Our Ruling

The Petition must fail.

Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is “the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon.”⁵⁸ Thus, it shall stand as the formidable guardian of the rights of the people, as guaranteed and protected by the Constitution, against any and all acts that threaten to breach such rights.

To fulfill this mandate, Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the courts a sacred duty and a mighty power to provide redress for wrongs committed and curb abuses of power even within the government, viz.:

ARTICLE VIII

 

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

 

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

By inscribing in the Constitution for the first time this expanded power of judicial review, such power has ceased to become discretionary on the part of the Court and has become a duty which it cannot rightfully renege on. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives⁵⁹ aptly explains:

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.⁶⁰ (Emphasis in the original)

The scope of judicial review was deliberately enlarged to prevent courts from seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine and turning a blind eye to abuses by the other branches of government.⁶¹ This expanded power of judicial review, however, is not a magic incantation which automatically triggers the exercise of such power by the Court especially when to do so would palpably transgress the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers.

Before the Court may exercise its power of expanded judicial review, there are requisites that must be complied with to spare unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.⁶² These requisites are: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.⁶³ Otherwise, the Court has no recourse but to dismiss the petition.

Unfortunately, the Petition of Abines et al. fails to meet all the foregoing requisites, warranting its outright dismissal.

The Petition does not raise any actual case
or controversy since the conduct of
legislative inquiries is absolutely within the
constitutional power of Congress and was in
accordance with its Rules

The existence of an actual case or controversy is a necessary condition precedent to the Court’s exercise of its power of adjudication. “An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution.”⁶⁴ This requisite carries “the assurance that ‘courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of the government’ pursuant to the principle of separation of powers.”⁶⁵

These areas include government measures or questions falling within the prerogative of the people in their sovereign capacity or the full discretionary authority granted to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Questions involving such matters are political questions which involve the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure. Under the political question doctrine, such matters do not present an actual case or controversy.⁶⁶

A. Rep. Barbers’ privilege speeches are covered by parliamentary immunity, hence, non-justiciable

Here, one of the issues raised by Abines et al. is the delivery by Rep. Barbers of his privilege speeches before the plenary sessions of the House of Representatives, wherein he referred to a certain group of individuals as “malicious vloggers,” “trolls,” and peddlers of false information online.⁶⁷ They assail his speeches for being arbitrary, despotic, and violative of their right to freedom of expression. On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Rep. Barbers’ privilege speeches may not be the lawful subject of any questioning due to parliamentary immunity.

Indeed, parliamentary immunity is a privilege accorded by Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution to members of the Congress, viz.:

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as Osmeña v. Pendatun,⁶⁸ the Court erased any doubt on the efficacy of this privilege in shielding legislators from any questions or liabilities arising from their privilege speeches spoken in Congress or its Committees, although they may be questioned or disciplined thereon, if warranted, by Congress itself, to wit:

Section 15, Article VI of our [then 1935] Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than Congress.⁶⁹ (Emphasis supplied)

This is because the freedom of legislators to speak their minds and concerns sits at the very heart of Congress’ power and function to address prevailing issues in society through the enactment of relevant laws. Osmeña explains:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliament as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.⁷⁰ (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, Trillanes v. Judge Castillo-Marigomen⁷¹ citing Jimenez v. Cabangbang⁷² delineated when parliamentary immunity applies, i.e., the “speech or debate” covered by the immunity refers to utterances made by members of the Congress in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by members of the Congress, either within or without the premises housing the offices of Congress, in the official discharge of their duties as members thereof and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

Here, it is undisputed that Rep. Barbers delivered his assailed privilege speeches in his official capacity as a Member of the House of Representatives and during the plenary sessions of the lower house. Equally important, Rep. Barbers’ privilege speeches were delivered in the context of exposing a prevailing social ill, i.e., the deliberate propagation of misinformation which victimizes not only public officials, but also ordinary citizens. While he surmised that there was a link between these perpetrators and POGOs as well as drug syndicates, he emphasized that malicious speech is not protected by the Constitution and that defamation, slander, and insults are punishable by law. These offenses, however, remained unabated due to lack of active intervention, suppression, and prosecution of culprits.⁷³

Recognizing the dangers outlined by Rep. Barbers in his privilege speech, the House of Representatives resolved to adopt House Resolution Nos. 286/2147,⁷⁴ which authorize the conduct of a joint inquiry in aid of legislation on the rampant posting of false and malicious content on social media while upholding freedom of speech and digital safety.

