Macalintal v. Office of the President, G.R. No. E-08557 (October 14, 2026)

The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment[.]

– Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78

Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the immediate issuance of a status quo ante order (SQAO), temporary restraining order (TRO), and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) and urgent motion to conduct special raffle¹ against respondents Office of the President (OP), through the Executive Secretary, the House of Representatives (HOR), the Senate of the Philippines (Senate), and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).²

The Petition invoked Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution to review, prohibit, and declare Republic Act No. 12326³ void and unconstitutional because it is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and prevailing jurisprudence, and therefore enacted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.⁴

Antecedents

The Petition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 12326 was filed in the context of challenges to other similar laws.

On June 27, 2023, this Court, in Macalintal v. COMELEC⁵ (2023 Macalintal), declared Republic Act No. 11935⁶ unconstitutional for violating substantive due process and the right of suffrage, and for grave abuse of discretion. We enumerated guidelines for determining future laws or rules postponing elections and allowed the October 30, 2023 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (BSKE) to proceed.⁷

Subsequently, on August 13, 2025, Republic Act No. 12232⁸ was signed into law. It prescribed four-year terms, a maximum of three consecutive terms for barangay officials and one term for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) officials in the same position. It scheduled the next BSKE for November 2, 2026, and every four years thereafter. The assumption of office of winning candidates was on the first day of December next following their election, and the hold-over of incumbents until their successors have been elected and qualified.

On November 11, 2025, this Court dismissed the petitions challenging Republic Act No. 12232 in Macalintal v. Senate⁹ (2025 Macalintal). We ruled that “Congress has the authority to determine the term of office of barangay officials, as explicitly stated in Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution.”

On September 24, 2026, President Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. signed into law Republic Act No. 12326, which took effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette on the next day. It amended several sections of Republic Act No. 12232. In its entirety, Republic Act No. 12326 reads:

Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 12232 or “An Act Setting the Term of Office of Barangay Officials and Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and for Other Purposes” is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Section 1. Term of Office. — The term of office of all elected barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials shall be five [] years. No elective barangay official shall serve for more than two [] consecutive terms in the same position. No elective Sangguniang Kabataan official shall serve for more than one [] term in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”

Sec. 2. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 12232 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Sec. 2. Date of Election. — The next regular barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections shall be held on the second Monday of November 2028 and every five [] years thereafter.”

Section 3. A new Section 4-A is hereby inserted after Section 4 of Republic Act No. 12232, to read as follows:

“Section 4-A. Filling Up of Vacancies in Sangguniang Kabataan Membership — Any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, a vacancy in the membership of the Sangguniang Kabataan shall be filled through the appointment by the city or municipal mayor with jurisdiction over the barangay of the concerned Sangguniang Kabataan of any person who meets, as of the date of appointment, the qualifications provided under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 10742 or the ‘Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of 2015,’ as amended by Republic Act No. 11768: Provided, That vacancies in the office of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson shall not be subject to this provision and shall be filled by succession as provided in Section 19(a) of Republic Act No. 10742, as amended.”

Sec. 4. A new Section 4-B is hereby inserted after the new Section 4-A to read as follows:

“Sec. 4-B. Training and Capacity Building. — Consistent with the five (5)-year term of office established under this Act, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in coordination with the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Commission on Elections (COMELEC), state universities and colleges (SUCs), and other appropriate government agencies, shall institutionalize continuing training and capacity-building programs for barangay officials and members of the Sangguniang Kabataan to strengthen their capacity to perform their duties and responsibilities and to ensure continuity in the implementation of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan programs and projects. Such programs shall, as far as practicable, be coordinated and harmonized to avoid unnecessary duplication and recurring training costs.”

Sec. 5. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 12232 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Sec. 5. Transitory Provision. — Considering the extension of their terms by two [] years, incumbent elective barangay officials shall be regarded as having completed one [] term in their respective positions. Incumbent officials serving their last term in the same position in accordance with Section 1 hereof shall be ineligible to run for the same position in the November 2028 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.”

Sec. 6. Limitation During Transition Period. — Nothing in this Act shall be construed to exempt any incumbent official from pending and future investigations concerning administrative, civil, or criminal cases or liabilities against them, and the consequences thereof during such incumbency: Provided, That incumbent officials with such pending cases may be prevented from sitting during the transition period in accordance with law as may be ordered by the courts or competent authority.

Sec. 7. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act.

Any unexpended balance of the appropriations authorized for the conduct of the barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections shall be deemed continuing appropriation of the COMELEC and shall remain available as funding source to cover the preparatory activities for the 2028 National and Local Elections and such other lawful expenditures and purposes as may be determined by the Commission.

Sec. 8. Separability Clause. — If any provision or part of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the remainder hereof not otherwise affected shall remain in full force and effect.

Sec. 9. Repealing Clause. — All laws, acts, decrees, executive orders, issuances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof which are contrary to and inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Sec. 10. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

On September 25, 2026, the COMELEC issued Minute Resolution 26-0842 which resolved to approve the cessation of all activities related to the November 2026 BSKE by virtue of Republic Act No. 12326, including activities such as the filing of certificates of candidacy and the printing of ballots.

On September 27, 2026, Macalintal filed the present Petition as a voter, taxpayer, and practicing lawyer with an actual and material legal interest in the subject of this petition. He alleges that this Court disregarded the 2023 Macalintal guidelines in upholding the validity of Republic Act No. 12232, and that Congress did the same when it enacted Republic Act No. 12326.

Specifically, he puts forward the following arguments in support of his Petition:

I. Republic Act No. 12326 infringes the electorate’s right of suffrage by postponing the November 2026 BSKE under the guise of fixing terms.

II. The postponement does not satisfy the Macalintal guidelines and substantive due process.

III. Republic Act No. 12326 is an ELECTION POSTPONEMENT LAW, disguised as a “term-fixing” law and is unconstitutional because the holdover mechanism applied to incumbent barangay officials constitutes legislative appointment in violation of the constitutional provision that they must be elected and NOT appointed.

IV. The law violates the constitutional requirement of one subject expressed in the title.¹⁰

In a Resolution dated September 30, 2026, the Court required respondents to comment on the Petition and on the prayer for injunctive relief within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the OP, Senate, HOR, and the COMELEC (collectively, respondents), argued for the dismissal of the Petition and applications for preliminary injunctive reliefs in its Comment dated October 5, 2026. The following grounds were submitted:

I. The petition violates the hierarchy of courts.

II. The determination of the term of barangay officials is a political question.

III. Republic Act No. 12326 is a valid term-fixing law.

a. The [2023] Macalintal guidelines do not apply to Republic Act No. 12326.

b. Republic Act No. 12326 is a valid exercise of legislative power satisfying substantive due process.

c. Republic Act No. 12326 does not infringe on the electorate’s right to suffrage.

IV. Republic Act No. 12326 does not constitute a legislative appointment through hold-over.

V. Republic Act No. 12326 does not violate the “one-subject, one-title” rule in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution [sic].

VI. Petitioner is not entitled to a status quo ante order and/or temporary restraining order.¹¹

Macalintal then filed an Omnibus Motion: (1) For Leave of Court to File and Admit the Herein Incorporated Reply to the Comment of the Respondents; and (2) Urgently Reiterating the Prayer for TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order.¹² He maintains that Section 5 of Republic Act No. 12326 belies respondents’ claim that the law does not extend the terms of incumbent officials; that the power of Congress to determine the term of barangay officials does not include the power to prolong the terms of sitting officials; that 2025 Macalintal does not bar the Petition under the doctrine of stare decisis because Republic Act No. 12326 involves a different interval, a different effect on the incumbents, and different justifications; that the reasons offered for the law are superficial; and that the new election date, the hold-over, and the extension of terms are prohibited riders.¹³

On October 8, 2026, Jupiter Stalin M. Larida (Larida), the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Kabangbang, Bantayan (Island), Cebu, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention, with the Comment-in-Intervention. He alleges that he was elected to and assumed the position in December 2023, and that the “affirmation of constitutionality or declaration of the unconstitutionality of [RA] 12326 could either favorably or adversely affect the status of the Intervenor as a Punong Barangay.”¹⁴

Larida prays for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that the Petition raises no genuine issue of constitutionality, as it questions neither the mandate of Congress to change the term of office of barangay and SK officials nor the authority of the President to sign Republic Act No. 12326 into law; that, consistent with 2025 Macalintal, the primary purpose of Republic Act No. 12326 is to fix the term of office of barangay and SK officials, not to postpone the November 2026 BSKE; and that the Petition merely seeks an explanation for a matter that falls within the wisdom of the legislative and executive branches.¹⁵ He adds that a five-year term benefits both the officials and their constituents, as it gives officials sufficient time to implement their plans, programs, and projects, and to familiarize themselves with the preparation of the Annual Barangay Budget and the formulation of the Barangay Development Plan.¹⁶

Issues

The issues for resolution are:

1. Whether direct resort to the Court is proper, and whether the requisites for the exercise of judicial review are present;
2. Whether Larida should be allowed to intervene;
3. Whether the determination of the term of office of barangay officials is a political question beyond judicial review;
4. Whether Republic Act No. 12326 is an election-postponement law subject to the guidelines laid down in 2023 Macalintal;
5. Whether the November 2028 date set by Republic Act No. 12326 is reasonable and not unduly long;
6. Whether Republic Act No. 12326 violates substantive due process and the right of suffrage;
7. Whether the hold-over of incumbent barangay officials under Republic Act No. 12326 constitutes a legislative appointment;
8. Whether Republic Act No. 12326 violates the one subject-one title rule under Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; and
9. Whether Macalintal is entitled to the issuance of a TRO, SQAO, and/or WPI.

Ruling of the Court

The Petition lacks merit. Larida’s intervention must likewise be denied. The Court resolves the issues in the order presented above.

I. Direct resort to the Court is justified,
and the requisites for the exercise of
judicial review are present

Respondents argue that the Petition violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts because it raises factual issues, such as the alleged waste of public funds, the public’s opposition to the postponement, and the alleged lack of study supporting the law.¹⁷

The Court does not agree.

Direct resort to the Court is allowed when the issues raised are pure questions of law.¹⁸ The constitutional questions in this case are of that kind. Whether Republic Act No. 12326 is a term-fixing law, whether it infringes the right of suffrage, whether its hold-over provision amounts to a legislative appointment, and whether it complies with the one subject-one title rule may all be resolved on the basis of the text of the law, the undisputed legislative record, and prevailing jurisprudence. The factual matters that respondents identify are not essential to the resolution of these questions. As in 2025 Macalintal, the Court can resolve whether the assailed law is unconstitutional without presenting evidence.

On the other hand, the power of judicial review may be exercised only when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.¹⁹

These requisites are present. Republic Act No. 12326 is already in effect, and the COMELEC has acted on it by discontinuing all activities for the November 2026 BSKE. Macalintal sues as a registered voter of Las Piñas City, a taxpayer, and a practicing lawyer.²⁰ In 2025 Macalintal, the Court recognized the standing of the same petitioner, in the same capacities, to challenge Republic Act No. 12232, holding that the postponement of the BSKE “is an actual and direct violation of their right to participate in the BSKE, or at the very least, is an imminent threat of violation of their right of suffrage.” There is no reason to rule differently here. The Petition was filed within days of the law’s effectivity, and the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 12326 is the lis mota of the case.

II. Larida’s intervention should be denied

Intervention is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and may be allowed only when (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or is otherwise qualified; and (b) the intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, taking into account whether the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. The legal interest must be of a direct and immediate character, such that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. It must be actual and material, and not indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential, or collateral.²¹

Larida does not meet the first requisite. He claims only that the outcome of the case “could either favorably or adversely affect” his status as Punong Barangay.²² Whatever effect a ruling may have on the length of his stay in office, it does not give him a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Public office is a public trust. It is not a property right, and no one has a vested right to hold any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office.²³ On this basis, the Court in 2025 Macalintal denied the intervention of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas and of punong barangays elected in the October 2023 BSKE, who likewise invoked the effect of the case on the length of their stay in office.²⁴ Larida stands in no different position.

Neither would Larida’s participation aid the Court in resolving the case. His Comment-in-Intervention raises no argument that respondents, through the OSG, have not already presented: that the Petition questions the wisdom, rather than the validity, of the law; and that Republic Act No. 12326, like Republic Act No. 12232, is a term-fixing law to which the 2023 Macalintal guidelines do not apply.²⁵ His intervention would add a party to the case, but not an issue.

Larida’s argument that a five-year term would enable barangay officials to develop proficiency in preparing the Annual Barangay Budget and the Barangay Development Plan²⁶ raises policy considerations. They are properly addressed to Congress, which, as discussed below, weighed similar considerations in enacting Republic Act No. 12326. They do not bear on the question of constitutionality before the Court.

III. The determination of the term of
barangay officials is a political
question only insofar as its wisdom is
concerned

Respondents argue that determining the term of barangay officials is a political question. They are correct insofar as the wisdom of that determination is concerned. As the Court explained in COMELEC v. Cruz,²⁷ “whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.”

The Petition, however, does not merely question the wisdom of a five-year term. It alleges that Republic Act No. 12326 transgresses specific constitutional limitations: the right of suffrage, substantive due process, the requirement that barangay officials be elected, and the one subject-one title rule. Whether Congress kept within these limits is a question the Court is bound to answer under its expanded power of judicial review. What the Court may not do, in answering it, is substitute its own judgment for that of Congress on how long barangay officials should serve, or on whether the reasons for the law are wise.

With these parameters in mind, the Court turns to the substantive issues.

IV. Republic Act No. 12326 is a term-
fixing law to which the 2023
Macalintal guidelines do not apply

The determination of a law’s fundamental character begins with its text. In 2025 Macalintal, the Court distinguished Republic Act No. 12232 from the election-postponement laws that preceded it, including Republic Act No. 11935, which was struck down in 2023 Macalintal. We noted that Republic Act No. 12232 is titled as an act “setting” the term of office of barangay officials, not one “postponing” an election; that it does not amend Republic Act No. 9164, as the postponement laws did; that it prescribes a new term for BSK officials, whereas the postponement laws retained the three-year term; and that it sets a new interval between elections. On these bases, the Court held that Republic Act No. 12232 is fundamentally a term-setting law, and that “since Republic Act No. 12232 is not primarily an election postponement law, the Macalintal 2023 guidelines become inapplicable.”

Each of these markers appears in Republic Act No. 12326. Its title describes it as an act “Fixing the Term of Office of Barangay Officials and Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan to Five [] Years.” It amends Republic Act No. 12232, a term-setting law, and not Republic Act No. 9164. It changes the term structure: it lengthens the term from four to five years and reduces the consecutive-term limit for barangay officials from three terms to two. It sets a new five-year interval between elections. Its principal purpose, as gleaned from its text, is to fix the term of barangay and SK officials. Setting the next BSKE for November 2028 implements the new term, and is not an independent objective. The rest of the provisions of Republic Act No. 12326 confirm this. Section 4-B, inserted by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 12326, directs the institutionalization of training and capacity-building programs for barangay and SK officials “[c]onsistent with the [five-year] term of office established under this Act.”²⁸

Macalintal seeks to show otherwise by pointing to news reports that headlined the law as one that “postpones” the BSKE, and to the explanation given at a media briefing when the signing of the law was announced.²⁹ These do not alter the character of the law. What a law is depends on what it says and what it principally seeks to accomplish, not on how it is described in the press.

Neither is the character of the law changed by the candid acknowledgment of the Senate sponsor that “the natural effect will, of course, be to postpone the upcoming [elections].”³⁰ 2025 Macalintal itself recognized that a term-setting law may incidentally affect the date of elections. An incidental effect does not convert a term-setting law into a postponement law.

Nor does the fact that Congress again changed the term of barangay officials barely a year after Republic Act No. 12232 alter the analysis. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution does not prescribe how long a statutory term must remain in place before Congress may revisit it. As the Court held in 2025 Macalintal, this power is expressly committed to Congress and “establishes that Congress possesses the discretion to fix, modify, and extend the term of office of barangay officials as circumstances and public welfare dictate.” The limit on that discretion lies elsewhere, which the Court discusses next.

Macalintal invites the Court to revisit 2025 Macalintal. The Court declines. Macalintal raised the same theory in that case, specifically, that a term-setting law that moves an election date is a postponement law in disguise, and the Court rejected it after full deliberation. He identifies no compelling countervailing consideration that would justify a different result less than a year later.

Stare decisis requires the Court to apply the controlling rule in 2025 Macalintal, but it does not dispense with the need to examine the statute before Us. The question is whether the differences between Republic Act No. 12326 and Republic Act No. 12232 change the measure’s legal character or make its commencement date unreasonable under 2025 Macalintal—not whether the laws are identical.

The changes in the length of the term, the election date, and the transitional treatment of incumbents are relevant to that inquiry. They do not, however, automatically convert a term-setting statute into a law whose primary purpose is postponing elections. Sections 1 and 2 establish a new term structure and the election cycle by which it is implemented. Section 5 addresses the transition from the former structure to the new one. The fact that Congress could have adopted a different transition does not establish that the one enacted has a different principal object.

The controlling precedent governs the classification of the law, while the reasonableness of the commencement date is determined by the circumstances of Republic Act No. 12326. This approach respects both the binding interpretation of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution in 2025 Macalintal and the constitutional limit that the same decision expressly preserved.

Neither may the term of office under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 12326 be treated as separate and distinct from the date of the elections under Section 2, because one is not necessarily implied by the other. That is the very proposition that 2025 Macalintal rejected. There, the Court held that the express grant to Congress of the power to determine the term of barangay officials “necessarily carries with it, the power to determine when that determined term begins and when it ends,” and that these “temporal components are not severable from the power to set the term itself—they are integral, subsidiary elements that give meaning and effect to the express constitutional grant of authority.”³¹

Because the power to fix the term includes the power to fix its commencement and the election date, the election date cannot be detached from the term and measured against standards, such as the 2023 Macalintal guidelines, crafted for laws whose purpose is to postpone elections.

That the term and the election date appear in separate sections of Republic Act No. 12326 does not make them separate subjects. A five-year term must begin and end on some date, and the election that fills the office must be held on some date. Sections 1 and 2 are two parts of one structure: the five-year term and the five-year election cycle that gives it effect.

Neither is the analysis altered by the views of individual legislators that the five-year term could have been applied prospectively, beginning with the officials to be elected in November 2026. These views show that the alternative was raised and debated in both chambers. They also show that it was not adopted. That some members of Congress preferred a different transition to the new term does not change the character of the choice that Congress, as a body, made. How to move from one term structure to another is part of the power to determine the term, and the Court may not substitute the option it prefers for the one Congress chose. As earlier discussed, the acknowledgment in the legislative record that Republic Act No. 12326 has the effect of moving the BSKE does not change the primary character of the law.

V. The November 2028 date is
reasonable and not unduly long

This is not to say that Congress’s power to fix the term of barangay officials is without limit. In 2025 Macalintal, the Court held that the power to fix the term carries with it the power to determine when the new term starts, “provided that such determined period is reasonable and should not be unduly long from the time of the enactment of the law setting the new term of office.”³² This limitation is the Court’s safeguard against the serial resetting of barangay elections that petitioner fears. The question is whether Republic Act No. 12326 respects it. The Court finds that it does.

