The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds that petitioner must be acquitted of the crime charged. The inclusion of bladed instruments in the definition of deadly weapons in COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 is ultra vires. As such, there is no offense penalizing the carriage of bladed instruments during the 2019 election period.

Preliminarily, the Court observes that the instant appeal was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is well-established that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 appeal.^[38] In People v. Ildefonso,^[39] the Court asserted:

[I]n criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal may correct errors, though unassigned, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appellate court is vested with full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.^[40]

The warrantless arrest of and the concomitant search on petitioner is valid

In his Brief, petitioner contends that the fan knife presented as evidence is inadmissible, being the fruit of the poisonous tree. He argues that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest, thereby violating his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.^[41]

The Court disagrees.

The Constitution unequivocally safeguards every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. As a general rule, no search or seizure may be conducted without a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. This protection, enshrined in Article III, Section 2^[42] of the 1987 Constitution, serves as a bulwark against arbitrary intrusions by the State.^[43]

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view;”
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.^[44]

Among the recognized exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant is the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides for instances when a lawful arrest may be effected without a warrant:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in [their] presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and [they have] probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where [they are] serving final judgment or [are] temporarily confined while [their] case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

Notably, there are three instances when warrantless arrests may be valid. These are: (a) arrest in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which has just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final Judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of their case, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.^[45]

In particular, an in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two elements: (a) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that they have just committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.^[46]

Stated differently, an in flagrante delicto arrest requires that the apprehending officer be impelled by probable cause to effect the arrest of the person caught.^[47] Probable cause has been defined as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent [person] to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.”^[48]

Further, while it is the general rule that a warrantless arrest must precede a warrantless search, jurisprudence has qualified this principle by providing that a search that is substantially contemporaneous with an arrest may validly precede the arrest itself, provided that the police already had probable cause to effect the arrest at the outset of the search.^[49]

At this juncture, it is essential to note that petitioner was arrested at a police checkpoint. Military or police checkpoints, being variants of searching moving vehicles, are not inherently illegal, as long as they are justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted with minimal intrusion to motorists.^[50] Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles, as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints, may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the officers at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.^[51]

Thus, the critical question in this case is whether the police officers at the checkpoint had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search on petitioner.

The Court answers in the affirmative.

In People v. Vinecario,^[52] the Court held that the police had probable cause to believe that the accused-appellants were committing a crime or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of an offense, justifying the search. This finding was based on accused-appellants’ attempt to speed away upon seeing the checkpoint, their suspicious and nervous behavior when questioned, and a claim by one of them of being a Philippine Army member, apparently to deter the police from continuing the inspection.^[53]

In People v. Suico,^[54] the Court also upheld the warrantless search, on the basis that the apprehending officers had probable cause. The apprehending officers in this case were manning a checkpoint in relation to the “no plate, no travel” policy. They received information about a person on a red motorcycle carrying a backpack and a yellow sack, allegedly containing marijuana. As the motorcycle approached the checkpoint, the driver abruptly made a U-turn, fell off the motorcycle, and tried to flee. However, one of the apprehending officers was able to hold onto the backpack of the driver after he fell. The other members requested the driver to open the backpack; the driver then admitted that he was carrying marijuana. The driver then opened the backpack and the sack, which both contained marijuana. The Court concluded that there was probable cause to conduct a warrantless search under these circumstances.^[55]

Meanwhile, in Uy v. People,^[56] the Court similarly found that the police officers had probable cause to believe that the accused was involved in a crime, which justified the search. While driving a motorcycle, the accused was flagged down at a checkpoint. When asked for the motorcycle registration papers, the accused failed to present the documents, raising the police officers’ suspicion that the motorcycle might have been stolen. During the inspection, the officers noticed a plastic cellophane protruding from the tools compartment. When the accused opened the tools compartment, the officers found a small bundle of dried marijuana wrapped in transparent cellophane. The police officers then continued their search and found the same transparent cellophane in the driver’s seat. When they opened the driver’s seat, they discovered five more bundles of marijuana. Thus, the Court concluded that the officers had probable cause to conduct the warrantless search.^[57]

By reason of parity, the Court finds that the search conducted on petitioner at the checkpoint on January 30, 2019 is valid. In this case, petitioner attempted to evade the COMELEC checkpoint by ignoring the officers’ signal to stop, prompting them to pursue and apprehend him at the second barrier.^[58] Further, when petitioner was asked to produce his driver’s license and the motorcycle’s registration papers, he was unable to do so. The combination of his evasive behavior and failure to produce a driver’s license and the motorcycle’s registration documents reasonably raised the police officers’ suspicion that petitioner was engaged in, or had recently committed, an unlawful act—that he stole the motorcycle. These circumstances constituted probable cause to justify the warrantless search.

Contrary to petitioner’s allegation,^[59] the arrest was not based on any traffic violation. Rather, it was his attempt to evade the police officers at the checkpoint, coupled with his failure to present the requisite documents, that gave the officers reasonable grounds to suspect that he was engaged in unlawful activity.^[60]

At any rate, the plain view doctrine also finds application in the instant case. The CA found that petitioner’s shirt lifted while he was alighting from the motorcycle, allowing the apprehending officers to notice a fan knife tucked into his waist.^[61] Under the “plain view doctrine,” unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.^[62]

Considering the foregoing, and in the absence of any compelling reason, the Court sees no basis to disturb the factual findings of the courts below.

Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 is null and void
insofar as it includes “bladed instruments” in the list of deadly
weapons prohibited during the 2019 election period.
Accordingly, petitioner must be acquitted

Nonetheless, petitioner must be acquitted of the crime charged.