Verily, just as Abines et al. are indubitably guaranteed their right to freedom of expression by Section 4, Article III⁷⁵ of the Constitution, Rep. Barbers, too, is guaranteed the same right, if not a more robust protection, under Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution when he spoke in his capacity as a lawmaker before Congress. This is an exercise of his constitutional prerogative as a Member of the House of Representatives that this Court may not touch upon without blatantly transgressing the primordial doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, in Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago,⁷⁶ the Court refrained from exercising its authority to discipline a member of the Bar, then an incumbent Senator, who blatantly insulted and demeaned the Court during her speech before the Senate, finding that such speech is protected by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity:

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name ofparliamentary immunity.⁷⁷ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

As such, insofar as Rep. Barbers’ privilege speeches are concerned, the Court stands in deference to the long-standing protection of parliamentary immunity which has brought the issue involving Rep. Barbers’ utterances beyond the realm of justiciable controversy.

B. The conduct of House inquiries in aid of legislation was in accordance with the limitations under prevailing jurisprudence

Too, Abines et al. aver that the House of Representatives is working towards the enactment of measures that aim to regulate the content of social media posts which violate the mandate of the Constitution against legislation abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press⁷⁸ Owing to this prohibition, they aver that the House of Representatives “has no business conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation for the purpose of enacting the same legislative measures that are proscribed by the Constitution.”⁷⁹

The House of Representatives moved to wield its power of inquiry which was expressly endowed to the legislative body in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of inquiry of Congress long precedes the present Constitution. In the landmark case of Arnault v. Nazareno⁸⁰, The Court recognized the power of inquiry as an essential measure to enable the Congress to effectively exercise its legislative functions, viz.:

A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not frequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.⁸¹

Such power being an inherent component of the power of Congress to legislate,⁸² the determination by either chamber of Congress, or by any of its committees, of the necessity to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation is a political question which falls outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. On this score, the Court has held:⁸³

The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.” Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, applies when there is found, among others, “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.”

 

………..

 

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.⁸⁴ (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The presence of such a political issue, however, does not preclude the Court from all forms of judicial review. In Senate v. Ermita⁸⁵, the Court ordained:

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called “McCarthy era,” however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

 

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

 

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

 

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights.⁸⁶ (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In the exercise of the power of inquiry, therefore, the Congress or any of its committees is bound by the following limitations: first, the inquiry must be “in aid of legislation;” second, the inquiry must be conducted in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure; and third, “[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”⁸⁷

Notably, Abines et al. neither pleaded nor proved any violation of the foregoing limitations. At any rate, based on the submissions of Abines et al. and the OSG, the Court finds that compliance with the specified limitations has been maintained thus far.

First. In Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,⁸⁸ following the privilege speech of then Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee undertook an investigation to look into a possible violation of Republic Act No. 3019.⁸⁹ The inquiry was then challenged for having been conducted without a valid legislative purpose. The Court found that the true purpose of the inquiry pertained to a matter that properly fell within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:⁹⁰

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

…………..

 

It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.⁹¹

Thus, when the inquiry pertains to matters that do not fall within the jurisdiction of Congress, it cannot be considered “in aid of legislation.” Unlike in Bengzon, Jr., the proper regulation against the proliferation of false information online is a subject matter that falls within the sole jurisdiction of the legislative department pursuant to its inherent police power. Settled is the rule that “the legislature has the broad and extensive power to regulate all matters which in its discretion are for the common good of the people, including the maintenance of peace and order and the protection of life and liberty, which the Constitution deems indispensable for the enjoyment by all people of the blessing of democracy.”⁹²

In the exercise of its discretion, the House of Representatives saw it fit to conduct a legislative inquiry to ascertain the vital measures to be enacted to curb the dangers brought by the dissemination of false or deceptive narratives to maintain peace and order in society. The dangers of the proliferation of false information and narratives are not difficult to imagine, and the need to address this issue most promptly is truly imperative. Allowing the unregulated dissemination of erroneous facts will ultimately degrade trust among the people and threaten the stability and reliability of day-to-day transactions.