First, the November 2028 date aligns with the five-year term Republic Act No. 12326 prescribes. The incumbents were elected in the BSKE held on October 30, 2023. In 2025 Macalintal, the Court observed that Republic Act No. 12232 harmonized the term structure with the October 2023 BSKE as its reference point. Measured from the same reference point, the next BSKE under Republic Act No. 12326, on the second Monday of November 2028, falls roughly five years after the last one, which is the very interval Congress has now prescribed as the regular term of barangay officials. The date is not arbitrary as it follows from the term.

The period between enactment and the commencement of the new electoral cycle is a material consideration under 2025 Macalintal. Republic Act No. 12326 was enacted in September 2026, while the next BSKE is set for November 2028. This interval is longer than the interval between the enactment of Republic Act No. 12232 and the BSKE scheduled under that law. The distinction must be acknowledged; it cannot be resolved simply by measuring the period from the October 2023 election.

It does not follow, however, that the longer interval is necessarily unconstitutional. 2025 Macalintal prescribed a standard of reasonableness, not a fixed maximum number of months between enactment and the next election. The relevant inquiry is whether the commencement date is unduly remote in light of the statutory term structure and the practical requirements of implementing the transition.

Here, Congress fixed a definite date and a recurring five-year cycle. The legislative record identifies the difficulty of holding the BSKE in 2027 while the COMELEC prepares for the May 2028 national and local elections, as well as the concern that a five-year cycle beginning in 2026 would cause the BSKE to coincide with the 2031 national and local elections. These considerations do not make November 2028 the only possible date, but the Constitution does not require Congress to prove that no other date could work. They provide a rational explanation for the transition selected.

The Court must still ask whether that explanation, considered with the length of the interval and the effect on incumbents, is sufficient to keep the law within the reasonableness limit recognized in 2025 Macalintal. In the Court’s view, the fixed date, the recurring cycle, and the identified electoral-administration considerations support a finding that the law is not unconstitutional. The interval is a serious consideration, but it does not by itself establish that Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority.

Second, Congress explained why the next BSKE could not reasonably be set earlier. According to the legislative record cited by respondents, proceeding with the BSKE in 2026 under a five-year cycle would cause it to coincide with the national and local elections in 2031, potentially leading to yet another postponement, whereas the cycle under Republic Act No. 12326 would coincide with a midterm election only once, in 2043.³³ Holding the BSKE in 2027, on the other hand, would conflict with the COMELEC’s preparations for the May 2028 national elections.³⁴

Macalintal contends that the reasons offered for Republic Act No. 12326 fail the test in 2023 Macalintal, which requires that a postponement be justified by reasons “sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling.”³⁵ That, however, is the standard for laws whose primary purpose is to postpone elections. It is not the measure of a term-fixing law. For a term-fixing law, 2025 Macalintal asks whether the period before the new term begins is reasonable and not unduly long.

These are considerations of electoral administration that fall squarely within the competence of Congress. They are relevant not because the Court must independently determine whether each is sufficiently compelling to justify a postponement under the 2023 Macalintal guidelines, but because they help explain the transition Congress selected and bear on whether the commencement date is unreasonable or unduly long under 2025 Macalintal. The Court must enforce that constitutional limit without converting its review into a choice among possible electoral calendars.

Third, the BSKE is set on a date certain, fixed in the law itself, and every five years thereafter. The electorate knows when it will next vote. This is the opposite of the indefinite deferment that the reasonableness limitation guards against.

A fixed date alone does not establish constitutionality; it may still be unreasonable if it arbitrarily or indefinitely postpones voters’ choice of officials. To be more accurate, Republic Act No. 12326 neither leaves the next election to executive discretion nor suspends it until an uncertain event. It sets a date and a recurring interval, which must be assessed under the standard for term-setting laws clarified in 2025 Macalintal. This allows review of future abuses without treating every electoral-timing change as unconstitutional.

Macalintal stresses that, counted from the original December 2025 schedule, the electorate will have waited three years. But the December 2025 date was validly reset by Republic Act No. 12232, as the Court held in 2025 Macalintal. The relevant inquiry under that case is whether the period before the new term begins is reasonable and not unduly long from the enactment of the law setting the new term. For the reasons stated, it is.

Neither is the interval between November 2026 and November 2028 a “badge of the unreasonableness of the interval that may render questionable the genuineness of the reasons for the postponement” under the 2023 Macalintal guidelines.³⁶ The interval must be viewed against the new five-year term. Measured from the October 2023 BSKE, the November 2028 BSKE comes about five years later, the same interval that Congress has prescribed for every BSKE thereafter. The interval is not remote from the term—it is the term. Nor is the genuineness of the reasons put in doubt considering that they were openly stated and debated in Congress.³⁷

Macalintal also asks what would stop Congress from resetting the BSKE again in 2028, and every time thereafter.³⁸ The answer is the same limitation, which the Court will apply to every future law that comes before it. The possibility that a future Congress may abuse its power is not a ground to invalidate the present law. The Court passes upon laws that have been enacted, not upon those that have yet to be filed.

VI. Republic Act No. 12326 does not
violate substantive due process or
the right of suffrage

Substantive due process requires the concurrence of two requisites: (1) lawful subject—the interests of the public generally, rather than a particular class, require State interference; and (2) lawful means—the means employed are reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective and are not unduly oppressive.³⁹

Both substantive due process requirements are met. The lawful subject is effective local governance: continuity of barangay and SK programs, implementation of multi-year development plans, and efficient use of limited public resources. These matters affect the public, and not just incumbent officials.

The chosen means reasonably serve those objectives without being unduly oppressive. Congress set a uniform five-year term and electoral cycle, with transition rules for the new schedule. The legislative record cites development planning, barangays’ limited resources, program continuity, and election costs and administration as the rational bases for this structure.

The proposed arrangement, i.e., holding the November 2026 BSKE and applying the five-year term prospectively, does not make the enacted arrangement constitutionally unreasonable. It is reiterated that the Constitution does not require Congress to choose the least disruptive option. The Court must assess whether the chosen means are constitutionally permissible, not whether they are optimal policy. We find that the objectives and means are sufficiently related, and petitioner has not shown the law to be unduly oppressive or arbitrary.

The law itself provides that the unexpended balance of the appropriations for the BSKE shall be deemed a continuing appropriation of the COMELEC, available for the preparatory activities for the 2028 National and Local Elections.⁴⁰

Congress considered terms ranging from three to 10 years, heard the Liga ng mga Barangay, the Department of Interior and Local Government, and the National Youth Commission, and considered and rejected the alternative of holding the 2026 BSKE and applying the five-year term only to those elected then.⁴¹ The means chosen, a uniform five-year term implemented through an election cycle that begins in 2028, bear a reasonable relation to these ends.

The fact that Congress considered and rejected the alternative of holding the November 2026 BSKE and applying the five-year term only to those elected thereafter does not establish that the transition it ultimately adopted is arbitrary. The alternative would have preserved the existing election date, but it would also have required Congress to retain a different transition arrangement and to begin the new electoral cycle with officials elected under the former schedule. There is no constitutional command, whether express or implied, for Congress to select the alternative merely because it would avoid moving the next election.

It bears stressing that the relevant question that remains is whether the means chosen bear a reasonable relation to the legitimate purposes of the law and are not unduly oppressive, and not whether another arrangement would have been less disruptive in one respect. Congress could consider continuity in local development planning, the costs and logistics of separate elections, and the need for a uniform and predictable electoral cycle. However, these considerations do not conclusively establish that every feature of Republic Act No. 12326 is valid, but they are sufficient to distinguish a debatable legislative choice from a measure shown to be constitutionally arbitrary.

The absence of a study showing the inadequacy of the former four-year term does not make the new five-year term unconstitutional. Congress need not wait for an existing law to prove itself deficient before revising it. Indeed, legislatures may change policy based on experience, institutional priorities, or their view of the public interest, subject to constitutional limits.

Macalintal’s challenge to these reasons is a disagreement with their wisdom. He argues that the reasons given at a media briefing are frivolous, that no study examined the sufficiency of the four-year term, and that the oil crisis and conflicts abroad cannot justify a postponement.⁴²

However, the validity of a law is measured against the purposes reflected in its text and in the legislative record, not against a spokesperson’s remarks at a media briefing. The record shows that the Senate committee reviewed studies on the economic effects of longer local terms,⁴³ and the Constitution does not condition the exercise of legislative power on the completion of any particular study. As to the oil crisis, the House sponsor himself treated it as secondary, stating that “[t]he price of oil goes up and down. The barangays’ need for time does not.”⁴⁴

One may find these reasons persuasive or find them wanting. Reasonable minds may differ. Yet the Court may not strike down a law because it would have struck the balance differently. It is precisely because Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution commits the term of barangay officials to Congress that the choice between a four-year and a five-year term, and between applying the new term to the incumbents or only to their successors, belongs to Congress.

We may disagree with the reasons of Congress, but it is not for the Court to replace them with its own.

To require compelling reasons for the length of the term would be to apply a standard drawn from the 2023 Macalintal guidelines on the postponement of elections. Nothing in Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution requires Congress to justify the length of the term it chooses with compelling reasons, or to first test the existing term or conduct an empirical study before changing it. The Constitution leaves the term of barangay officials to be “determined by law.” The question under the due process clause is whether the interests of the public require the measure, and whether the means employed are reasonably necessary to its purpose and not unduly oppressive.

Neither does Republic Act No. 12326 infringe the right of suffrage. The Court held in 2025 Macalintal that the right of suffrage “does not mandate any specific electoral frequency or term length for the BSK officials,” and that an election is regular “if it occurs at fixed, predictable intervals established by law, regardless of whether those intervals are two, three, four, or five years.”

