, among others, that: (1) the Petition for Certiorari is fatally defective because it was not Ricardo himself who verified the same; (2) as a fugitive from justice, Ricardo and his counsel have no standing before the court; and (3) the MTCC correctly ruled that there is no prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings.⁴³ Likewise, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed its Comment⁴⁴, mainly contending that Ricardo is not entitled to the suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question.⁴⁵ The OSG, likewise, highlighted that crimes are offenses against the state and prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. Thus, whether Nixon had authority to file the criminal case on behalf of VTI was immaterial as Ricardo could still be found guilty of the crime of grave coercion on the basis of the valid Information filed by the OCP of Bacolod City.⁴⁶
In the meantime, on February 15, 2021, the date set for Ricardo’s arraignment for the case of grave coercion, the MTCC noted that Ricardo did not appear. However, the MTCC also noted the presence of FNS, his counsel. Considering the absence of Ricardo on the date of his arraignment, the MTCC issued an Order⁴⁷ dated February 15, 2021, ordering that the case be archived as six months have already elapsed from the date of the Philippine National Police’s receipt of the warrant of arrest without it having been served.⁴⁸
Thereafter, on March 1, 2021, the RTC, in resolving Ricardo’s Petition for Certiorari [With Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction], rendered the first assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. the assailed Orders issued by the respondent judge, i.e., Orders dated July 23, 2020, August 5, 2020, August 6, 2020, August 17, 2020 and August 27, 2020 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 20-07-34724, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. for [g]rave [c]oercion, is held in abeyance pending resolution of the pending prejudicial question before the commercial court.
SO ORDERED.⁴⁹ (Emphasis in the original)
In granting Ricardo’s Petition for Certiorari, the RTC ruled that: first, the Verification attached to the Petition for Certiorari is compliant with Rule 7, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC,⁵⁰ considering that the SPA executed by Ricardo, among others, authorizes FNS and Atty. Fortun to represent him in any proceedings, and to commence any appeal or action before the courts;⁵¹ second, the contention with respect to fugitives from justice, specifically the “fugitive disentitlement principle” has no basis in fact and law;⁵² and third, the intra-corporate dispute cases pose a prejudicial question, considering that Nixon’s authority to file a criminal case on behalf of VTI remains questionable.⁵³
Both Nixon, on behalf of VTI, and the OSG moved for reconsideration.⁵⁴ However, in the second assailed Order, the RTC denied the same.⁵⁵ Thus, Nixon, on behalf of VTI, was constrained to file the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, arguing that: (1) the RTC committed grave error when it denied the contention that Ricardo, being a fugitive from justice, had lost his standing before the court; (2) the ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao,⁵⁶ which differentiates “custody of the law” and “jurisdiction over the person” in criminal cases has no basis in law, is repugnant to the equal protection clause, violates the State and the People of the Philippines’ right to due process, and constitutes judicial legislation; (3) the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is void as it was signed by Atty. Fortun, and not Ricardo; and (4) there is no prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action against Ricardo.⁵⁷
On August 11, 2022, Ricardo, through FNS, filed his Comment⁵⁸, praying for the dismissal of the Petition for Review on Certiorari, based on the following grounds: (1) it raises questions of fact;⁵⁹ (2) the “fugitive disentitlement principle” espoused in the Petition for Review on Certiorari does not have any legal foundation in the Philippines, and is repugnant to the constitutional right to be presumed innocent and to due process of law;⁶⁰ (3) judicial precedents must be respected, and there is no cogent reason to overturn Miranda;⁶¹ and (4) a prejudicial question exists that justifies the suspension of the grave coercion case.⁶²
Issues
The primordial issue to be resolved in this case is whether fugitives from justice lose their standing in court. Nevertheless, for the complete disposition of the case, the Court is, likewise, tasked to resolve whether there exists a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal case of grave coercion against Ricardo.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition for Review on Certiorari is meritorious.
Prejudicial Question
To recount, Ricardo, through FNS, argued that the RTC correctly held that the criminal case of grave coercion must be suspended because of the presence of a prejudicial question. In particular, Ricardo, through FNS, averred that the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute cases will necessarily determine his guilt or innocence in the grave coercion case. Notably, the RTC was persuaded by these contentions and resolved to hold in abeyance the criminal proceedings against Ricardo.