Notably, under House Resolution No. 286, the parameters of the joint inquiry specifically require that: (1) all proposed measures be aligned with constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and expression, and prevent any undue censorship; (2) gaps in legislation be identified to address the challenges posed by emerging technologies and harmful online content; (3) transparency and accountability mechanisms for social media platforms be improved; and (4) measures be recommended to address cybercrimes arising from false and malicious online content.⁹³

As the inquiry is still underway, no measure has been proposed by the House Tri-Committee at this time. Nevertheless, it is clear from the privilege speeches of Rep. Barbers as well as the last three parameters of House Resolution No. 286 that the inquiry was conducted for the purpose of enabling the Congress to effectively carry out its constitutionally mandated functions.

Second. Petitioners do not dispute that the inquiries were scheduled and held in accordance with the House of Representatives’ and the House Tri-Committee’s duly published rules of procedure. Compliance with the second limitation is thus not in issue.

Third. Contrary to Abines et al.’s assertions, their rights as resource persons were duly guaranteed and protected during the proceedings. The 19th Congress of the Philippines published its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Sections 9 and 10 thereof enumerate the rights and duties of the witness and persons affected by the hearing, thus:

Section 9. Rights and Duties of Witnesses. The rights of witnesses including their right against self-incrimination shall be respected. Witnesses who are not government officials summoned by the committee shall be entitled, upon their request and subject to the approval of the Speaker, to reasonable transportation expenses and such other amounts as may be deemed necessary for their stay in Metro Manila.

 

Witnesses shall testify under oath to be administered by the Chairperson or by any other person authorized by law.

 

A witness shall be limited to giving information relevant and germane to the subject matter under investigation. The committee shall rule upon the admissibility of any testimony or information presented by a witness. Privileged communications shall be respected.

 

Any witness desiring to deliver or present a prepared or written statement before the committee shall file a copy of such statement, under oath, with the secretary of the committee within forty-eight (48) hours before the hearing at which the statement is to be delivered or presented.

 

Such statements or portions thereof that are relevant and germane to the subject of the investigation may, at the conclusion of the testimony of the witness, and upon approval by a majority vote of the Members of the committee, a quorum being present, be inserted into the official transcript of the proceedings.

 

A witness shall be allowed to request for and be granted postponement of the appearance before the committee or subcommittee on grounds that render such witness physically unable to attend the inquiry or investigation: Provided, That the fact of physical inability to attend the inquiry or investigation is supported by appropriate medical or other certification as may be required by the committee or sub-committee, and: Provided further, That no witness shall be granted more than two (2) postponements of appearance before the committee without justifiable cause.

Section 10. Rights and Duties of Persons Affected by a Hearing. Where applicable, any person named in a public hearing or in the released record of testimonies given in executive sessions, who has not been previously so named shall, within a reasonable time thereafter, be notified of such fact by registered letter, return receipt requested, to the address of such person last known to the committee. The notice shall include:

a. a statement that the person has been so named;

b. date and place of hearing where the person was named;

c. name of the person who testified; and

d. information that a copy of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is available for the perusal of such person in the house.

 

Any person so notified who believes that one’s character or reputation was adversely affected may, within seven (7) days after receipt of said notice:

a. communicate with the secretary of the committee; and/or

b. request to appear in person before the committee in public session and give testimony, at the expense of the concerned person.

 

Any person testifying under the foregoing provisions shall be accorded the same privileges as any other witness appearing before the committee, and may be questioned concerning any matter relevant and germane to the subject of the investigation.