Republic Act No. 12326 does not abolish, suspend, or indefinitely postpone the BSKE. It fixes the next BSKE on a date certain and every five years thereafter. It establishes a definite schedule: the next BSKE is in November 2028, followed by elections every five years. The electorate therefore retains a definite and periodic opportunity to select its barangay and SK representatives.

This was the distinction drawn by the Court in 2025 Macalintal: Republic Act No. 12232 did not abolish or indefinitely postpone the BSKE but changed the statutory term and established a new and definite electoral cycle. We ruled that such legislation did not violate the right of suffrage.

Macalintal argues that an election date that has been moved twice in thirteen months is neither regular nor certain.⁴⁵ But regularity, in the constitutional sense, refers to fixed intervals established by law, as Republic Act No. 12326 provides. The law establishing those intervals may be amended, but that does not make the election irregular, as every statutory election is subject to amendment by a later law, within the limits of the Constitution and prevailing jurisprudence.

Moreover, the argument that the electorate will have gone approximately five years between BSKEs does not alter the analysis. We reiterate that the Constitution does not fix the term for barangay officials. Whether five years is the most apt period is primarily a matter of legislative policy, and not judicial wisdom. The reasons respondents put forward, such as continuity in local governance, completion of multi-year programs, fiscal considerations, reducing the frequency and cost of elections, and aligning terms with local planning cycles, are not prohibited by the Constitution.

Indeed, the Court has no duty to substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress. Our review is warranted only upon a clear showing that Congress crossed a constitutional boundary. No such showing has been made here.

VII. The hold-over of incumbent officials
does not constitute a legislative appointment

Petitioner argues that the hold-over of incumbent officials is tantamount to a legislative appointment, and violates the constitutional provision that barangay officials must be elected and not appointed.⁴⁶ The Court has already rejected this argument in 2023 Macalintal. There, the Court explained that “a [hold-over] is not technically an extension of term of the officer but a recognition of the incumbent as a de facto officer, which is made imperative by the necessity for a continuous performance of public functions,”⁴⁷ and that it “essentially extends the tenure, or the actual holding of office, of the officer, not the term which should be deemed to have concluded at the appointed date.”⁴⁸ The Court further held:

Since the power to prescribe the term of office of barangay officials is expressly lodged in Congress by the Constitution, its decision to prescribe the new term of office of barangay officials, the commencement thereof, as well as the manner of ensuring the continuity of service in the meantime, such as through hold-over of incumbents, are policy decisions that the Court will not lightly interfere with.⁴⁹

Republic Act No. 12326 does not alter the hold-over provision of Republic Act No. 12232. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 12232, which remains in force, provides that incumbent officials shall remain in office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The incumbents themselves were elected in the October 2023 BSKE. Their continuation in office pending the election of their successors is not an appointment by Congress, but the operation of a hold-over provision that the Court has repeatedly sustained. The present situation is materially different from a statute or directive that designates individuals to occupy elective offices without an election.

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 12326 must be read together with the hold-over provision retained in Republic Act No. 12232. The reference to an “extension” describes the practical effect of the transition to the new electoral schedule, but it does not independently appoint incumbents to a new term. The hold-over provision remains the legal basis for their continued service until their successors have been elected and qualified.

Indeed, Section 5 separately determines how the transition is counted for purposes of eligibility under the new term-limit structure. It treats incumbent elective barangay officials as having completed one term and disqualifies those serving their last term from seeking the same position in November 2028. This construction gives effect to the statutory language without treating the transitional period as a new electoral mandate. It also preserves the distinction recognized in 2023 Macalintal between the legal term of an office and an incumbent’s continued tenure pending the election and qualification of a successor.

This Court should take heed of the pronouncement in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan:

Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions.⁵⁰

VIII. Republic Act No. 12326 does not
violate the one-subject-one title rule

Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The Court has consistently given this requirement a liberal rather than a technical construction. The title need not mirror, fully index, or catalogue all the contents and minute details of the law; it suffices that the title is comprehensive enough to include the general object that the statute seeks to implement.⁵¹ The provision is “aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches.”⁵² The controlling question is whether each challenged provision bears a fair and reasonable relationship to the statute’s general subject.

In 2025 Macalintal, the Court held that Republic Act No. 12232’s single subject is the prescription of a new term for barangay and SK officials; and that “[t]he supposedly separate subjects contained in its provisions are actually necessary components of establishing this new, four-year term structure.”

Here, the principal subject of Republic Act No. 12326 is the establishment of a five-year term and the corresponding electoral cycle for barangay and SK officials. The provisions of Republic Act No. 12326 must be examined according to whether they are germane or reasonably incidental to the implementation of that term structure. The title’s reference to “other purposes” does not dispense with this inquiry; neither, however, does the Constitution require every section to prescribe the term directly.

Upon careful examination of Republic Act No. 12326, the Court is convinced that each provision bears a direct or reasonably incidental relationship to the establishment and implementation of the new term structure. Indeed, Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Republic Act No. 12326 are not riders.

Section 2 fixes the next election date and the recurring five-year interval. Clearly, the date of the next BSKE is not foreign to a law that fixes the term of office. As discussed, the power to determine the term includes the power to fix when it begins and when it ends. The title of Republic Act No. 12326 likewise states that it amends Republic Act No. 12232, a law that itself fixes both the term of office and the date of the BSKE. A reader of the title would reasonably expect that a change in the term would carry a corresponding change in the election cycle.

The remaining provisions are similarly germane to the implementation of the new term structure. Section 4 establishes training and capacity-building programs expressly consistent with the new term; Section 5 prescribes how the transition is to be counted for purposes of term limits; Section 6 preserves accountability for incumbents during the transition; and Section 7 addresses the use of election appropriations in implementing the new schedule.

Section 3, which provides for the appointment by city or municipal mayors of persons to fill vacancies in SK membership, presents the more difficult question. It concerns the composition and continuity of the SK rather than the duration of the term itself. Nevertheless, the one-subject-one-title rule does not require every provision to prescribe the term directly. The question is: does the provision reasonably relate to organizing and maintaining the barangay and SK electoral structure under the Act, or is it unrelated to that subject?

The Court should not uphold Section 3 solely because the law’s title includes “and for other purposes”; that phrase cannot save a provision unrelated to the title’s subject. The stronger justification is the provision’s connection to continuity in the SK’s composition during the law’s regulated term. In any case, even if this relationship were found insufficient, Section 3 could be severed under the separability clause in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 12326 without undermining the principal term-setting provisions. The validity of the entire statute should not automatically depend on a discrete ancillary provision’s validity if the statute can function coherently without it.

Neither was the effect of Republic Act No. 12326 on the November 2026 BSKE concealed. The legislative record cited by respondents shows that the relationship between the five-year term and the next election date was openly raised and debated, both in the committee and on the floor, where the sponsor was interpellated on whether the measure complied with the 2023 Macalintal guidelines.⁵³ Thus, the evils that the one subject-one title rule seeks to prevent are absent here.

IX. Macalintal is not entitled to the
issuance of a TRO, SQAO, and/or WPI

The dismissal of the Petition necessarily carries with it the denial of the prayer for injunctive relief. Nonetheless, because Macalintal urgently reiterates his prayer for a TRO and/or SQAO in his Omnibus Motion, the Court explains why, even apart from the merits, no TRO should issue.

Petitioner claims that unless respondents are enjoined, his rights and the rights of those similarly situated will be irreparably damaged, as they will continue to be governed for another two years by officials without their mandate, who will be paid with public funds, and without any assurance that this will be the last postponement of the BSKE; that the postponement is unreasonable and unduly long under the guidelines laid down in 2023 Macalintal, that the COMELEC will stop all preparations for the November 2026 BSKE, thereby rendering the Petition moot; that the OP may undertake measures to enforce the hold-over provision in favor of the incumbents; and that injunctive relief is needed to preserve the Court’s jurisdiction and ensure that its judgment will not be a mere paper victory.⁵⁴

No one disputes that the right of suffrage lies at the heart of our democratic and republican order. The question on the prayer for interim relief is narrower. It is whether petitioner has shown the clear right and the irreparable injury that justifies suspending the operation of a duly enacted statute of the same character as the one this Court sustained less than a year ago in 2025 Macalintal.⁵⁵ He has not. The right he seeks to protect through a TRO rests on a premise that this Court declined to adopt in 2025 Macalintal, and the urgency he invokes cannot supply what that premise lacks. Moreover, to issue the TRO, the Court would have to weigh the sufficiency of Congress’s reasons for a policy that the Constitution expressly commits to Congress.

A. The issuance of a TRO against the
implementation of a statute calls for
the greatest circumspection

Whatever its form, interim injunctive relief issues only upon a showing of the following requisites: (a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (d) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.⁵⁶

The burden is heavier still when what is sought to be restrained is the enforcement of a law. Every law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, in that “to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.”⁵⁷ Thus, the Court has cautioned that the suspension of the operation of a law “is a matter of extreme delicacy” because it interferes with the official acts of the duly elected representatives of the people, and that “[t]he possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.”⁵⁸ Petitioner alleges no bad faith or harassment in the enforcement of Republic Act No. 12326. What he alleges is that the law is unconstitutional. That, without more, does not suffice.

The requisite instances when a TRO may issue are: (1) when great or irreparable injury would result before the application can be heard; and (2) when the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. These instances describe when a court may act before a hearing. They do not dispense with the requirement that the applicant first establish a clear and unmistakable right. Urgency is a reason to act quickly. It is not, by itself, a reason to act.

B. Petitioner has not shown a
clear and unmistakable right

i. The right invoked rests on an election date
fixed by statute, which Congress has since amended

The right that petitioner seeks to protect is the right to vote in the BSKE on November 2, 2026. That date is not fixed by the Constitution. It was fixed by Section 2 of RA 12232, which Congress enacted on August 13, 2025. What one statute has fixed, a later statute may change, and Republic Act No. 12326 changed it.

Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution leaves the term of office of barangay officials to be “determined by law.” In 2025 Macalintal, the Court read this provision as establishing that “Congress possesses the discretion to fix, modify, and extend the term of office of barangay officials as circumstances and public welfare dictate,” including the power “to determine when the new term of office starts, provided that such determined period is reasonable and should not be unduly long from the time of the enactment of the law setting the new term of office.”⁵⁹ The Court likewise held that the right of suffrage “guarantees that citizens will elect their officials through ‘regular’ elections—it does not mandate any specific electoral frequency or term length for the BSK officials,” and that “[a]n election is ‘regular’ if it occurs at fixed, predictable intervals established by law, regardless of whether those intervals are two, three, four, or five years.”⁶⁰

Measured against these pronouncements, a claimed right to an election on a particular statutory date (one that Congress has since reset under its express constitutional authority) is not a right in esse. At the very least, it is a right in serious dispute.

The issue at hand is not whether petitioner has a constitutional right to suffrage. Rather, the issue is whether petitioner has a clear legal right to compel the BSKE to be held specifically in November 2026, notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 12326. We find that he does not.

ii. 2025 Macalintal renders petitioner’s
claimed right, at the very least, doubtful

In 2025 Macalintal, the Court held that Republic Act No. 12232 is a term-setting law, and that “since Republic Act No. 12232 is not primarily an election postponement law, the [2023] Macalintal guidelines become inapplicable.”⁶¹ The Court explained that “[t]he legal character of the measure determines which constitutional framework governs its validity,” and that guidelines “formulated to govern laws whose primary purpose is postponing elections . . . should not apply to laws whose primary purpose is constitutional term-setting, even if it incidentally affects the date of elections.”⁶²

On its face, Republic Act No. 12326 is a law of the same kind. Its title is “An Act Fixing the Term of Office of Barangay Officials and Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan to Five [] Years, Amending Republic Act No. 12232.” Its first section fixes a five-year term;⁶³ its second sets the date of the next regular BSKE and every five years thereafter.⁶⁴ Its structure mirrors that of Republic Act No. 12232, which the Court sustained.

Petitioner’s claim rests on the premise that the 2023 Macalintal guidelines govern Republic Act No. 12326—in other words, that a law which fixes a new term and, as a consequence, sets a later election date is a postponement law. That is the very proposition the Court considered and did not adopt in 2025 Macalintal. However, interim relief must rest on the law as the Court declared it. The doctrine of stare decisis counsels against treating its holding as though it did not exist.

Further, petitioner argues that 2025 Macalintal does not bar his present petition because Republic Act No. 12326 involves a different interval, a different effect on the incumbents’ mandate, different justifications, and an express provision that, in his view, “extends” the terms of incumbents.⁶⁵ He points to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 12326 which states, in part, that “[c]onsidering the extension of their terms by two [] years, incumbent elective barangay officials shall be regarded as having completed one [] term in their respective positions.” Respondents counter that the provision is not an independent source of hold-over authority, but merely a counting rule for purposes of the two-term limit, and that Republic Act No. 12326 retains the same hold-over provision of Republic Act No. 12232 that the Court upheld.⁶⁶

These questions are not insignificant, and the Court has resolved them on the merits. 2025 Macalintal itself requires that the period before the new term begins be reasonable and not unduly long. But it is precisely because these questions are genuinely contested, and because the Court’s most recent pronouncement on a materially similar statute runs against petitioner, that his right cannot be described as clear and unmistakable.

When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.⁶⁷

iii. It is not for the Court to replace
the wisdom of Congress with its own

Macalintal dismisses the reasons offered for Republic Act No. 12326 as baseless.⁶⁸ That argument applies the requirement under the 2023 Macalintal guidelines that a postponement be justified by reasons “sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling.”⁶⁹ As already discussed, 2025 Macalintal held that standard inapplicable to term-setting laws.

More fundamentally, the length of term of barangay officials is a matter that the Constitution has entrusted to Congress. As the Court explained in 2025 Macalintal, Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution “reflects a constitutional judgment that term length involves policy considerations appropriately resolved through the legislative process. It reflects the political tension of balancing continuity against accountability, weighing administrative efficiency against democratic changes, considering local governance needs, and responding to changing circumstances.”⁷⁰

Deference of this kind is not abdication. It recognizes that the remedy for an unwise policy lies, in the first instance, with the people, who may call their representatives to account at the polls. The Court’s responsibility is to determine, after full deliberation, whether Congress has crossed a constitutional line. Until that determination is made, the presumption that it has not must stand.

iv. The injury alleged is not irreparable,
and the Petition will not be rendered moot

Petitioner argues that, unless the Court restrains Republic Act No. 12326, the COMELEC will stop all preparations for the November 2026 BSKE, potentially rendering the Petition moot⁷¹ before the issues are fully addressed. This Court’s experience in the 2023 and 2025 Macalintal cases shows that the lapse of a scheduled election date does not necessarily preclude effective judicial review. The Court may still resolve the constitutionality of the challenged statute and formulate the appropriate relief for a meritorious petition.

There is no diminution of the democratic significance of a missed election. Voting in a regular election is central to suffrage, and a later election cannot restore the chance to vote on an earlier date. The question now is whether Macalintal has established a clear and unmistakable right to compel an election on the date set by Republic Act No. 12232 despite Republic Act No. 12326, and whether he met the requirements for extraordinary interim relief. Since precedent recognizes Congress’s authority to set terms and their commencement, subject to constitutional limits, petitioner’s claimed right to the November 2026 date remains seriously disputed. That dispute must be resolved on the merits, not presumed in his favor at the interim-relief stage.

In 2023 Macalintal, petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, alleging that the COMELEC had already stopped its preparations for the December 5, 2022 BSKE. That date passed while the case remained pending. The Court nonetheless held that “despite the lapse of the originally scheduled date of the BSKE, i.e., December 5, 2022, the case has not been rendered moot as to preclude the exercise by this Court of its judicial review power.”⁷² Having declared Republic Act No. 11935 unconstitutional, the Court then fashioned the appropriate relief, applying the operative fact doctrine.

In 2025 Macalintal, petitioner again moved for interim relief and for early resolution, citing the COMELEC’s termination of its preparations for the December 2025 BSKE. Yet, the Court proceeded to resolve the case on the merits.

Currently, petitioner recognizes that the Court’s power to grant effective relief does not lapse on November 2, 2026. He prays, in the alternative, that the COMELEC be directed to conduct the BSKE “on a date reasonably close to November 2, 2026 pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.”⁷³ Had he prevailed, the Court could have granted precisely that relief. A final judgment in his favor would thus not have been a mere paper victory.

Neither is the continued service of the incumbents in a hold-over capacity an irreparable injury. Whatever injury the hold-over may cause is temporary and reparable. A hold-over lasts only until successors are elected and qualified. Had petitioner prevailed, the Court could have directed the holding of elections, and the hold-over would have ended once the newly elected officials assumed office. This is what the Court did in 2023 Macalintal: even after declaring Republic Act No. 11935 unconstitutional, it allowed the sitting BSK officials to “continue to hold office until their successor shall have been elected and qualified.” If the hold-over did not call for the incumbents’ immediate removal even after a final declaration of unconstitutionality, it can hardly be an irreparable injury that warrants a TRO before any such declaration has been made. Nor is the pecuniary aspect of the claimed injury beyond measure. As argued by the respondents, the honoraria and allowances paid to the incumbents are definite sums, paid for services actually rendered.⁷⁴

As to the concern over the waste of public funds, the record does not clearly support it either. Respondents cite the explanation of the Senate sponsor that, of the funds appropriated for the BSKE, only about PHP 8 billion had been obligated, of which about PHP 200 million would be unrecoverable, and that the ballots printed may still be used for the 2028 elections.⁷⁵ These representations are cited not to resolve any factual question, but to show that the equities on this point do not tilt clearly in petitioner’s favor.

The requested relief would do more than preserve the status quo. It would require the COMELEC to resume preparations for an election whose date Congress has subsequently changed by statute, and would substantially suspend the operation of Republic Act No. 12326 before the Court has determined that the law is unconstitutional. Such relief is not justified merely by the urgency of the petition. The applicant must still establish a clear and unmistakable right, a substantial invasion of that right, and the need for extraordinary relief to prevent irreparable injury. Because the asserted right to compel the November 2026 BSKE is genuinely disputed under 2025 Macalintal, the requisites for the requested interim relief have not been established.

Provisional remedies cannot be used to accomplish this. Injunctive relief cannot be employed to protect a right that is merely contingent or disputed, nor may it serve as a means to prejudge the merits of the principal action.⁷⁶

Conclusion

The Court is mindful that the right of suffrage is indispensable to our democratic and republican order. The safeguards articulated in 2023 Macalintal remain essential against laws whose primary purpose is to postpone elections and impair the electorate’s opportunity to choose its representatives. But those safeguards must be applied consistently with Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution, which expressly commits the determination of the term of barangay officials to law.

In 2025 Macalintal, the Court held that the power to determine the term includes the authority to determine its commencement, subject to the constitutional requirement that the interval be reasonable and not unduly long. Republic Act No. 12326 must be assessed under that framework. Though Congress’s choice may be disputed as policy, petitioner has not shown that the choice exceeds the constitutional limit recognized in 2025 Macalintal.

The Court must remain vigilant against any legislative measure that would use term-setting as a pretext for indefinitely depriving the electorate of regular elections. However, vigilance does not permit the Court to disregard a controlling precedent or to substitute its preferred electoral calendar for the one enacted by Congress. Applying the governing constitutional standard, the Court finds no sufficient basis to invalidate Republic Act No. 12326 or to grant the interim relief sought.

Hamilton described the judiciary as having “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” The TRO prayed for by petitioner would have the Court exercise its will before it has exercised judgment by suspending a law enacted by Congress and approved by the President, and to command, by consequence, the conduct of an election before the Court has determined whether that law is in fact unconstitutional. Our task is to determine, after full deliberation, whether Congress has kept within constitutional bounds—not to anticipate that it has not. Having undertaken that task, the Court finds that Congress did not overstep those bounds in enacting Republic Act No. 12326.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to: (1) GRANT petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal’s motion for leave to file and admit the Reply incorporated in his Omnibus Motion, and the Reply is NOTED and ADMITTED; (2) DENY the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention filed by Jupiter Stalin M. Larida and NOTE the Entry of Appearance filed by his counsel, Atty. Garri Solomon R. Fernandez; (3) DENY the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, status quo ante order, and/or writ of preliminary injunction; and (4) DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 12326.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

¹ The Petition prayed for the following:

1. Upon the filing of this Petition, this Honorable Court CONDUCT a special raffle of this case so that this urgent Petition may be immediately acted upon; and thereafter:a. ISSUE a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order directing respondents, and all persons acting on their behalf, to refrain from implementing Republic Act No. 12326, or to OBSERVE THE STATUS QUO prevailing before its passage insofar as it pertains to the postponement of the November 2, 2026 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, until further orders from this Honorable Court;b. DIRECT respondent COMELEC to CONTINUE with its preparations for the November 2, 2026 BSKE in a manner that will ensure clean, honest, and credible Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections, should this Honorable Court rule that said elections should take place as scheduled; andc. In the event that incumbent barangay officials shall have assumed office in a holdover capacity before this Honorable Court could issue the injunctive reliefs prayed for, ISSUE a Status Quo Ante Order directing them to observe the status quo prevailing prior to their appointment or installation as holdover officials, or to CEASE and DESIST from claiming, assuming, or performing said functions until further orders from this Honorable Court.
2. After due proceedings, this Honorable Court render judgment GRANTING this Petition and:(i) DECLARING Republic Act No. 12326 inoperative, invalid, and/or unconstitutional insofar as it pertains to the postponement of the November 2, 2026 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections; and(ii) DIRECTING respondent COMELEC to continue and/or resume preparations for the holding of the November 2, 2026 BSKE or, if by reasons of time constraints the same could not be held on such date, conduct the said elections on a date reasonably close to November 2, 2026 pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.

² Petition, pp. 1–21. The OP is impleaded for the implementation of RA 12326. The HOR is identified as the government agency that passed House Bill No. (HB) 10971, adopting Senate Bill No. (SBN) 2387, which was signed by the President as RA 12326. The Senate is the government instrumentality that passed SBN 2387. Finally, COMELEC is the constitutional commission tasked with administering all laws relating to elections and with preparing for and holding the November 2026 BSKE.

³ An Act Fixing the Term of Office of Barangay Officials and Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan to Five [] Years, Amending Republic Act No. 12232, or “An Act Setting the Term of Office of Barangay Officials and Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and for Other Purposes.”

⁴ Petition, p. 5.

⁵ 943 Phil. 212 (2023) [Per J. Kho, Jr., En Banc].

⁶ An Act Postponing the December 2022 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 9164, as Amended, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.

⁷ The Court listed the following criteria to serve as guidelines in the determination of the validity of any future laws or rules postponing elections in 2023 Macalintal:

1. The right of suffrage requires the holding of honest, genuine, regular, and periodic elections. Thus, postponement of the elections is the exception.
2. The postponement of the elections must be justified by reasons sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling under the circumstances:a. The postponement must be intended to guarantee the conduct of free, honest, orderly, and safe elections;b. The postponement must be intended to safeguard the electorate’s right of suffrage;c. The postponement must be intended to safeguard other fundamental rights of the electorate; ord. Such other important, substantial, or compelling reasons that necessitate the postponement of the elections, i.e., necessitated by public emergency, but only if and to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.i. Reasons such as election fatigue, purported resulting divisiveness, shortness of existing term, and/or other superficial or farcical reasons, alone, may not serve as important, substantial, or compelling reasons to justify the postponement of the elections. To be sufficiently important, the reason for the postponement must primarily be justified by the need to safeguard the right of suffrage or other fundamental rights or required by a public emergency situation.
3. The electorate must still be guaranteed an effective opportunity to enjoy their right of suffrage without unreasonable restrictions notwithstanding the postponement of the elections.
4. The postponement of the elections is reasonably appropriate for the purpose of advancing sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling governmental reasons.a. The postponement of the elections must be based on genuine reasons and only on objective and reasonable criteria.b. The postponement must still guarantee that the elections will be held at regular periodic intervals that are not unduly long.i. The intervals must still ensure that the authority of the government continues to be based on the free expression of the will of the electorate.ii. Holding the postponed elections at a date so far remote from the original elections date may serve as badge of the unreasonableness of the interval that may render questionable the genuineness of the reasons for the postponement.c. The postponement of the elections is reasonably narrowly tailored only to the extent necessary to advance the government interest.
5. The postponement must not violate the Constitution or existing laws.

⁸ An Act Setting the Term of Office of Barangay Officials and Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and for Other Purposes.

⁹ G.R. Nos. E-02002, E-02010, E-02142, E-02276, November 11, 2025 [Per J. J. Lopez, En Banc].

¹⁰ Petition, pp. 14–15.

¹¹ Comment, pp. 7–8.

¹² Omnibus Motion, pp. 1–12.

¹³ Id. at 2–9.

¹⁴ Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention, p. 1.

¹⁵ Comment-in-Intervention, pp. 1–5.

¹⁶ Id. at 6–11.

¹⁷ Comment, pp. 9–10.

¹⁸ Macalintal v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. E-02002, E-02010, E-02142 & E-02276, November 11, 2025 [Per J. J. Lopez, En Banc].

¹⁹ Republic v. Abaya, et al., 928 Phil. 182, 206 (2022) [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc].

²⁰ Petition, pp. 11–12.

²¹ Republic v. Rubin, 887 Phil. 600 (2020) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].

²² Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention, p. 1.

²³ Macalintal v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. E-02002, E-02010, E-02142 & E-02276, November 11, 2025 [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc], citing Civil Service Commission v. Javier, 570 Phil. 89, 114 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc]; Rep. Lagman v. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, 888 Phil. 434, 497 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]; and Commission on Elections v. Cruz, 620 Phil. 175, 200 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

²⁴ Id.

²⁵ Comment-in-Intervention, pp. 1–5.

²⁶ Id. at 6–11.

²⁷ 620 Phil. 175, 190 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc]. (Citations omitted)

²⁸ Republic Act No. 12326, sec. 4.

²⁹ Petition, pp. 2–3, 19–20.

³⁰ Comment, p. 48.

³¹ Macalintal v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. E-02002, E-02010, E-02142 & E-02276, November 11, 2025 [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc].

³² Id. at 37–38.

³³ Comment, pp. 29, 33.

³⁴ Id. at 33.

³⁵ Petition, p. 22.

³⁶ Macalintal v. COMELEC, 943 Phil. 212 (2023) [Per J. Kho, Jr., En Banc].

³⁷ Comment, pp. 47–48.

³⁸ Omnibus Motion, p. 5.

³⁹ Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., 793 Phil. 17, 59 (2016) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

⁴⁰ Republic Act No. 12326, sec. 7.

⁴¹ Comment, pp. 3, 14–15.

⁴² Petition, pp. 2–7, 17–19.

⁴³ Comment, p. 28.

⁴⁴ Id. at 4.

⁴⁵ Omnibus Motion, p. 5.

⁴⁶ Petition, pp. 9, 19–20.

⁴⁷ Macalintal v. COMELEC, 943 Phil. 212, 389 (2023) [Per J. Kho, Jr., En Banc].

⁴⁸ Id.

⁴⁹ Id. at 309–310.

⁵⁰ 364 Phil. 890, 903 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]. (Citations omitted)

⁵¹ Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 190 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].

⁵² Id.

⁵³ Comment, pp. 47–48.

⁵⁴ Petition, pp. 21–23.

⁵⁵ G.R. Nos. E-02002, E-02010, E-02142 & E-02276, November 11, 2025 [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc].

⁵⁶ Bureau of Customs v. Court of Appeals, 900 Phil. 1, 24 (2021) [Per J. Hernando, Third Division]. (Citation omitted)

⁵⁷ Macalintal v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. E-02002, E-02010, E-02142 & E-02276, November 11, 2025 [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc].

⁵⁸ Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 27 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

⁵⁹ Macalintal v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. E-02002, E-02010, E-02142 & E-02276, November 11, 2025 [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc].

⁶⁰ Id.

⁶¹ Id.

⁶² Id.

⁶³ SECTION 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 12232 or “An Act Setting the Term of Office of Barangay Officials and Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and for Other Purposes” is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SECTION 1. Term of Office. — The term of office of all barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials shall be five [] years. No elective barangay official shall serve for more than two [] consecutive terms in the same position. No elective Sangguniang Kabataan official shall serve for more than one [] term in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”

⁶⁴ SECTION 2. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 12232 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 2. Date of Election. — The next regular barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections shall be held on the second Monday of November 2028 and every five [] years thereafter.”

⁶⁵ Omnibus Motion, p. 6.

⁶⁶ Comment, p. 39.

⁶⁷ Incorporators of Mindanao Institute, Inc. v. United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 685 Phil. 21, 34 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

⁶⁸ Petition, p. 22.

⁶⁹ Macalintal v. COMELEC, 934 Phil. 212, 317 (2023) [Per J. Kho, Jr., En Banc].

⁷⁰ Macalintal v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. E-02002, E-02010, E-02142 & E-02276, November 11, 2025 [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc].

⁷¹ Petition, p. 23.

⁷² Macalintal v. COMELEC, 943 Phil. 212, 279 (2023) [Per J. Kho, Jr., En Banc].

⁷³ Petition, p. 24; Omnibus Motion, p. 16.

⁷⁴ Comment, p. 54.

⁷⁵ Id. at 30.

⁷⁶ See Evy Construction and Development Corporation v. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, 820 Phil. 123 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

Case Digest

Macalintal v. Office of the President, et al.
G.R. No. E-08557, October 14, 2026
[Per J. Zalameda, En Banc]

Syllabus: Political Law; Constitutional Law; Local Government; Term of Office of Barangay Officials (Article X, Section 8); Right of Suffrage; Substantive Due Process; One Subject-One Title Rule (Article VI, Section 26[1]); Judicial Review; Remedial Law; Intervention; Provisional Remedies

Doctrines

1. Direct resort to the Court is allowed when the issues raised are pure questions of law.
2. Intervention is not a matter of right. The legal interest must be direct and immediate, such that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. Public office is a public trust, not a property right, and no one has a vested right to hold any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office.
3. What Congress, in its wisdom, decides on the term of barangay officials is a political question beyond judicial scrutiny. It remains subject to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.
4. The guidelines in 2023 Macalintal govern laws whose primary purpose is to postpone elections. They do not apply to laws whose primary purpose is constitutional term-setting, even if such laws incidentally affect the date of elections. An incidental effect does not convert a term-setting law into a postponement law.
5. The power to fix the term of barangay officials includes the power to determine when the term begins and ends, provided that the period is reasonable and not unduly long from the enactment of the law setting the new term.
6. The Constitution does not require Congress to choose the least disruptive option, to justify the length of the term with compelling reasons, or to conduct an empirical study before changing the term.
7. The right of suffrage does not mandate any specific electoral frequency or term length for barangay officials. An election is regular if it occurs at fixed, predictable intervals established by law.
8. A hold-over is not technically an extension of term but a recognition of the incumbent as a de facto officer. It extends the tenure, not the term, and is not a legislative appointment.
9. The one subject-one title rule is construed liberally. Each challenged provision must bear a fair and reasonable relationship to the statute’s general subject. The phrase “and for other purposes” cannot save a provision unrelated to the title’s subject.
10. To restrain the enforcement of a law, the applicant must show a clear and unmistakable right in esse. When the right is doubtful or disputed, injunctive relief is not proper. An injunction cannot be used to prejudge the merits of the principal action.

Facts:

In Macalintal v. COMELEC (2023 Macalintal), the Court declared Republic Act No. 11935 unconstitutional for postponing the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (BSKE). The Court also laid down guidelines for future laws postponing elections. Congress then enacted Republic Act No. 12232. That law set a four-year term for barangay officials, allowed three consecutive terms, and scheduled the next BSKE for November 2, 2026. In Macalintal v. Senate (2025 Macalintal), the Court upheld Republic Act No. 12232 as a term-setting law.

On September 24, 2026, the President signed Republic Act No. 12326, which amended Republic Act No. 12232. The new law fixed the term of barangay and SK officials at five years and limited barangay officials to two consecutive terms. It moved the next BSKE to the second Monday of November 2028 and every five years after. It allowed city or municipal mayors to appoint persons to fill vacancies in SK membership. It also provided that, “[c]onsidering the extension of their terms by two [] years,” incumbents shall be regarded as having completed one term. The next day, the COMELEC stopped all activities for the November 2026 BSKE.

Romulo B. Macalintal (Macalintal) filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as a voter, taxpayer, and practicing lawyer. He prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO), a status quo ante order (SQAO), and/or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI). He argued that Republic Act No. 12326 is an election-postponement law disguised as a term-fixing law. He claimed that it fails the 2023 Macalintal guidelines and substantive due process, that the hold-over of incumbents is a legislative appointment, and that the law violates the one subject-one title rule.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the petition violates the hierarchy of courts and that the term of barangay officials is a political question. It maintained that the law is a valid term-fixing law to which the 2023 Macalintal guidelines do not apply.

Jupiter Stalin M. Larida (Larida), an incumbent Punong Barangay, moved to intervene. He claimed that the ruling “could either favorably or adversely affect” his status.

Issues:

1. Is direct resort to the Court proper, and are the requisites for the exercise of judicial review present?
2. Should Larida be allowed to intervene?
3. Is the determination of the term of office of barangay officials a political question beyond judicial review?
4. Is Republic Act No. 12326 an election-postponement law subject to the guidelines laid down in 2023 Macalintal?
5. Is the November 2028 date set by Republic Act No. 12326 reasonable and not unduly long?
6. Does Republic Act No. 12326 violate substantive due process and the right of suffrage?
7. Does the hold-over of incumbent barangay officials under Republic Act No. 12326 constitute a legislative appointment?
8. Does Republic Act No. 12326 violate the one subject-one title rule under Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution?
9. Is Macalintal entitled to the issuance of a TRO, SQAO, and/or WPI?

Ruling:

1. Is direct resort to the Court proper, and are the requisites for the exercise of judicial review present? — Yes.

Direct resort to the Court is allowed when the issues raised are pure questions of law. The constitutional questions in this case are of that kind. Whether Republic Act No. 12326 is a term-fixing law, whether it infringes the right of suffrage, whether its hold-over provision amounts to a legislative appointment, and whether it complies with the one subject-one title rule may all be resolved on the basis of the text of the law, the undisputed legislative record, and prevailing jurisprudence. The factual matters that respondents identify are not essential to the resolution of these questions. As in 2025 Macalintal, the Court can resolve whether the assailed law is unconstitutional without presenting evidence.

On the other hand, the power of judicial review may be exercised only when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

These requisites are present. Republic Act No. 12326 is already in effect, and the COMELEC has acted on it by discontinuing all activities for the November 2026 BSKE. Macalintal sues as a registered voter of Las Piñas City, a taxpayer, and a practicing lawyer. In 2025 Macalintal, the Court recognized the standing of the same petitioner, in the same capacities, to challenge Republic Act No. 12232, holding that the postponement of the BSKE “is an actual and direct violation of their right to participate in the BSKE, or at the very least, is an imminent threat of violation of their right of suffrage.” There is no reason to rule differently here. The Petition was filed within days of the law’s effectivity, and the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 12326 is the lis mota of the case.

2. Should Larida be allowed to intervene? — No.

Intervention is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and may be allowed only when (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or is otherwise qualified; and (b) the intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, taking into account whether the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. The legal interest must be of a direct and immediate character, such that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. It must be actual and material, and not indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential, or collateral.

Larida does not meet the first requisite. He claims only that the outcome of the case “could either favorably or adversely affect” his status as Punong Barangay. Whatever effect a ruling may have on the length of his stay in office, it does not give him a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Public office is a public trust. It is not a property right, and no one has a vested right to hold any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. On this basis, the Court in 2025 Macalintal denied the intervention of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas and of punong barangays elected in the October 2023 BSKE, who likewise invoked the effect of the case on the length of their stay in office. Larida stands in no different position.

Neither would Larida’s participation aid the Court in resolving the case. His Comment-in-Intervention raises no argument that respondents, through the OSG, have not already presented x x x. His intervention would add a party to the case, but not an issue.

3. Is the determination of the term of office of barangay officials a political question beyond judicial review? — Only insofar as its wisdom is concerned.

Respondents argue that determining the term of barangay officials is a political question. They are correct insofar as the wisdom of that determination is concerned. As the Court explained in COMELEC v. Cruz, “whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.”

The Petition, however, does not merely question the wisdom of a five-year term. It alleges that Republic Act No. 12326 transgresses specific constitutional limitations: the right of suffrage, substantive due process, the requirement that barangay officials be elected, and the one subject-one title rule. Whether Congress kept within these limits is a question the Court is bound to answer under its expanded power of judicial review. What the Court may not do, in answering it, is substitute its own judgment for that of Congress on how long barangay officials should serve, or on whether the reasons for the law are wise.

4. Is Republic Act No. 12326 an election-postponement law subject to the guidelines laid down in 2023 Macalintal? — No.

The determination of a law’s fundamental character begins with its text. In 2025 Macalintal, the Court distinguished Republic Act No. 12232 from the election-postponement laws that preceded it, including Republic Act No. 11935, which was struck down in 2023 Macalintal. We noted that Republic Act No. 12232 is titled as an act “setting” the term of office of barangay officials, not one “postponing” an election; that it does not amend Republic Act No. 9164, as the postponement laws did; that it prescribes a new term for BSK officials, whereas the postponement laws retained the three-year term; and that it sets a new interval between elections. On these bases, the Court held that Republic Act No. 12232 is fundamentally a term-setting law, and that “since Republic Act No. 12232 is not primarily an election postponement law, the Macalintal 2023 guidelines become inapplicable.”

Each of these markers appears in Republic Act No. 12326. Its title describes it as an act “Fixing the Term of Office of Barangay Officials and Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan to Five [] Years.” It amends Republic Act No. 12232, a term-setting law, and not Republic Act No. 9164. It changes the term structure: it lengthens the term from four to five years and reduces the consecutive-term limit for barangay officials from three terms to two. It sets a new five-year interval between elections. Its principal purpose, as gleaned from its text, is to fix the term of barangay and SK officials. Setting the next BSKE for November 2028 implements the new term, and is not an independent objective.

x x x

Neither is the character of the law changed by the candid acknowledgment of the Senate sponsor that “the natural effect will, of course, be to postpone the upcoming [elections].” 2025 Macalintal itself recognized that a term-setting law may incidentally affect the date of elections. An incidental effect does not convert a term-setting law into a postponement law.