Rule 111, Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure discuss the concept of prejudicial questions, to wit:
Section 6. Suspension by Reason of Prejudicial Question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in court for trial, and shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In People v. Arambulo,⁶³ the Court elucidated that:
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.⁶⁴ (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, in Alsons Development and Investment Corporation v. Heirs of Confesor,65 the Court expounded that the rationale behind the doctrine of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions from different tribunals.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court rules that there exists no prejudicial question between the grave coercion case and the intra-corporate dispute cases.
To be sure, in numerous cases, the Court has declared that the resolution in an intra-corporate dispute may be determinative of the guilt or innocence of an accused in a criminal case.
In Omictin v. Court of Appeals,66 Vincent Omictin (Omictin) filed an estafa case against Saag Phils., Inc.’s former President George Lagos (Lagos), for his refusal to return two company vehicles, despite repeated demands. Lagos filed a motion to suspend proceedings in view of the pendency of an intra-corporate dispute involving the parties. Apparently, there were issues regarding the validity of Omictin’s appointment as Saag Phils., Inc.’s Operations Manager.
In finding for Lagos, the Court ruled that the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or innocence of Lagos in the crime of estafa because one of the elements of estafa is that the offended party made a demand to the offender. The Court then observed that the offended party in the case is the corporation, Saag Phils., Inc.; as such, the validity of the demand for the delivery of the two company vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such demand on behalf of the corporation. Considering that Lagos precisely questioned Omictin’s appointment as one of the corporation’s officers in the intra-corporate dispute, and if it is later found that Omictin’s authority is defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, and the case for estafa could not prosper. Thus, the Court held that there exists a prejudicial question because the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute is determinative of whether the criminal proceeding may proceed.
Similarly, in JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. v. Liclican,67 the Court found that the intra-corporate dispute, which was filed for the nullification of the corporation’s election of directors and officers, is a prejudicial question to the qualified theft case filed against Cecilia Liclican (Liclican).
Nevertheless, the Court finds that these cases are inapplicable to the case at bar. The Omictin case involves a case of estafa with abuse of confidence, where it is necessary to determine the legitimate members of the BOD as one of the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence requires that a demand must be made by the offended party upon the offender. If the offended party is a corporation – the demand must be made by persons who are duly authorized to act on its behalf. As such, the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute case therein will necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused because an element of the crime of estafa will be absent if it is resolved that demand was made not by the legitimate members of Saag Phils., Inc.’s BOD. Meanwhile, the JM Dominguez case pertains to a qualified theft case, where grave abuse of confidence is one of the elements. The Court was, thus, tasked to resolve whether the accused used their position in the corporation to withdraw and disburse corporate funds even if they no longer had authority to do so. Moreover, the determination of who the lawful officers of the corporation are would ascertain whether Liclican had stolen company property, or whether she was merely performing her duties as part of the corporation’s BOD. Invariably, the intra-corporate dispute case in the JM Dominguez case posed a prejudicial question to the qualified theft case.
Here, the question of who the legitimate members of VTI’s BOD are does not have any relation to the grave coercion case. The intra-corporate dispute cases do not relate to any of the elements of the crime of grave coercion.
Under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave coercion is committed when “any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.” Thus, to convict an accused for grave coercion, the following elements must be present: (1) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; (2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or intimidation; and (3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.⁶⁸
Evidently, the determination of who the legitimate officers of VTI does not relate at all to any of the elements of the crime of grave coercion. This means that the criminal case could proceed independently of the intra-corporate dispute cases, as the resolution in the latter would not have any significant impact on the criminal case. The elements of the crime of grave coercion could still be proved and established even without awaiting the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute cases. In other words, the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute cases would not effectively determine Ricardo’s guilt or innocence in the grave coercion case.
On this note, it bears emphasis that the Court’s Second Division rendered a Resolution dated April 15, 2024 in the case titled “Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. v. People of the Philippines and Nixon A. Banibane,” docketed as G.R. No. 271961, ruling that there is no prejudicial question between the intra-corporate dispute cases and the criminal cases against Ricardo. In the said case, which is similar to the case at bar, the Court’s Second Division affirmed the CA’s holding that the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute cases is not determinative of Ricardo’s guilt or innocence. Significantly, the crime charged in the said case, likewise, involves Ricardo’s act of refusing to release the 55 buses from the compound of Dynamic.
Meanwhile, with respect to doubts as to Nixon’s authority to file the criminal case, on behalf of VTI, the Court finds the same immaterial because the crime of grave coercion, being a public crime, may be filed and prosecuted de oficio. As held in Francisco, Jr. v. People:69
Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness, a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for the institution of a criminal action. The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is sufficient.
A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be filed by the “offended party” but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense subject thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio.70 (Citations omitted)
Again, in Montelibano v. Yap,71 the Court declared that:
[I]n criminal cases, the offended party is the State, and “the purpose of the criminal action is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the State with his crime…. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state.” As such, the Rules dictate that criminal actions are to be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Clearly, the discretion on who to present as witnesses is vested with the public prosecutor, and no authority from the private complainant is required.72 (Citations omitted)
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds that no prejudicial question exists here. Thus, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the suspension of the criminal case of grave coercion against Ricardo.
Custody of the Law v. Jurisdiction Over the
Person in Criminal Cases
The Court shall now discuss the crux of the controversy to guide the bench and the bar in cases where the delineation between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person is invoked.
In the seminal case of Valdepeñas v. People,73 the Court explained that jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired, either upon his or her apprehension, with or without a warrant, or his or her submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, there are two ways in which jurisdiction over the person of an accused may be had: (1) when the accused is apprehended or arrested, and custody over their person is acquired; or (2) when the accused voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court.⁷⁴
In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez,75 the Court explained that voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court may either be through pleading to the merits of the case, or by filing bail, which requires that custody over the person of the accused is first acquired:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.76 (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, in Miranda v. Tuliao,77 the Court further clarified how jurisdiction is acquired over the person of an accused, and discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person of an accused:
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we held that “[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.'” The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.78 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Such distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person as exhaustively laid out in Miranda had been reiterated by the Court in several cases. In Padua v. People,79 the Court expressly held that:
Indeed, a person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. However, applying also the same pronouncement in Tuliao, the Court also held therein that, “in adjudication of other reliefs sought by accused, it requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the person.” Thus, except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.80 (Citation omitted)
Likewise, in Sen. De Lima v. Judge Guerrero,81 the Court emphasized that based on Miranda, an accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law. Moreover, in Alawiya v. Court of Appeals,82 the Court declared that:
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.⁸³ (Citations omitted)
Similar pronouncements have also been made by the Court in Jimenez v. Judge Sorongon,84 where the Court held that: “[f]iling pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court,”⁸⁵ and in David v. Agbay,86 where the Court affirmed that “custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.”87
From these judicial precepts, it is clear that the Court made a distinction on when custody of an accused is required, and how criminal proceedings may progress even if an accused is not under the custody of the court. In particular, these cases declared that custody of the law is required for the court to act upon applications for bail. However, custody of the law is not necessary for the court to adjudicate other reliefs sought by an accused because the same constitutes as a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction. In other words, save for some special cases, jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired once affirmative relief is sought, even if custody over the person of the accused is not secured. The rationale for this distinction is explained in Miranda in this wise:
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.88 (Citation omitted)
Applying the standards set forth in Miranda and the succeeding cases, it is evident that once an accused participates in the case and asks for affirmative relief, such accused is deemed to have submitted himself or herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Even if the accused is not physically under the custody of the court, the court may proceed to adjudicate and grant or deny the reliefs sought.
In fact, under the rules, there are only a number of specific instances when the physical presence of an accused is required. First, as discussed above, the physical presence of an accused is required for the courts to act on applications for bail. Second, even if out on bail, the presence of an accused is required when specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification.89 Third, the accused must personally appear during his or her arraignment.90 Fourth, the accused must be present during the promulgation of judgment.91
In this case, it must be underscored that Ricardo has never been physically present before the courts, even on the date set for his arraignment in the case for grave coercion. The courts have never acquired custody over his person. To recall, it is undisputed that Ricardo has left the Philippines and is only represented by FNS in the criminal proceedings. Custody over Ricardo’s person has never been secured, but by virtue of the Court’s ruling in Miranda, Ricardo is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the courts upon his filing of his Motion to Suspend Proceedings through FNS and is allowed to participate in the criminal proceedings.
The Court, thus, acknowledges that Miranda has allowed those who have not been under the custody of the courts, such as Ricardo, to seek affirmative relief in criminal cases while they willfully evade arrest. This being said, a more crucial question still remains – whether Ricardo should be allowed to continue seeking affirmative relief before the courts despite his apparent flight from the Philippines and evident intent to evade arrest and criminal prosecution.