To constitute a violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 10446, in relation to Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, the following elements must be established: (1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; (2) such possession occurs during the election period; and (3) the weapon is carried in a public place.^[63]

In this case, the RTC and the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged. They found that petitioner was in possession of a deadly weapon, specifically a fan knife, during the election period without having been authorized by the COMELEC to possess or carry the same.^[64]

In order to determine petitioner’s criminal liability under COMELEC Resolution No. 10446, it is imperative to delve into the background of said Resolution and the judicial rulings relevant to this case.

On October 1, 2018, COMELEC Resolution No. 10429^[65] set the inclusive dates for the 2019 election period. It likewise enumerated the prohibited acts during this period. Pursuant thereto, for the 2019 election period, the “bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons, unless authorized in writing by the [COMELEC]”^[66] was considered a prohibited act.

On November 21, 2018, to implement Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 during the 2019 election period, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10446. Section 2(a) thereof provides:

SECTION 2. Prohibited Acts. – During the Election Period:

(a) No person shall bear, carry or transport Firearms or Deadly Weapons outside his residence or place of business, and in all public places, including any building, street, park, and in private vehicles or public conveyances, even if he is licensed or authorized to possess or to carry the same, unless authorized by the Commission, through the [Committee on the Ban on Firearms and Security Personnel], in accordance with the provisions of this Resolution[.] (Emphasis in the original)

In the same Resolution, a “deadly weapon” was defined to include bladed instruments, viz.:

1. Deadly Weapon includes bladed instruments, hand grenades or other explosives, except pyrotechnics. Provided, That, a bladed instrument is not covered by the prohibition when possession of the bladed instrument is necessary to the occupation of the possessor or when it is used as a tool for legitimate activity. (Emphasis in the original)

On September 16, 2021, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 10446, in relation to Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, for carrying a bladed weapon without COMELEC authorization during the 2019 election period.^[67]

On April 11, 2023, in Buella v. People,^[68] the Court declared that bladed instruments are excluded from the term “deadly weapon” under Rule I, Section 1(f), in relation to Rule II, Section 1(a), of COMELEC Resolution No. 10015.^[69] The Court ratiocinated in the wise:

[C]OMELEC Resolution No. 10015 expanded the coverage of the Omnibus Election Code and [Republic Act] No. 7166 by including “bladed instruments” in the list of prohibited weapons during an election period. The prohibition under the said laws extends only to regulated deadly weapons. Bladed instruments are not regulated and, thus, do not fall within the ambit of the prohibition. By including bladed instruments in the prohibition, COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 criminalizes acts not criminalized under statutory law.^[70]

In Buella, the Court held that the possession of a bladed weapon without the appropriate permit in a public place during the election period does not amount to possession of a deadly weapon.

On June 7, 2023, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC and convicted petitioner for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 10446, in relation to Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166.^[71]

The Court will now proceed with the examination of the effect of the Buella case on the instant case and the application of the Court’s ruling therein.

Under Article IX(c), Section 2(1) of the Constitution, the COMELEC is duty-bound to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.^[72] The COMELEC, through its quasi-legislative powers, has the power to issue rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may be expressly delegated to it by Congress.^[73]

However, the COMELEC’s exercise of quasi-legislative power is subject to limitations, one of which is that it must be within the ambit of legislative authority.^[74] Accordingly, the COMELEC’s authority to issue resolutions on the bearing, carrying, or transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons is necessarily confined to the scope provided by the legislative enactments it seeks to implement, particularly the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 7166.

Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

. . . .

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.

Meanwhile, Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, pertinently reads:

Section 32. Who May Bear Firearms. – During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearms licenses shall be suspended during the election period. (Emphasis in the original)

In interpreting the above provisions, the Court in Buella, held that COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 is null and void insofar as it includes bladed instruments in the definition of deadly weapons prohibited during the 2016 election period. Simply put, the Court found that the inclusion of bladed instruments as prohibited deadly weapons under Resolution No. 10015 exceeds the scope of legislative authority granted to the COMELEC under the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 7166.^[75]

The Court explained that Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates only firearms. This is evident from both the title of the section, “Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business,” and from its express terms, which solely address the regulation of firearms during the election period.^[76]

The Court further noted that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 appears, at first glance, to expand the scope of this prohibition by contemplating “other deadly weapons.” However, a careful reading of Section 32 reveals that the reference to deadly weapons is restricted by the provision itself. The title of Section 32, “Who May Bear Firearms,” restricts the use of the term “other deadly weapons” through the specific mention of firearms. Furthermore, the Court elucidated that the qualifying phrases “even if licensed to possess or carry the same” and “unless authorized in writing by the Commission” apply equally to firearms and deadly weapons.

The Court concluded in Buella that to come within the ambit of the election offense, “the deadly weapon must be: (1) one which is regulated or one for which a license is needed to possess or carry the same; and (2) one for which the COMELEC may issue an authorization to possess or carry during the election period.”^[77]

Hence, the Court held in Buella that the COMELEC exceeded the scope of legislative authority granted to it when it included bladed instruments within the term “deadly weapons.” The Court declared that bladed instruments do not fall within the purview of the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 7166, as the prohibition under these laws extends only to regulated deadly weapons. Since no license is required for the possession or carriage of bladed instruments, and the COMELEC does not issue permits for their possession or use during the election period, then bladed instruments do not fall within the ambit of the prohibition.^[78]

The Court’s declaration in Buella—that the possession of bladed instruments is not covered by the prohibition under the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 7166—must be applied to the instant case.

Similar to COMELEC Resolution No. 10015, the subject matter of the ruling in Buella, COMELEC Resolution No. 10446, under which petitioner was charged and convicted, seeks to implement Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166. Further, an examination of the pertinent provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 demonstrates that the provision defining deadly weapon is similarly worded while the provision defining prohibited acts is exactly worded the same: