Maraya v. Madriaga, G.R. No. E-03300 (November 4, 2026)

Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari¹ filed by petitioner Juanito P. Maraya (Juanito) assailing the Decision² and the Resolution³ of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the Orders dated April 28, 2022⁴ and February 28, 2023,⁵ respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), denying Juanito’s Motion to Revive and consequently dismissing the Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent Florenda C. Madriaga (Florenda).

Factual Antecedents

On February 24, 2005, Florenda filed a Petition⁶ to nullify her marriage with Juanito on the ground that the latter was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

On March 10, 2005, summons was personally served and received by Juanito at his given address.⁷

On January 23, 2006, the case was dismissed for failure of Florenda to prosecute her case.⁸ Upon her motion for reconsideration, the case was revived and reinstated on February 10, 2006.⁹ Still, despite the case being rescheduled for hearings, Florenda filed several motions to cancel the same.¹⁰ On April 19, 2007, Florenda was subjected to oral deposition as she was scheduled to leave for Hong Kong where she was employed as an Overseas Contract Worker.¹¹

On May 25, 2007, the RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor of Batangas as deputized by the Office of the Solicitor General, to conduct investigation if collusion existed between the parties.¹² Per its Compliance¹³ dated August 22, 2007, the prosecutor confirmed that no such collusion exists.

After several postponements of the scheduled hearings due to the absence of either Florenda, her witnesses, or her counsel,¹⁴ and in view of Florenda’s counsel’s manifestation that the former was abroad and not communicating with the latter, the RTC resolved to archive the case on September 15, 2009.¹⁵

On August 20, 2020, Juanito’s counsel filed an entry of appearance. On November 14, 2020, they requested for a copy of the case records.¹⁶

On March 24, 2022, Juanito filed a Motion to Revive¹⁷ the archived case and attached his Answer dated November 26, 2021,¹⁸ where he likewise prayed for the nullity of his marriage to Florenda. He alleged that it was Florenda who was suffering from psychological incapacity which rendered her unable to comply with her marital obligations.¹⁹

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Order dated April 28, 2022,²⁰ the RTC denied Juanito’s Motion to Revive. Its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion to Revive is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.²¹ (Emphasis in the original)

Since the records reveal that the case was archived on September 15, 2009 and considering that Juanito prayed for its revival after more than 12 years, the RTC found the motion as lacking in merit. It held that the right to file such motion lies with Florenda as plaintiff. Moreover, it ruled that the present motion was tantamount to collusion, therefore meriting dismissal of the petition. Juanito was advised to take the proper step to advance his cause.²²

Juanito filed a Motion for Reconsideration,²³ arguing that (1) under Office of Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 89-2004, the presiding judge shall motu proprio or upon motion of any party, order reinstatement or revival of an archived case; and (2) the mere fact that he filed an Answer does not mean he colluded with Florenda.

In its Order dated February 28, 2023,²⁴ the RTC nonetheless ordered the dismissal of Florenda’s petition for nullity on the basis of failure to prosecute. The dispositive portion of the ruling states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED. The Order dated April 28, 2022 STANDS. This case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.²⁵ (Emphasis in the original)

The RTC held that OCA Circular No. 89-2004 was inapplicable here since the same would be futile. Although Juanito did not cause the delay of the instant case, Florenda slept on her rights and was remiss of her duty to prove the nullity of their marriage. Thus, even if the case were to be revived, the trial court found that the same would not move forward for the sole reason that the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage was on plaintiff Florenda.²⁶

The RTC held that it was not the act of filing an answer per se that amounted to collusion but what was contained in Juanito’s Answer. It found that based on the allegations therein, Juanito wanted to revive an archived case that was already abandoned by the plaintiff and sought to adopt such suit as his own to declare their marriage void. This averment amounted to collusion because Juanito did not vehemently oppose the annulment proceedings.²⁷

Finally, considering that the case had remained archived in the court’s docket for an unreasonable length of time without action on the part of Florenda to prosecute her case, there is a lack of interest warranting dismissal.²⁸

Juanito filed another Motion for Reconsideration,²⁹ arguing that he should not be barred from presenting his evidence on account of Florenda’s neglect to prosecute her petition and that there was no collusion between them. The RTC denied Juanito’s motion in an Order dated April 4, 2023,³⁰ on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading.

Unsatisfied, Juanito lodged an appeal before the CA.³¹

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision dated February 25, 2025,³² the CA denied Juanito’s appeal and affirmed the RTC Orders. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Order dated February 28, 2023 of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.³³ (Emphasis in the original)

Procedurally, the CA disagreed with the RTC’s ruling that Juanito filed a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. Rather, it found that the earlier motion for reconsideration was filed for the Order dated April 28, 2022, which denied the motion to revive the archived petition. On the other hand, the next motion for reconsideration was for the Order dated February 28, 2023, which not only denied Juanito’s motion but dismissed Florenda’s petition for nullity on the ground of failure to prosecute. Where the prohibition seeks to proscribe second motions for reconsideration filed by the same party assailing the same judgment or resolution, the rule is inapplicable here because Juanito’s motions pertained to different and distinct judgments.³⁴

Notwithstanding giving the appeal due course, the CA still found that the dismissal of the case was warranted. It discussed that Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court on failure to prosecute, contemplates want of diligence attributable to the plaintiff in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. Such unwillingness is manifested in either plaintiff’s failure to appear at the time of trial, failure to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time, or failure to comply with the Rules of Court or any court orders. Considering the antecedents and circumstances, it held that the RTC aptly exercised its discretion to dismiss Florenda’s petition. Her prolonged inaction, compounded by repeated cancellations of hearings and noncompliance with court orders, reflected her lack of due diligence in pursing her claim.³⁵

The CA likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of Juanito’s Motion to Revive, finding that the burden of proof to show nullity of marriage belonged to the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of marriage or against its dissolution. Since Florenda, as plaintiff of the petition, had the onus of proving that one or both spouses in the marriage had psychological incapacity, any motion to revive the case by Juanito is ineffectual and therefore futile, considering that this will not alter the evidentiary requirement and will fail to substantiate the claim of nullity.³⁶

In the Resolution dated October 7, 2025, the CA denied Juanito’s motion for reconsideration, upon a finding that no compelling reason or persuasive ground warranted a reversal or modification of its earlier Decision.³⁷

The Petition

Petitioner assails the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s dismissal of the case. Since there was no qualification or indication in the assailed orders that the dismissal was without prejudice, then he is effectively barred from filing his own petition for declaration of nullity. In the first place, petitioner argues that an archived case must first be revived before a court can proceed to act or dismiss a case and that this remedy to revive is not limited to the party who filed the initiatory pleading. He also asserts that respondent Florenda’s fault and neglect in failing to prosecute should not be taken against him as to deprive him of his day in court.³⁸

Petitioner then assails the CA’s conclusion that his Motion to Revive would be ineffectual and futile since it was Florenda who had the burden of proving nullity due to psychological incapacity. He argues that while the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, the determination of whether psychological incapacity exists is based on the totality of evidence presented. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, there is likewise no requirement that such totality solely come from the evidence that plaintiff presents, especially when the rules of procedure allow the respondent to file an answer. In the end, petitioner prays that he be allowed to present evidence to prove the nullity of his marriage. He maintains that the filing of his Answer shows their mutual desire to have the marriage nullified but does not imply that they have colluded to trick the court.³⁹

Issue

The issue for this Court’s resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s denial of petitioner’s motion to revive and its dismissal of the petition for nullity due to failure to prosecute.

Our Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The RTC erred in archiving the case

To recall, from the filing of the petition for nullity in 2005, the case was initially dismissed and reinstated after reconsideration in 2006. Thereafter, investigation for collusion ensued in 2007. In 2009, and after several postponements of the scheduled hearings supposedly due to the absence of either respondent, her witnesses, or her counsel, the RTC resolved to archive the case.

Indeed, the archiving of cases is a widely accepted measure designed to shelve cases in which no immediate action is expected but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. It saves the petitioner or applicant from the added trouble and expense of refiling a dismissed case. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains where action on it can be taken.⁴⁰

However, the archiving of cases is time-bound and limited to specific grounds. SC Administrative Circular No. 07-A-1992,⁴¹ as reiterated in OCA Circular No. 89-2004,⁴² provide for the procedure for archiving. They both state:

II. Civil Cases

In civil cases, the court may motu proprio or upon motion, order that a civil case be archived only in the following instances:

(a) When the parties are in the process of settlement, in which case the proceedings may be suspended, and the case archived for a period not exceeding [90] days. The case shall be included in the trial calendar on the day immediately following the lapse of the suspension period.

(b) When an interlocutory order or incident in the civil case is elevated to, and is pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

(c) When defendant, without fault or neglect of plaintiff, cannot be served with summons within [six] months from issuance of original summons. (Emphasis supplied)

None of the above sanctioned grounds is applicable in the present case. The records are bereft of any indication that there were negotiations for settlement, a pending incident restrained by a higher court, nor inability to serve summons upon the defendant. In the first place, a petition for nullity could not have been the subject of a settlement since the validity of a marriage can never be compromised.⁴³ It was likewise established that summons was duly received.⁴⁴

Even assuming that one of the three grounds was attendant, the archiving of a case cannot go beyond the period of 90 days. Here, the case was placed under archived status for far too long, i.e., beginning 2009 or for 13 long years until 2022 when petitioner’s counsel finally filed a motion for its revival.

To reiterate, archiving is a procedural measure designed to only temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, i.e., where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal.⁴⁵ Where it was established here that respondent, her witnesses or counsel, indeed repeatedly failed to appear during the scheduled hearing dates thus leading to their multiple postponements,⁴⁶ and where the case was already dismissed prior to its reinstatement on reconsideration,⁴⁷ then a ground for dismissal was already apparent and available. At that time, the RTC could have already exercised its discretion to dismiss the case due to the fault or neglect of the plaintiff.

Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his or her evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his or her action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

Instead, it resolved to archive the case in 2009, allowed the same to remain without action for 13 years, and then use such duration as further justification of the prolonged inaction that merited immediate denial of petitioner’s relief. Where there was no valid ground for archiving but a valid ground for dismissal otherwise existent at the time, the RTC should not have archived the case and permit inaction on the same for such a long period. The impropriety of this predicate act by the RTC provides context as to why it likewise and consequently erred in issuing the assailed Orders dated April 28, 2022 and February 28, 2023.

The RTC erred in issuing the assailed Orders

OCA Circular No. 89-2004 further states:

General Provisions

(a) Copies of the order archiving the case shall be furnished the parties.

(b) A special docket shall be maintained to record the cases, both criminal and civil, that have been archived.

(c) A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the Presiding Judge.

(d) The Presiding Judge shall, motu proprio or upon motion of any party, order the reinstatement/revival of an archived case and its withdrawal from the archives whenever the same is ready for trial or further proceedings.

(e) The Branch Clerk of Court shall submit to the [OCA], a list of archived cases (stating the reason/s for archiving the case) which shall be attached to the Monthly Reports of Cases (SC Form No. 1-2004), submitted monthly by each court[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, in OCA Circular No. 259-2024,⁴⁸ all first and second level courts were directed to issue orders: (a) reviving archived cases in their respective courts; (b) thereafter, directing the parties to file a manifestation conveying their interest to pursue their case; and (c) if no manifestation is filed or in case the parties on record fail to appear despite due notice, appropriately acting upon the archived cases to take them out of the court’s docket, such as dismissing civil cases with prejudice and provisionally dismissing criminal cases for failure to vigorously prosecute and/or pursue the same.⁴⁹

From these regulations, the following are made apparent:

First, where the rules clearly provide that an order for the reinstatement or revival of an archived case may be initiated upon motion of any party, then the RTC erred in issuing its April 28, 2022 Order, denying petitioner’s Motion to Revive, on the reasoning that the right to file such pleading was exclusively with respondent as plaintiff of the petition for nullity.⁵⁰

Second, an archived case must first be revived before further action may be taken thereon as archival is not tantamount to a dismissal. The trial court must probe and determine the interest of the parties to pursue the case. It is in the absence of showing of such interest that the case will then be dismissed with prejudice.

Here, the entry of appearance and request for records as early as 2020, and the subsequent filing of a Motion to Revive with Answer in 2022,⁵¹ surely manifested petitioner’s interest as one of the parties to further pursue the case. The RTC, through the February 28, 2023 Order, should not have precipitously dismissed the archived case before it has been revived. Further, it should not have suddenly tacked the years of respondent’s lack of communication with the court as against petitioner and to his prejudice, failing to consider petitioner’s attempt at revival as precisely indicative of that interest to pursue the case. Indubitably, the RTC erred in issuing its assailed Orders.

Petitioner’s Motion to Revive with Answer is a counterclaim that can proceed within this same action

Assuming that respondent’s unreachability was, indeed, indicative of her lack of interest and that her petition was therefore dismissible for failure to prosecute, the revival of the case in view of petitioner’s interest could have nonetheless allowed the proceedings to continue where Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court also clearly declares that dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff is “without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.”

Indeed, jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements declaring that unless otherwise qualified by the court, a dismissal under Rule 17, Section 3 “has the effect of an adjudication on the merits,” barring the refiling of the case.⁵² Petitioner, however, is mistaken in asserting that this consequently bars him from filing a case and likewise challenging the validity of their marriage.⁵³ The dismissal of respondent’s petition does not operate to deprive him of his right to pursue his counterclaim either in the same or in a separate action.

To hold that the dismissal due to respondent’s fault is to petitioner’s prejudice, such that it prevents him from pursuing his counterclaim, is to let the last line of Rule 17, Section 3 render nugatory the preceding line of the same provision. This runs contrary to the adage that particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, such that a statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.⁵⁴

In Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago,⁵⁵ the Court settled that as part of the notable changes introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the counterclaim survives despite the dismissal of the complaint under Rule 17, Section 3, irrespective of whether the counterclaim was permissive or compulsory. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.⁵⁶ The Court therein held that the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the Amended Answer with Counterclaim since the rule mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the merits of such counterclaim. Thus, the Court therein reversed the RTC and ordered a remand for trial on the merits of the counterclaim.⁵⁷

The Court’s explanation of the proviso in Pinga endures even under the 2019 Rules of Court as Rule 17, Section 3 remains unamended viz.:

It would then seemingly follow that if the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause(s) of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. Yet that hardly is the case, especially as a general rule. More often than not, the allegations that form the counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission of the plaintiff other than the plaintiff’s very act of filing the complaint. Moreover, such acts or omissions imputed to the plaintiff are often claimed to have occurred prior to the filing of the complaint itself. The only apparent exception to this circumstance is if it is alleged in the counterclaim that the very act of the plaintiff in filing the complaint precisely causes the violation of the defendant’s rights. Yet even in such an instance, it remains debatable whether the dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint is sufficient to obviate the pending cause of action maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff.

. . . .

The dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint does not traverse the boundaries of time to undo the act or omission of the plaintiff against the defendant, or vice versa. While such dismissal or withdrawal precludes the pursuit of litigation by the plaintiff, either through his/her own initiative or fault, it would be iniquitous to similarly encumber the defendant who maintained no such initiative or fault. If the defendant similarly moves for the dismissal of the counterclaim or neglects to timely pursue such action, let the dismissal of the counterclaim be premised on those grounds imputable to the defendant, and not on the actuations of the plaintiff.

. . . .

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.⁵⁸ (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In this case, petitioner filed a Motion to Revive with attached Answer, essentially claiming that their marriage should be nullified because it was respondent instead—and not him—who was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the marital obligations. By not merely providing a justification to defeat plaintiff’s claim as one would in an affirmative defense,⁵⁹ but asserting a new and independent claim and seeking relief from the plaintiff,⁶⁰ petitioner here is essentially advancing a counterclaim, and he is electing to prosecute his right to do so in the same action and within these proceedings.

In a proceeding for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, the applicable substantive laws are the Family Code and the Civil Code, while the governing procedural law is SC Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC,⁶¹ with the Rules of Court applying suppletorily.⁶²

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Albeit no express mention of a counterclaim, the rule nonetheless sanctions the filing by the respondent spouse of an answer; although failure to do so will not automatically result in a declaration of default.⁶³ A marriage may also be nullified upon the premise that either or both of the spouses are psychologically incapacitated.⁶⁴ Notably, while the Rules of Court ascertains the right to file such counterclaim as discussed above, it does not supply an exact timeframe or specific manner by which the defendant from a dismissed complaint may pursue the counterclaim within the same action.

Here, it was error for the RTC to reason that the case should be dismissed simply because petitioner is seeking to adopt the suit as his own to declare their marriage void when the same had already been abandoned by the plaintiff.⁶⁵ Notwithstanding any supposed abandonment by respondent of her cause, petitioner may be allowed to constitute his counterclaim within the same action and through his Answer, specifically premised on the entire theory that their marriage must end because of respondent’s distinct psychological incapacity, thus:

21. After a few months, [petitioner] found out that [respondent Florenda] went back to Hong Kong. At first, he tried every means to reach out to her, but kept coming up short. As soon as he was able to contact her, [respondent Florenda] always had the overwhelming urge to run away. She would immediately shut [petitioner] down. This heartbreak left [petitioner] inexplicably empty. For months, there was a tangled knot of anxiety, an endless battle between his end and his heart whether to take a leap of faith and move on.
22. The thought of [respondent Florenda] walking out of [petitioner]’s life was indeed heartbreaking. But since their relationship was filled with constant fighting, arguing, misunderstandings, and pushing people away, [petitioner] eventually got tired of it. He thought it was all too easy for [respondent Florenda] to give up on them. She let him break away far too quickly. All [petitioner] wanted was a wife who could and would always be there for him but to [respondent Florenda] he was simply asking too much;
23. For [29] years, [respondent Florenda] was detached, neglectful, immature, and emotionally abusive. But despite that, [petitioner] fought for love and begged for it. . .
24. The foregoing facts clearly established that [respondent Florenda] suffers from a psychological disorder which evidently rendered her unable to comply with the essential marital obligations. She failed to comply with Article 68 of the Family Code . . .
25. The marriage of [respondent Florenda and petitioner] is void ab initio because the former never really had the heart, will [,] and mind for marriage and its attendant obligations [.]⁶⁶

True, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC requires a respondent to file an answer to a petition within 15 days from service of summons⁶⁷ and petitioner here failed to file the same within such period, as in fact it took him around 12 years or until 2021 to 2022 to do so. In Juliano-Llave v. Republic,⁶⁸ the wife, who did not file an answer within the time left for filing an answer even after the extensions granted, and who filed a motion to dismiss instead of such answer, was held to have lost her right to file the same, without being deprived of her right to due process.⁶⁹

However, the present case is not on all fours with Juliano-Llave. There, the Court noted that the wife, as respondent, remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer and present her evidence when it was her turn to do so. Such failure was attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party, the petitioning husband who was able to present his evidence. Sans her answer, the Court held that the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its decision after deeming that the wife waived her right to present her side.⁷⁰

Here, although petitioner did not file his Answer within the immediately preceding period after he was served his summons, the RTC and the CA’s findings only pertained to respondent’s neglect and prolonged inaction.⁷¹ No similar finding was made about petitioner’s postponements, obstinate refusal, or analogous dilatory tactics.

Moreover, Juliano-Llave conducted its trial in the normal course of things, as opposed to here where the petition was irregularly archived for such a long period. Indeed, the earlier revival of the archived case could have been initiated by any party, which included petitioner; but, where the trial court equally had the duty to periodically monitor its docket, then the case’s years of inactivity cannot be solely attributed to petitioner’s failure to file the answer within the given period.

In any case, an action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage is imprescriptible.⁷² Thus, any strict imposition of the period to file an answer that would prejudice petitioner is counterintuitive, since he is not precluded and is in fact allowed by the rules, to file this counterclaim through another separate action.

But to uphold the dismissal order and let petitioner file anew his complaint for nullity before a different Family Court, as the RTC suggests, would not serve any compelling purpose, is impractical, and counterproductive to the cause of justice.⁷³

Since the disposition of this case has already been delayed by improper archiving, the trial court below has already ordered the prosecutor to investigate, with the latter having complied and finding that there was lack of collusion, and where petitioner has likewise attached pieces of evidence in support of his Answer,⁷⁴ then it is in the best interest of justice that the petitioner’s claim be adjudicated under the present proceedings, instead of altogether dismissing the same.

At this juncture, the Court finds occasion to likewise dispel the RTC’s insinuation that the case must be dismissed because petitioner’s motion was tantamount to collusion.⁷⁵ Even with its clarification that it was not the filing of the answer per se but the allegations thereof that were used as basis,⁷⁶ the court a quo erred in concluding that there was collusion.

The mere fact that both spouses believe that a marriage should end is not tantamount to collusion, especially here where the Court’s own examination of the allegations of their respective pleadings would show that they fundamentally disagree on the root cause of the invalidity of such marriage. Both spouses do not admit incapacity on their part; rather, they contend that it is the other spouse that possesses such psychological incapacity.

In Puyat v. Puyat,⁷⁷ the Court explained:

It is also difficult to believe that there is collusion between the parties when it is apparent that the animosity between them persists based on their submissions and reliefs prayed for. Even at this stage of the proceedings, [the wife] refuses to concede that she is psychologically incapacitated should the nullity of marriage be granted. Simply because they mutually desire to have their marriage declared null and void does not mean that they have colluded to trick the court. To rule otherwise would be to unfairly foreclose the remedy under Article 36 to all individuals who are similarly situated as [the husband] and [the wife]. To the Court’s mind, the CA failed to demonstrate the presence of collusion or that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.⁷⁸ (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. Ramoran-Wong,⁷⁹ the Court emphasized that the parties’ mutual desire to void their marriage does not necessarily equate to collusion. A lack of objection is not the same as collusion. In the absence of any evidence that the parties conspired to fabricate a matrimonial offense or colluded to obtain a declaration of nullity without valid grounds, a finding of collusion is unwarranted.⁸⁰ Here, not only is there lack of sufficient evidence proving that respondent and petitioner conspired to have their marriage voided, but the provincial prosecutor also reported at the outset, that there was no finding of collusion.⁸¹ This official finding is entitled to the presumption of regularity.⁸²

Finally, the CA’s reasoning crumbles as to the futility of petitioner’s Motion to Revive because respondent’s lack of interest prevents her from satisfying her burden of proof.⁸³

Undoubtedly, it is the plaintiff-spouse who has the burden to prove the existence of the psychological incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.⁸⁴ It was thus respondent’s burden to prove that petitioner’s psychological incapacity was attended with gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence.⁸⁵ However, her failure to do so due to her unresponsiveness or lack of interest does not affect—nor as the CA would put it, render ineffectual—the separate and distinct onus of petitioner to prove the allegations of his counterclaim.

The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove their assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment.⁸⁶ As the plaintiff in his own counterclaim, petitioner is equally entitled to the opportunity granted to respondent in the original petition, to establish his cause of action and to prove the right he asserts.⁸⁷ Thus, it is petitioner’s burden, in turn, to substantiate his own theory that it was respondent’s psychological incapacity to fulfill her obligations that caused the nullity of their marriage through the jurisprudential requisites and by the established quantum of evidence.

Time and again, the Court has recognized that technicality and procedural imperfection, should as a rule, not serve as the bases of decisions.⁸⁸ In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court deems that the ends of justice would be better served if petitioner is given ample opportunity to fully ventilate his claim in order for the court to fully ascertain the merits of the case.⁸⁹ Considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, the Court resolves that a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of evidence and proper resolution on the merits is most appropriate.⁹⁰

FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 25, 2025 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2025 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 121859 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court a quo for the revival of the case and the reception of respondent Juanito Maraya’s evidence on his counterclaim.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

¹ Petition for Review on Certiorari, pp. 1–35.

² CA rollo, pp. 117–128. The February 25, 2025 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 121859 was penned by Associate Justice Roberto P. Quiroz and concurred in by Associate Justices Rafael Antonio M. Santos and Ferdinand C. Baylon of the Fourteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila City.

³ Id. at 160–161. The October 7, 2025 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 121859 was penned by Associate Justice Roberto P. Quiroz and concurred in by Associate Justices Rafael Antonio M. Santos and Ferdinand C. Baylon of the Former Fourteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila City.

⁴ RTC records, p. 168. The April 28, 2022 Order in Civil Case No. 891 was penned by Presiding Judge Wilhelmina B. Go-Santiago of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Nasugbu, Batangas.

⁵ Id. at 179–182. The February 28, 2023 Order in Civil Case No. 891 was penned by Presiding Judge Wilhelmina B. Go-Santiago of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Nasugbu, Batangas.

⁶ Id. at 2–5.

⁷ Id. at 8.

⁸ Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 6; RTC records, p. 9.

⁹ Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 6; RTC records, p. 19.

¹⁰ Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 6; RTC records, pp. 20–26.

¹¹ Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 6; RTC records, pp. 38–41, 45.

¹² Petition for Review on Certiorari, pp. 6–7; RTC records, p. 51.

¹³ RTC records, p. 58.

¹⁴ Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 7; RTC records, pp. 60, 62, 69, 80. The February 20, 2009 and April 17, 2009 hearings were canceled and reset on the initiative of Presiding Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor (see RTC records, pp. 72, 74).

¹⁵ RTC records, p. 83.

¹⁶ CA rollo, p. 119; RTC records, pp. 87–90.

¹⁷ Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 8; RTC records, pp. 91–93.

¹⁸ Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 8; RTC records, pp. 94–105.

¹⁹ Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 8; RTC records, pp. 99–167.

²⁰ RTC records, p. 168.

²¹ Id.

²² Id.

²³ Id. at 89–177.

²⁴ Id. at 179–182.

²⁵ Id. at 182.

²⁶ Id. at 180.

²⁷ Id. at 181.

²⁸ Id. at 182.

²⁹ Id. at 183–190.

³⁰ Id. at 192–193.

³¹ Id. at 203–205.

³² CA rollo, pp. 117–128.

³³ Id. at 127.

³⁴ Id. at 122–123.

³⁵ Id. at 123–125.

³⁶ Id. at 125–127.

³⁷ Id. at 161.

³⁸ Petition for Review on Certiorari, pp. 10–31.

³⁹ Id. at 31–34.

⁴⁰ Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc., 424 Phil. 372, 394 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

⁴¹ SC Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, June 21, 1993, Re: Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases. This issuance remains good law as the same has been relied upon in National Transmission Corp. v. Untiveros, 954 Phil. 220, 228 (2024) [Per J. Lopez, J., Second Division].

⁴² OCA Circular No. 89-2004, August 12, 2004, Reiteration of the Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases.

⁴³ CIVIL CODE, art. 2035.

⁴⁴ RTC records, p. 8.

⁴⁵ See Balao v. Ermita, 787 Phil. 684, 696 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. (Emphasis supplied)

⁴⁶ RTC records, pp. 60, 62, 69, 80.

⁴⁷ Id. at 9, 19.

⁴⁸ OCA Circular No. 259-2024, August 22, 2024, Resolution dated [August 13,] 2024 of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 24-07-27-SC, Re: Archived Cases of the First and Second Level Courts.

Procedural rules may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to that effect. (see Survivors of Agrichemicals in Gensan, Inc. v. Standard Fruit Co., 940 Phil. 18, 38 (2023) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

⁴⁹ OCA Circular No. 259-2024.

⁵⁰ RTC records, p. 168.

⁵¹ Id. at 87–93.

⁵² See Heirs of Sta. Rita v. Heirs of Manalo, G.R. No. 256093, July 30, 2025 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Lozada v. Lozada, G.R. No. 245405, March 25, 2019 [Unsigned Resolution, Second Division]; Spouses Lava v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 228532, February 15, 2017 [Unsigned Resolution, Third Division].

⁵³ Petition for Review on Certiorari, pp. 10–12.

⁵⁴ See Calleja v. Executive Secretary, 918-B Phil. 1, 106 (2021) [Per J. Carandang, En Banc]. (Citations omitted)

⁵⁵ 526 Phil. 868 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].

⁵⁶ Id. at 875.

⁵⁷ Id. at 888.

⁵⁸ Id. at 891–893.

⁵⁹ See RULES OF COURT, Rule 6, sec. 5(b) provides that an affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him or her.

⁶⁰ See Firaza Sr. v. Spouses Ugay, 708 Phil. 24, 30–31 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division] where the Court discussed the well-settled principle that a counterclaim is essentially a complaint filed by the defendant against the plaintiff and stands on the same footing as an independent action. Further, it characterized a counterclaim as involving a cause of action separate from that alleged in the complaint; it has for its purpose the vindication of a right in as much as the complaint similarly seeks the redress of one.

⁶¹ SC Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003, Re: Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

⁶² Santos v. Santos, 857 Phil. 50, 60 (2019) [Per J. Reyes, A. Jr., Third Division].

⁶³ SC Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003, secs. 2(a), 8.

⁶⁴ SC Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003, sec. 2(d).

⁶⁵ RTC records, p. 181.

⁶⁶ Id. at 99–100.

⁶⁷ SC Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003, sec. 8(1).

⁶⁸ 662 Phil. 203 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

⁶⁹ Id. at 216–218.

⁷⁰ Id.

⁷¹ RTC records, p. 180, CA rollo, pp. 124–125.

⁷² SC Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003, sec. 2(c).

⁷³ See David v. Calilung, 894 Phil. 752, 770 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, En Banc].

⁷⁴ RTC records, pp. 51, 58, 108–159.

⁷⁵ Id. at 168, 181.

⁷⁶ Id. at 181.

⁷⁷ 906 Phil. 143 (2021) [Per J. Carandang, First Division].

⁷⁸ Id. at 153.

⁷⁹ G.R. No. 276986, February 3, 2026 [Per J. Singh, Third Division].

⁸⁰ Id. at 16. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

⁸¹ RTC records, pp. 51, 58.

⁸² Republic v. Ramoran-Wong, G.R. No. 276986, February 3, 2026 [Per J. Singh, Third Division] at 17. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

⁸³ CA rollo, p. 126

⁸⁴ Cabutaje v. Republic, G.R. No. 248569, January 15, 2025 [Per J. Dimaampao, Third Division] at 4. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

⁸⁵ Id. at 4–5. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

⁸⁶ Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca, 581 Phil. 188, 194 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

⁸⁷ Firaza Sr., v. Spouses Ugay, 708 Phil. 24, 31 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

⁸⁸ Latogan v. People, 869 Phil. 271, 274 (2020) [Per J. Inting, Second Division].

⁸⁹ See Ambrose v. Suque-Ambrose, 905 Phil. 149, 151 (2021) [Per J. Gaerlan, First Division].

⁹⁰ Id. at 155.

Case Digest

Atty. Eryel Legis Comania, LPT

Maraya v. Madriaga, et al.
G.R. No. E-03300, November 4, 2026
[Per J. Hernando, First Division]

SYLLABUS

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Archiving of Civil Cases (SC Administrative Circular No. 07-A-1992; OCA Circular No. 89-2004; OCA Circular No. 259-2024); Revival of Archived Cases; Dismissal Due to Fault of Plaintiff (Rule 17, Section 3); Survival of Counterclaim; Civil Law; Family Code; Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity (Article 36); A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; Collusion; Burden of Proof; Imprescriptibility of Action for Nullity

DOCTRINES

1. Archiving is limited and time-bound. A civil case may be archived only on the grounds in SC Administrative Circular No. 07-A-1992, as reiterated in OCA Circular No. 89-2004:
   • (a) the parties are in the process of settlement, for a period not exceeding 90 days;
   • (b) an interlocutory order or incident is pending before a higher court that has issued a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction; or
   • (c) the defendant, without fault or neglect of the plaintiff, cannot be served with summons within six months from issuance of the original summons.

   Archiving is proper only where no ground for outright dismissal exists. A petition for nullity of marriage cannot be archived for settlement, because the validity of a marriage can never be compromised.

2. Revival before dismissal. The presiding judge may order the revival of an archived case motu proprio or upon motion of any party, not only the plaintiff. An archived case must first be revived before further action may be taken on it, because archival is not a dismissal. The court must determine the parties’ interest to pursue the case. Only when no such interest is shown may the case be dismissed with prejudice.
3. The counterclaim survives a Rule 17 dismissal. A dismissal due to the plaintiff’s fault under Rule 17, Section 3 is without prejudice to the defendant’s right to prosecute his or her counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. In a nullity case, a respondent-spouse whose answer asserts that the petitioner-spouse is the one psychologically incapacitated advances a counterclaim. That counterclaim may proceed in the same action even if the petition is dismissed.
4. A mutual desire to end the marriage is not collusion. A lack of objection is not collusion, and neither is the fact that both spouses want their marriage voided. A finding of collusion requires evidence that the parties conspired to fabricate a matrimonial offense or to obtain a declaration of nullity without valid grounds. The prosecutor’s finding of no collusion enjoys the presumption of regularity.
5. Each party carries its own burden. The plaintiff-spouse’s failure to discharge the burden of proving psychological incapacity does not render ineffectual the defendant-spouse’s separate burden to prove his or her counterclaim. Whoever asserts the affirmative of an issue must prove it.

FACTS

On February 24, 2005, Florenda C. Madriaga (Florenda) filed a petition to declare her marriage to Juanito P. Maraya (Juanito) void on the ground of his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Summons was personally served on Juanito on March 10, 2005.

The case was dismissed on January 23, 2006 for Florenda’s failure to prosecute. On her motion for reconsideration, it was reinstated on February 10, 2006. Florenda then filed several motions to cancel hearings. On April 19, 2007, she was deposed orally because she was leaving for Hong Kong, where she worked as an Overseas Contract Worker. On the RTC’s order, the provincial prosecutor of Batangas investigated for collusion and reported, in a Compliance dated August 22, 2007, that none existed.

After more postponements caused by the absence of Florenda, her witnesses or her counsel, and after her counsel manifested that she was abroad and not communicating, the RTC archived the case on September 15, 2009.

On August 20, 2020, Juanito’s counsel entered an appearance and later requested the case records. On March 24, 2022, Juanito filed a Motion to Revive with an attached Answer dated November 26, 2021. In the Answer, he also prayed for the nullity of the marriage, but alleged that it was Florenda who was psychologically incapacitated.

The RTC, in its Order of April 28, 2022, denied the motion. It held that only Florenda, as plaintiff, could move for revival, and that the motion was tantamount to collusion. On reconsideration, the RTC, in its Order of February 28, 2023, again denied relief and dismissed Florenda’s petition for failure to prosecute. It ruled that revival would be futile because the burden of proof rested on Florenda. It also found collusion in the contents of Juanito’s Answer, since he sought to adopt the abandoned suit as his own instead of opposing it. The RTC denied a further motion for reconsideration as a prohibited second motion.

The CA ruled that the second motion for reconsideration was not prohibited, because it assailed a different order. Nonetheless, in its Decision of February 25, 2025, the CA affirmed the dismissal under Rule 17, Section 3, citing Florenda’s prolonged inaction. It also held that Juanito’s revival motion was futile because the burden of proving nullity lay with Florenda. The CA denied reconsideration on October 7, 2025.

ISSUES

1. Did the CA err in affirming the RTC’s denial of Juanito’s Motion to Revive and the dismissal of the petition for nullity for failure to prosecute?
2. Was the archiving of the petition for nullity proper?
3. May the defendant-spouse move to revive an archived case, and may the court dismiss an archived case before reviving it?
4. Does the dismissal of the petition under Rule 17, Section 3 bar the defendant-spouse from pursuing his own claim for nullity in the same action, despite his belated Answer?
5. Did Juanito’s Answer praying for the nullity of the marriage amount to collusion?
6. Was the Motion to Revive futile because the burden of proving psychological incapacity rested on the plaintiff?

RULING

1. Did the CA err in affirming the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Revive and the dismissal of the petition for nullity? — Yes.

“The Petition is impressed with merit.”

The Court found errors at every stage: the archiving, the denial of revival, the dismissal before revival, the finding of collusion, and the holding that revival was futile. These are discussed under Issues 2 to 6.

“Time and again, the Court has recognized that technicality and procedural imperfection, should as a rule, not serve as the bases of decisions. In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court deems that the ends of justice would be better served if petitioner is given ample opportunity to fully ventilate his claim in order for the court to fully ascertain the merits of the case. Considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, the Court resolves that a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of evidence and proper resolution on the merits is most appropriate.”

2. Was the archiving of the petition for nullity proper? — No.

“Indeed, the archiving of cases is a widely accepted measure designed to shelve cases in which no immediate action is expected but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. It saves the petitioner or applicant from the added trouble and expense of refiling a dismissed case. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains where action on it can be taken.”

SC Administrative Circular No. 07-A-1992, as reiterated in OCA Circular No. 89-2004, provides:

“In civil cases, the court may motu proprio or upon motion, order that a civil case be archived only in the following instances:
(a) When the parties are in the process of settlement, in which case the proceedings may be suspended, and the case archived for a period not exceeding [90] days. x x x
(b) When an interlocutory order or incident in the civil case is elevated to, and is pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
(c) When defendant, without fault or neglect of plaintiff, cannot be served with summons within [six] months from issuance of original summons.”

“None of the above sanctioned grounds is applicable in the present case. The records are bereft of any indication that there were negotiations for settlement, a pending incident restrained by a higher court, nor inability to serve summons upon the defendant. In the first place, a petition for nullity could not have been the subject of a settlement since the validity of a marriage can never be compromised. It was likewise established that summons was duly received.”

“Even assuming that one of the three grounds was attendant, the archiving of a case cannot go beyond the period of 90 days. Here, the case was placed under archived status for far too long, i.e., beginning 2009 or for 13 long years until 2022 when petitioner’s counsel finally filed a motion for its revival.”

The Court held that a ground for dismissal under Rule 17, Section 3 was already available in 2009:

“Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his or her evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his or her action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.”

“Where there was no valid ground for archiving but a valid ground for dismissal otherwise existent at the time, the RTC should not have archived the case and permit inaction on the same for such a long period. The impropriety of this predicate act by the RTC provides context as to why it likewise and consequently erred in issuing the assailed Orders dated April 28, 2022 and February 28, 2023.”

3. May the defendant-spouse move to revive an archived case, and may the court dismiss it before revival? — Yes, any party may move for revival; no, the case must first be revived.

OCA Circular No. 89-2004, General Provisions, paragraph (d), provides:

“(d) The Presiding Judge shall, motu proprio or upon motion of any party, order the reinstatement/revival of an archived case and its withdrawal from the archives whenever the same is ready for trial or further proceedings.”

The Court also cited OCA Circular No. 259-2024. That circular directs courts to revive archived cases, require the parties to manifest their interest in pursuing them, and, absent such manifestation or appearance, act on the cases, such as by dismissing civil cases with prejudice.

“First, where the rules clearly provide that an order for the reinstatement or revival of an archived case may be initiated upon motion of any party, then the RTC erred in issuing its April 28, 2022 Order, denying petitioner’s Motion to Revive, on the reasoning that the right to file such pleading was exclusively with respondent as plaintiff of the petition for nullity.”

“Second, an archived case must first be revived before further action may be taken thereon as archival is not tantamount to a dismissal. The trial court must probe and determine the interest of the parties to pursue the case. It is in the absence of showing of such interest that the case will then be dismissed with prejudice.”

“Here, the entry of appearance and request for records as early as 2020, and the subsequent filing of a Motion to Revive with Answer in 2022, surely manifested petitioner’s interest as one of the parties to further pursue the case. The RTC, through the February 28, 2023 Order, should not have precipitously dismissed the archived case before it has been revived. x x x Indubitably, the RTC erred in issuing its assailed Orders.”

4. Does the Rule 17, Section 3 dismissal bar Juanito’s own claim for nullity in the same action, despite his belated Answer? — No.

“x x x the revival of the case in view of petitioner’s interest could have nonetheless allowed the proceedings to continue where Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court also clearly declares that dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff is ‘without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.’”

“To hold that the dismissal due to respondent’s fault is to petitioner’s prejudice, such that it prevents him from pursuing his counterclaim, is to let the last line of Rule 17, Section 3 render nugatory the preceding line of the same provision.”

Citing Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, the Court quoted:

“x x x the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint. x x x At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.”

On the nature of Juanito’s Answer:

“By not merely providing a justification to defeat plaintiff’s claim as one would in an affirmative defense, but asserting a new and independent claim and seeking relief from the plaintiff, petitioner here is essentially advancing a counterclaim, and he is electing to prosecute his right to do so in the same action and within these proceedings.”

On the late Answer, the Court distinguished Juliano-Llave v. Republic:

“Here, although petitioner did not file his Answer within the immediately preceding period after he was served his summons, the RTC and the CA’s findings only pertained to respondent’s neglect and prolonged inaction. No similar finding was made about petitioner’s postponements, obstinate refusal, or analogous dilatory tactics.”

“In any case, an action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage is imprescriptible. Thus, any strict imposition of the period to file an answer that would prejudice petitioner is counterintuitive, since he is not precluded and is in fact allowed by the rules, to file this counterclaim through another separate action.”

“But to uphold the dismissal order and let petitioner file anew his complaint for nullity before a different Family Court, as the RTC suggests, would not serve any compelling purpose, is impractical, and counterproductive to the cause of justice.”

5. Did Juanito’s Answer amount to collusion? — No.

“The mere fact that both spouses believe that a marriage should end is not tantamount to collusion, especially here where the Court’s own examination of the allegations of their respective pleadings would show that they fundamentally disagree on the root cause of the invalidity of such marriage. Both spouses do not admit incapacity on their part; rather, they contend that it is the other spouse that possesses such psychological incapacity.”