The Court answers in the negative.
Criminal jurisdiction is the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose punishment for it.92 “A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.”93 Jurisdiction of the courts is, therefore, required to ensure that the court’s judgment would be enforceable. Clearly, this will not be met if an accused, who was allowed to participate in the case and ask for affirmative relief, is a fugitive or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine courts, such as in this case.
While the Court’s ruling in Miranda allows Ricardo’s case to proceed, the Court is convinced that once any judgment is rendered, there is no assurance or guarantee that the same would be enforceable against Ricardo, being a fugitive from justice. This means that the very concept of criminal jurisdiction is negated and rendered nugatory.
Thus, the Court finds it imperative to carve out an exception to the pronouncements in Miranda when the criminal case involves fugitives from justice. As will be further explained below, jurisdiction over the person of an accused, who is a fugitive from justice, would not be acquired by the courts simply by the filing of any pleading or by participating in the case through his or her lawyers. Custody over their persons, either by their arrest or voluntary surrender, must first be secured before a case against them may proceed.
Fugitives From Justice
A fugitive from justice is a person who attempts to evade law enforcement by fleeing the jurisdiction.94 Significantly, in Marquez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,95 the Court defined a fugitive from justice as one who not only flees after conviction to avoid punishment, but also includes those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Moreover, in Labao, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,96 citing Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections,97 the Court explained what constitutes a fugitive from justice:
Based on settled jurisprudence, the term “fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” In Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, this Court held that:
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.98 (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring in the original)
While an analysis of jurisprudence reveals a variance of who could be considered a fugitive from justice, it is undeniable that the common and indispensable element is the intent to evade prosecution or punishment.
With this in mind, the Court finds that Ricardo should be considered a fugitive from justice.
To recount, as early as August 2019, Ricardo was aware that Complaints for: (1) carnapping; (2) violation of the Public Service Act; and (3) grave coercion were filed against the Yanson 4, before the OCP of Bacolod City in connection with the taking of the 55 VTI buses to Dynamic. Moreover, Ricardo was aware that on March 4, 2020, Informations were already filed against him for the crime of carnapping, as he himself and his counsel, were furnished with copies of the OCP of Bacolod City’s Resolution finding probable cause against him.
Notably, after the issuance of the OCP of Bacolod City’s Resolution in the carnapping case, and while the grave coercion and the violation of the Public Service Act case were still under investigation, Ricardo executed an SPA in favor of FNS, authorizing his lawyers to act on his behalf in all civil, criminal and administrative matters in connection with all the companies of the Yanson family. On the same day, Ricardo and his siblings left the Philippines per the Bureau of Immigration, and since March 7, 2020, or for more than five years now, Ricardo and his siblings have not returned to the Philippines to face the criminal charges against them. Still, Ricardo has continually been represented by FNS in the proceedings.
While it is true that Ricardo left the Philippines before a warrant of arrest against him had been issued, it must be borne in mind that, at least for the case of carnapping or violation of Republic Act No. 10833, Informations have already been filed before he fled on March 7, 2020.
Presently, a discussion on the distinction between and “Complaint” and an “Information” is crucial, as suggested by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.
A Complaint is an accusation by an offended party, while an Information is a formal charge filed by a prosecutor after conducting preliminary investigations, revealing that the required quantum of proof has already been met to proceed with the filing of criminal charges.99 The filing of an Information in court, thus, signifies the prosecutor’s determination and finding that a crime has, indeed, been committed, and that there is enough evidence to proceed with trial.
Significantly, it must be underscored that in 2023, the Department of Justice (DOJ) changed criminal proceedings by raising the quantum of proof required during preliminary investigations before an Information could be filed in court from probable cause to the existence of a prima facia and reasonable certainty of conviction. Section 2 of DOJ Department Circular No. 20 defines prima facie evidence as follows:
Section 2. Quantum of Proof. In carrying out such role, prosecutors must ensure the existence of a prima facie case and a reasonable certainty of conviction based on available documents, witness/es, real evidence and the like. Prima facie evidence is such status of evidence which on its own and if left uncontroverted, is sufficient to establish all the elements of a crime.
Meanwhile, Section 2 of DOJ Department Circular No. 16 explains when there is reasonable certainty of conviction:
Section 2. Reasonable Certainty of Conviction. There is reasonable certainty of conviction when a prima facie case exists based on the evidence-at-hand including but not limited to witnesses, documentary evidence, real evidence, and the like, and such evidence, on its own and if left uncontroverted by accused, shall be sufficient to establish all the elements of the crime or offense charged, and consequently warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Based on these guidelines, before an Information is filed in court, the prosecution must be convinced that the evidence presented and available during the preliminary investigation stage is compelling and sufficient to secure a conviction during trial.
In view of the foregoing, the totality of circumstances in this case – Ricardo’s flight, and his failure to return and surrender despite knowledge of pending criminal proceedings against him, and particularly the existence of Informations filed against him prior to his departure from the Philippines – glaringly demonstrate his desire and intent to evade law enforcement and the judicial processes.
Flight, has always been seen as an indication of guilt. “The flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be established for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence.”100
His flight and deliberate intent to evade prosecution should, thus, be taken against him, and should be considered a waiver of his right to adduce evidence and participate in the criminal case against him because a fugitive from justice loses his standing in court and is not entitled to seek relief from the courts.101 For his willful evasion of the court’s jurisdiction, Ricardo should be sanctioned, rather than rewarded.
At this juncture, a discussion of the “fugitive disentitlement doctrine,” which the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari urges the Court to apply in the instant case, is in order.
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine finds its statutory basis in Title 28, Section 2466 of the United States Code, which provides:
(a) A judicial officer may disallow a person from using the resources of the courts of the United States in furtherance of a claim in any related civil forfeiture action or a claim in third party proceedings in any related criminal forfeiture action upon a finding that such person-
(1) after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant or process has been issued for his apprehension, in order to avoid criminal prosecution-
(A) purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the United States;
(B) declines to enter or reenter the United States to submit to its jurisdiction; or
(C) otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in which a criminal case is pending against the person; and
(2) is not confined or held in custody in any other jurisdiction for commission of criminal conduct in that jurisdiction.
(b) Subsection (a) may be applied to a claim filed by a corporation if any majority shareholder, or individual filing the claim on behalf of the corporation is a person to whom subsection (a) applies.
The fugitive disentitlement doctrine originated in the United States in the 19th century. It was seen as an equitable principle of criminal appellate procedure, which contemplates the dismissal of an absconding criminal’s appeal. Absconding, therefore, was considered a betrayal of the very process the appellant invokes, and was seen to cause injury to the dignity of the judiciary. In particular, the doctrine provides that a fugitive from justice may not seek relief and is “disentitled” from the judicial system whose authority such fugitive evades. In other words, because a fugitive from justice has demonstrated such disrespect for the legal processes, he or she has no right to call upon the courts and the judicial system to adjudicate any of his or her claims.102
In the present, the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is determined by examining four key factors, namely: (1) assuring the enforceability of a decision against the fugitive; (2) not allowing a fugitive to utilize the resources of the court when he or she has flouted the judicial system; (3) discouraging escape and encouraging voluntary surrender; and (4) avoiding prejudice to the other side or the Government caused by the fugitive’s escape or extended absence.103
While the fugitive disentitlement doctrine has not been categorically applied by the Court in this jurisdiction, it is worthy to note that the same has actually been adopted and practiced in the Philippines, and finds explicit basis in both the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Specifically, Rule 124, Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
Meanwhile, in Usares v. People,104 the Court discussed the aforecited provision, thus:
The reason behind this provision is not difficult to discern. Same as one who escapes from prison or confinement, or flees to a foreign country, an accused-appellant who jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal is considered to have evaded the established judicial processes to ensure his proper criminal prosecution, and in so doing, forfeits his right to pursue an appeal. In People v. Mapalao, the Court explained that:
The reason for this rule is . . . once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement… he should not be afforded the right to appeal therefrom….. While at large as above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court.105 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original; citations omitted)
In the same vein, in De Joya v. Judge Marquez,106 the Court elucidated that those who refuse to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction should not be entitled to seek relief:
Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.107 (Emphasis supplied)
Invariably, while the Court has not used the term “fugitive disentitlement doctrine” in this jurisdiction, both the Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize its application in the Philippine context. Indeed, the present Rules of Court recognize the court’s unmistakable authority to dismiss a case upon a convicted appellant’s escape because evasion from the court’s jurisdiction effectively results in a waiver of any right to seek judicial relief as it would be the height of inequity to ask the courts to consider one’s case and rule in his or her favor while simultaneously demonstrating contempt for the court’s authority by absconding.
Thus, the Court finds it high time to also apply such mandate to those who have committed a crime or are suspected of committing a crime, and fled outside the Philippines’ jurisdiction. Adopting such mandate strengthens the justice system and due process rights, which both the accused and the State are equally entitled to.
For an accused, due process rights include, among others, the right to a fair and impartial trial and to present evidence in his or her defense. On the other hand, for the State, due process rights pertain to a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict.108 Indubitably, this right of the State is curtailed if an accused can flout the law and mock it by becoming a fugitive from justice because by fleeing and evading arrest, fugitives from justice choose to live and operate outside the jurisdiction of Philippine law. This amounts to a self-repudiation and renunciation of the court’s jurisdiction over one’s person.
Significantly, ensuring that the State has a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict is the same rationale behind the issuance of precautionary hold departure orders.
Under A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC,109 a precautionary hold departure is defined as an order commanding the Bureau of Immigration “to prevent any attempt by a person suspected of a crime to depart from the Philippines.”110 It shall be issued if, upon determination by a judge, probable cause exists and there is a high probability that the person accused of a crime will depart from the Philippines to evade arrest and prosecution against him or her.111 In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,112 the Court explained that A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC was issued precisely to prevent a person accused of committing a crime from being out of reach of the courts:
[I]t becomes more imperative for the courts to use their inherent powers to prevent miscarriage of justice. It was in response to this need that A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC was issued. Specifically, it authorizes the issuance of a precautionary HDO even prior to the filing of an information in court when justified under the circumstances. This recognizes the fact that the processes leading to the filing of a case usually take a while before they are concluded such that by the time the information is filed in court, the accused may have already left the country and is now beyond the reach of courts. This renders futile the processes taken up prior to the filing of information and stalls the administration of justice until the accused is brought to the jurisdiction of the court. The issuance of a precautionary HDO cures this predicament.113
In fact, the practical considerations of adopting the fugitive disentitlement doctrine become more apparent because of the current landscape in the Philippines.
In particular, it is well known that several personalities suspected of being engaged in illegal activities related to offshore gambling and human trafficking have fled the Philippines while investigations were being conducted against them. While anticipating possible criminal and administrative charges, these personalities left the Philippines, obviously, to be out of the Philippines’ reach. Significantly, to ensure their return, the Government of the Philippines even relied on the aid of international organizations and foreign law enforcement officials so that these personalities could face the charges against them. Securing their return is imperative because while these people remain outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines, the State cannot exercise its right to prosecute and convict.
The same is true in the case of Ricardo. The State cannot exercise its right to prosecute or convict while he remains outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines. His flight, continued absence from the Philippines, and refusal to surrender, undermine and frustrate the administration of justice. Thus, it becomes even more critical to apply and expressly adopt the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to the instant case, and to all other cases where fugitives from justice are involved.
The application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is in accordance with the Court’s inherent power as provided for in Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.114 With the four key factors in determining the applicability of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in consideration, courts of justice would be able to more effectively administer justice and uphold the very purpose of criminal jurisdiction.
In addition, the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine will also promote the equal protection of the laws.
In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,115 the Court held that statutes earlier declared as valid may nevertheless be adjudged as violative of the equal protection clause in light of its application under changed conditions:
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.116
The present situation where there is no express prohibition on fugitives from availing themselves of judicial remedies – may be reviewed for possibly violating the equal protection clause.
As revealed by the instant case, persons, such as Ricardo, had fled abroad and gone into hiding to evade and frustrate the successful implementation of warrants of arrest, especially in cases where bail is not available as a matter of right. It necessitates big financial resources and connections to evade the long arm of the law. It takes significantly more to flee to foreign jurisdictions and abuse the judicial systems by “appearing” continuously in cases and criminal proceedings through lawyers and legal representatives. Undeniably, this could only be done by those with extensive financial wealth and resources.
Indeed, while it appears that the lack of prohibition on fugitives to continuously avail of judicial remedies does not make an explicit classification, its application shows that there is a clear distinction between the rich and the poor to access to the justice system. Hence, the Court must appreciate and address the same.
For all these reasons, an accused is generally considered a fugitive from justice when the accused fails to appear physically before the court when required by law, our rules, or by order from the judge. More specifically, the person who flees from the Philippines with knowledge that an Information was filed against them in court and a warrant of arrest is issued, demonstrates a clear intent to evade arrest and prosecution, and renders such person a fugitive from justice. They may then be disentitled to any judicial relief.
As discussed above, before an Information is filed in court, the prosecution must be satisfied that the quantum of proof – currently, the existence of a prima facie case and reasonable certainty of conviction – has been met. Ensuring that this quantum of proof has been met safeguards those accused of committing a crime, and offers greater protection against unwarranted accusations. In other words, when an Information is filed, and consequently, when a warrant of arrest has been issued against the person, such person cannot readily claim that the accusation against them is baseless or a mere fabrication. At this point in time, there is enough evidence against them that leads to a well-founded belief that they would be convicted during trial.
Thus, for purposes of determining the status of an individual as a fugitive from justice, the starting point shall be the filing of an Information in court, and the issuance of a warrant of arrest. However, it is of vital importance that such person has knowledge that an Information against him has already been filed, or that a warrant of arrest has been issued. This knowledge may be established through: (1) actual notice, such as personal receipt of a copy of the Information; or (2) constructive notice, such as when there are clear, public, and documented efforts by law enforcement to serve legal process, even if personal service was evaded or unsuccessful.
Relevantly, as suggested by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa during the deliberations of this case, before declaring an individual as a fugitive from justice, the following procedure should be observed by the court where the Information is filed:
1. After finding probable cause, the court shall issue a warrant of arrest.
2. The warrant of arrest, including an e-warrant, shall be implemented within 10 calendar days from its receipt by the executing officer.
3. If there is a failure to execute the warrant of arrest by reason that the accused is outside the Philippine jurisdiction, as stated in the executing officer’s return, the court may, either by motion or motu proprio, and after assessment of the circumstances of the case, declare the accused a fugitive from justice. From then, such person loses their standing in court, can no longer participate in the proceedings, and cannot seek any judicial relief. They can only restore his or her standing before the court through voluntary surrender.
4. A warrant of arrest which was not served personally to the accused because they are outside the Philippine jurisdiction shall remain outstanding until its eventual implementation.
5. The criminal case shall be archived only if the accused remains at large for six months from the date of the issuance of the warrant of arrest or creation of the e-warrant, without prejudice to the revival of the case upon successful implementation of the warrant of arrest or upon notice to the court that the person subject of the warrant of arrest has been arrested or committed under a different warrant.
Based on the foregoing guidelines, the Court deems it proper to remand the case to the MTCC for the lower court to implement the Court’s guidelines and, at the same time, ensure that Ricardo is given due process and the opportunity to voluntarily surrender, prior to any declaration that he is a fugitive from justice.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated September 23, 2021 filed by petitioners Vallacar Transit, Inc. and Nixon A. Banibane is GRANTED. The Orders dated March 1, 2021 and August 12, 2021 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 in Civil Case No. 20-15564 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is remanded to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7 of Bacolod City. The lower court is directed to revive and reinstate Criminal Case No. 20-07-34724 from the archives and order the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. Pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this case, if there is a failure to execute the warrant of arrest by reason that Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. is outside the Philippine jurisdiction as stated in the executing officer’s return, the MTCC may, if the circumstances warrant, make a declaration that Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. is a fugitive from justice, and therefore, cannot seek any judicial relief from the court.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes:
¹ Rollo, pp. 3–90.
² Id. at 91–103. Penned by Presiding Judge Phoebe A. Gargantiel-Balbin of the Sixth Judicial Region, Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City.
³ Id. at 104–108.
⁴ Id. at 186–254.
⁵ Id. at 103.
⁶ Id. at 189.
⁷ Id. at 620–629.
⁸ Id. at 630–640.
⁹ Id. at 193–194.
¹⁰ Id. at 654–683.
¹¹ Id. at 194–195.
¹² Id. at 8.
¹³ Id. at 776–832.
¹⁴ Id. at 776.
¹⁵ Id. at 748.
¹⁶ Id. at 109–121.
¹⁷ Id. at 109.
¹⁸ Id. at 864–892.
¹⁹ Id. at 864–865.
²⁰ Id. at 132–149.
²¹ Id. at 147.
²² Id. at 148.
²³ Id. at 150–157.
²⁴ Id. at 158.
²⁵ Id. at 162–164.
²⁶ Id. at 162–163.
²⁷ Id. at 165–167.
²⁸ Id. at 937–984.
²⁹ Id. at 986–1009.