Citing Puyat v. Puyat, the Court quoted:

“Simply because they mutually desire to have their marriage declared null and void does not mean that they have colluded to trick the court. To rule otherwise would be to unfairly foreclose the remedy under Article 36 to all individuals who are similarly situated x x x.”

Citing Republic v. Ramoran-Wong:

“Here, not only is there lack of sufficient evidence proving that respondent and petitioner conspired to have their marriage voided, but the provincial prosecutor also reported at the outset, that there was no finding of collusion. This official finding is entitled to the presumption of regularity.”

6. Was the Motion to Revive futile because the burden of proof rested on the plaintiff? — No.

“Undoubtedly, it is the plaintiff-spouse who has the burden to prove the existence of the psychological incapacity by clear and convincing evidence. x x x However, her failure to do so due to her unresponsiveness or lack of interest does not affect—nor as the CA would put it, render ineffectual—the separate and distinct onus of petitioner to prove the allegations of his counterclaim.”

“The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove their assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment. As the plaintiff in his own counterclaim, petitioner is equally entitled to the opportunity granted to respondent in the original petition, to establish his cause of action and to prove the right he asserts.”

Dispositive. The Court GRANTED the Petition for Review on Certiorari. It reversed and set aside the CA Decision dated February 25, 2025 and Resolution dated October 7, 2025 in CA-G.R. CV No. 121859. The case was remanded to the RTC a quo for the revival of the case and the reception of Juanito’s evidence on his counterclaim.

DISCUSSION

Where did the trouble start?

With the archiving in 2009. Archiving is a parking space, not a burial ground. It keeps alive a case that cannot move for now but should not be dismissed. Let us test the three grounds against the facts:

1. Parties in the process of settlement — Absent. There were no negotiations. In any case, the validity of a marriage can never be compromised.
2. Incident pending before a higher court with a TRO or injunction — Absent. No such incident existed.
3. Defendant cannot be served summons within six months, without the plaintiff’s fault — Absent. Juanito was personally served on March 10, 2005.

No ground existed. Worse, a ground for dismissal already existed: Florenda’s repeated absences and her earlier dismissal for failure to prosecute. The RTC chose to archive, let the case sleep for 13 years, then counted those 13 years against the party who woke it up.

Can the defendant revive a case he did not file?

Yes. OCA Circular No. 89-2004 allows revival motu proprio or “upon motion of any party.” The RTC’s view that only the plaintiff could move for revival has no basis in the circular.

Can a court dismiss an archived case outright?

No. The case must first be revived. The court then determines whether the parties are still interested. Only if no interest is shown may it dismiss, with prejudice, consistent with OCA Circular No. 259-2024. Juanito showed interest in 2020 and 2022, so the RTC dismissed prematurely.

Why did Juanito’s Answer survive Florenda’s abandonment of her petition?

Because it was a counterclaim, not a mere defense. He did not simply deny his own incapacity. He asserted a new and independent claim: that Florenda was psychologically incapacitated, and that the marriage was void on that ground. Rule 17, Section 3 says the dismissal is “without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.” Following Pinga, the counterclaim stands or falls on its own merits, not on the fate of the complaint.

But was the Answer not filed some 16 years late?

The Court gave three answers:

1. Unlike the wife in Juliano-Llave, Juanito was not found to have engaged in obstinate refusal or dilatory tactics. The findings of neglect were all against Florenda.
2. The delay stemmed from an irregular archiving, and the trial court shared the duty to monitor its docket.
3. An action or defense for nullity of a void marriage is imprescriptible. Juanito could refile anyway, so forcing him to start over before another Family Court would be impractical.

Was there collusion? Let us test it.

• Conspiracy to fabricate a matrimonial offense — Absent. The spouses accuse each other. Neither admits incapacity.
• Agreement to obtain nullity without valid grounds — Absent. There was no evidence of this.
• Prosecutor’s finding — No collusion. The 2007 report enjoys the presumption of regularity.

A shared wish to end the marriage is not collusion. As Puyat put it, ruling otherwise would foreclose Article 36 to similarly situated spouses.

Why was revival not futile?

Because burdens are separate. Florenda carried the burden on her petition. Juanito, as plaintiff in his counterclaim, carries his own burden to prove Florenda’s incapacity by the established quantum of evidence and through the jurisprudential requisites. One party’s failure does not cancel the other’s opportunity.

Take note:

• The CA’s procedural ruling stands untouched. The CA held that Juanito’s second motion for reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading because it assailed a different order. The Supreme Court did not disturb or discuss this ruling.
• The Court did not rule on whether Florenda is in fact psychologically incapacitated. That question was remanded for trial. The Court also did not say whether Juanito’s evidence meets the requisites. It noted only that he must prove gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence, as these were described for the plaintiff’s burden, by the established quantum.
• The status of Florenda’s own petition is not expressly addressed. The Court reasoned on the assumption that her petition was dismissible, and the remand covers only Juanito’s counterclaim. It did not expressly reinstate her petition.
• A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not mention counterclaims. The Court read the right from the Rules of Court, which apply suppletorily. It acknowledged that the Rules do not supply an exact timeframe or manner for prosecuting a counterclaim within the same action after the complaint is dismissed.
• The 90-day limit. In the quoted circular, the 90-day period attaches to ground (a), settlement. The Court nonetheless stated that archiving on any of the three grounds “cannot go beyond the period of 90 days.” This statement was made on an assumption (“Even assuming”), since no ground existed here.

Bar takeaways

• A civil case may be archived only on three grounds: settlement (up to 90 days), a higher court’s TRO or injunction, or failure to serve summons within six months without the plaintiff’s fault.
• A nullity case cannot be archived “for settlement,” because the validity of marriage is not subject to compromise.
• Any party may move to revive an archived case, and the case must be revived before it can be dismissed.
• A defendant’s counterclaim survives a dismissal under Rule 17, Section 3 and may be prosecuted in the same or in a separate action.
• In a nullity case, a respondent-spouse who alleges that the petitioner is the incapacitated one is asserting a counterclaim, not a mere defense.
• Mutual desire to end the marriage is not collusion, and the prosecutor’s no-collusion finding enjoys the presumption of regularity.
• An action or defense for nullity of a void marriage is imprescriptible.