³⁰ Id. at 168–172. Penned by Presiding Judge Abraham A. Bayona.
³¹ Id. at 172.
³² Id. at 173–177. Penned by Presiding Judge Abraham A. Bayona.
³³ Id.
³⁴ Id. at 178–179.
³⁵ Id. at 124–126.
³⁶ Id. at 396–397.
³⁷ Id. at 180–183.
³⁸ Id. at 184–185.
³⁹ Id. at 186–254.
⁴⁰ Id. at 206–207.
⁴¹ Id. at 255–281.
⁴² Id. at 259–261.
⁴³ Id. at 283–316.
⁴⁴ Id. at 286.
⁴⁵ Id. at 301.
⁴⁶ Id. at 364.
⁴⁷ Id.
⁴⁸ Id. at 102–103.
⁴⁹ Section 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath or verified. A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign said verification. The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary’s certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the following attestations: (a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on his personal knowledge, or based on authentic documents; (b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the pleading. A pleading required to be verified that contains a verification based on “information and belief,” or upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
⁵⁰ Rollo, pp. 98–99.
⁵¹ Id. at 99–100.
⁵² Id. at 101–102.
⁵³ Id. at 317–352, 365–378.
⁵⁴ Id. at 108.
⁵⁵ 520 Phil. 907 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
⁵⁶ Rollo, pp. 15–18.
⁵⁷ Id. at 502–577.
⁵⁸ Id. at 538.
⁵⁹ Id. at 544–553.
⁶⁰ Id. at 557.
⁶¹ Id. at 561.
⁶² 760 Phil. 754 (2015) [Per J. Perez, First Division].
⁶³ Id. at 761.
⁶⁴ 840 Phil. 342 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
⁶⁵ 541 Phil. 68 (2007) [Per J. Azcuna, First Division].
⁶⁶ 765 Phil. 262 (2015) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
⁶⁷ 672 Phil. 698, 708 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
⁶⁸ 599 Phil. 80 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
⁶⁹ Id. at 89.
⁷⁰ 822 Phil. 262 (2017) [Per J. Martires, Third Division].
⁷¹ Id. at 273.
⁷² 123 Phil. 734 (1966) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
⁷³ Id. at 739.
⁷⁴ 291 Phil. 664 (1993) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
⁷⁵ Id. at 674.
⁷⁶ 520 Phil. 907 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
⁷⁷ Id. at 919–993.
⁷⁸ 846 Phil. 354 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
⁷⁹ Id. at 374–375.
⁸⁰ 819 Phil. 616 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
⁸¹ 603 Phil. 264 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
⁸² Id. at 276.
⁸³ 700 Phil. 316 (2012) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
⁸⁴ Id. at 326.
⁸⁵ 756 Phil. 278 (2015) [Per J. Villarama, Third Division].
⁸⁶ Id. at 292.
⁸⁷ Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 923 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
⁸⁸ See Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure… (text retained as provided).
⁸⁹ See Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure…
⁹⁰ See Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure…
⁹¹ Sen. De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, 819 Phil. 616, 824 (2017)…
⁹² Padua v. People, 846 Phil. 354, 374–375 (2019)…
⁹³ Fugitive from justice, Merriam-Webster Dictionary…
⁹⁴ 313 Phil. 417 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
⁹⁵ 790 Phil. 348 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
⁹⁶ 328 Phil. 624 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, En Banc].
⁹⁷ 790 Phil. 348, 364 (2016)…
⁹⁸ Sections 3 and 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
⁹⁹ People v. Medina, 788 Phil. 115, 124 (2016)…
¹⁰⁰ See Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People…
¹⁰¹ See The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine…
¹⁰² See Degen v. United States…
¹⁰³ 845 Phil. 339 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
¹⁰⁴ Id. at 345.
¹⁰⁵ 516 Phil. 717 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna, Second Division].
¹⁰⁶ Id. at 724.
¹⁰⁷ Gomez v. People, 889 Phil. 915, 980 (2020)…
¹⁰⁸ Rule on Precautionary Hold Departure Order, August 7, 2018.
¹⁰⁹ Section 1, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC.
¹¹⁰ Section 4, A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC.
¹¹¹ 842 Phil. 240 (2018) [Per J. A. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
¹¹² Id. at 271.
¹¹³ Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect…
¹¹⁴ 487 Phil. 531, 793 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
¹¹⁵ Id. at 562–563.