Nor does the fact that Congress again changed the term of barangay officials barely a year after Republic Act No. 12232 alter the analysis. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution does not prescribe how long a statutory term must remain in place before Congress may revisit it. As the Court held in 2025 Macalintal, this power is expressly committed to Congress and “establishes that Congress possesses the discretion to fix, modify, and extend the term of office of barangay officials as circumstances and public welfare dictate.”

Macalintal invites the Court to revisit 2025 Macalintal. The Court declines. Macalintal raised the same theory in that case, specifically, that a term-setting law that moves an election date is a postponement law in disguise, and the Court rejected it after full deliberation. He identifies no compelling countervailing consideration that would justify a different result less than a year later.

Stare decisis requires the Court to apply the controlling rule in 2025 Macalintal, but it does not dispense with the need to examine the statute before Us.

x x x

Neither may the term of office under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 12326 be treated as separate and distinct from the date of the elections under Section 2, because one is not necessarily implied by the other. That is the very proposition that 2025 Macalintal rejected. There, the Court held that the express grant to Congress of the power to determine the term of barangay officials “necessarily carries with it, the power to determine when that determined term begins and when it ends,” and that these “temporal components are not severable from the power to set the term itself—they are integral, subsidiary elements that give meaning and effect to the express constitutional grant of authority.”

Because the power to fix the term includes the power to fix its commencement and the election date, the election date cannot be detached from the term and measured against standards, such as the 2023 Macalintal guidelines, crafted for laws whose purpose is to postpone elections.

5. Is the November 2028 date set by Republic Act No. 12326 reasonable and not unduly long? — Yes.

This is not to say that Congress’s power to fix the term of barangay officials is without limit. In 2025 Macalintal, the Court held that the power to fix the term carries with it the power to determine when the new term starts, “provided that such determined period is reasonable and should not be unduly long from the time of the enactment of the law setting the new term of office.” This limitation is the Court’s safeguard against the serial resetting of barangay elections that petitioner fears. The question is whether Republic Act No. 12326 respects it. The Court finds that it does.

First, the November 2028 date aligns with the five-year term Republic Act No. 12326 prescribes. The incumbents were elected in the BSKE held on October 30, 2023. x x x Measured from the same reference point, the next BSKE under Republic Act No. 12326, on the second Monday of November 2028, falls roughly five years after the last one, which is the very interval Congress has now prescribed as the regular term of barangay officials. The date is not arbitrary as it follows from the term.

x x x

It does not follow, however, that the longer interval is necessarily unconstitutional. 2025 Macalintal prescribed a standard of reasonableness, not a fixed maximum number of months between enactment and the next election. The relevant inquiry is whether the commencement date is unduly remote in light of the statutory term structure and the practical requirements of implementing the transition.

x x x

Second, Congress explained why the next BSKE could not reasonably be set earlier. According to the legislative record cited by respondents, proceeding with the BSKE in 2026 under a five-year cycle would cause it to coincide with the national and local elections in 2031, potentially leading to yet another postponement, whereas the cycle under Republic Act No. 12326 would coincide with a midterm election only once, in 2043. Holding the BSKE in 2027, on the other hand, would conflict with the COMELEC’s preparations for the May 2028 national elections.

Macalintal contends that the reasons offered for Republic Act No. 12326 fail the test in 2023 Macalintal, which requires that a postponement be justified by reasons “sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling.” That, however, is the standard for laws whose primary purpose is to postpone elections. It is not the measure of a term-fixing law. For a term-fixing law, 2025 Macalintal asks whether the period before the new term begins is reasonable and not unduly long.

x x x

Third, the BSKE is set on a date certain, fixed in the law itself, and every five years thereafter. The electorate knows when it will next vote. This is the opposite of the indefinite deferment that the reasonableness limitation guards against.

x x x

The interval must be viewed against the new five-year term. Measured from the October 2023 BSKE, the November 2028 BSKE comes about five years later, the same interval that Congress has prescribed for every BSKE thereafter. The interval is not remote from the term—it is the term.

x x x

The possibility that a future Congress may abuse its power is not a ground to invalidate the present law. The Court passes upon laws that have been enacted, not upon those that have yet to be filed.

6. Does Republic Act No. 12326 violate substantive due process and the right of suffrage? — No.

Substantive due process requires the concurrence of two requisites: (1) lawful subject—the interests of the public generally, rather than a particular class, require State interference; and (2) lawful means—the means employed are reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective and are not unduly oppressive.

Both substantive due process requirements are met. The lawful subject is effective local governance: continuity of barangay and SK programs, implementation of multi-year development plans, and efficient use of limited public resources. These matters affect the public, and not just incumbent officials.

The chosen means reasonably serve those objectives without being unduly oppressive. Congress set a uniform five-year term and electoral cycle, with transition rules for the new schedule.

x x x

It is reiterated that the Constitution does not require Congress to choose the least disruptive option. The Court must assess whether the chosen means are constitutionally permissible, not whether they are optimal policy.

x x x

The absence of a study showing the inadequacy of the former four-year term does not make the new five-year term unconstitutional. Congress need not wait for an existing law to prove itself deficient before revising it.

x x x

To require compelling reasons for the length of the term would be to apply a standard drawn from the 2023 Macalintal guidelines on the postponement of elections. Nothing in Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution requires Congress to justify the length of the term it chooses with compelling reasons, or to first test the existing term or conduct an empirical study before changing it. The Constitution leaves the term of barangay officials to be “determined by law.” The question under the due process clause is whether the interests of the public require the measure, and whether the means employed are reasonably necessary to its purpose and not unduly oppressive.

Neither does Republic Act No. 12326 infringe the right of suffrage. The Court held in 2025 Macalintal that the right of suffrage “does not mandate any specific electoral frequency or term length for the BSK officials,” and that an election is regular “if it occurs at fixed, predictable intervals established by law, regardless of whether those intervals are two, three, four, or five years.”

Republic Act No. 12326 does not abolish, suspend, or indefinitely postpone the BSKE. It fixes the next BSKE on a date certain and every five years thereafter.

x x x

This was the distinction drawn by the Court in 2025 Macalintal: Republic Act No. 12232 did not abolish or indefinitely postpone the BSKE but changed the statutory term and established a new and definite electoral cycle. We ruled that such legislation did not violate the right of suffrage.

x x x

But regularity, in the constitutional sense, refers to fixed intervals established by law, as Republic Act No. 12326 provides. The law establishing those intervals may be amended, but that does not make the election irregular, as every statutory election is subject to amendment by a later law, within the limits of the Constitution and prevailing jurisprudence.

7. Does the hold-over of incumbent barangay officials under Republic Act No. 12326 constitute a legislative appointment? — No.

The Court has already rejected this argument in 2023 Macalintal. There, the Court explained that “a [hold-over] is not technically an extension of term of the officer but a recognition of the incumbent as a de facto officer, which is made imperative by the necessity for a continuous performance of public functions,” and that it “essentially extends the tenure, or the actual holding of office, of the officer, not the term which should be deemed to have concluded at the appointed date.” The Court further held:

Since the power to prescribe the term of office of barangay officials is expressly lodged in Congress by the Constitution, its decision to prescribe the new term of office of barangay officials, the commencement thereof, as well as the manner of ensuring the continuity of service in the meantime, such as through hold-over of incumbents, are policy decisions that the Court will not lightly interfere with.

Republic Act No. 12326 does not alter the hold-over provision of Republic Act No. 12232. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 12232, which remains in force, provides that incumbent officials shall remain in office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The incumbents themselves were elected in the October 2023 BSKE. Their continuation in office pending the election of their successors is not an appointment by Congress, but the operation of a hold-over provision that the Court has repeatedly sustained.

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 12326 must be read together with the hold-over provision retained in Republic Act No. 12232. The reference to an “extension” describes the practical effect of the transition to the new electoral schedule, but it does not independently appoint incumbents to a new term. The hold-over provision remains the legal basis for their continued service until their successors have been elected and qualified.

Indeed, Section 5 separately determines how the transition is counted for purposes of eligibility under the new term-limit structure. x x x It also preserves the distinction recognized in 2023 Macalintal between the legal term of an office and an incumbent’s continued tenure pending the election and qualification of a successor.

This Court should take heed of the pronouncement in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan:

Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions.

8. Does Republic Act No. 12326 violate the one subject-one title rule under Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution? — No.

Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The Court has consistently given this requirement a liberal rather than a technical construction. The title need not mirror, fully index, or catalogue all the contents and minute details of the law; it suffices that the title is comprehensive enough to include the general object that the statute seeks to implement. The provision is “aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches.” The controlling question is whether each challenged provision bears a fair and reasonable relationship to the statute’s general subject.

In 2025 Macalintal, the Court held that Republic Act No. 12232’s single subject is the prescription of a new term for barangay and SK officials; and that “[t]he supposedly separate subjects contained in its provisions are actually necessary components of establishing this new, four-year term structure.”

Here, the principal subject of Republic Act No. 12326 is the establishment of a five-year term and the corresponding electoral cycle for barangay and SK officials.

x x x

Section 2 fixes the next election date and the recurring five-year interval. Clearly, the date of the next BSKE is not foreign to a law that fixes the term of office. As discussed, the power to determine the term includes the power to fix when it begins and when it ends.

x x x

The Court should not uphold Section 3 solely because the law’s title includes “and for other purposes”; that phrase cannot save a provision unrelated to the title’s subject. The stronger justification is the provision’s connection to continuity in the SK’s composition during the law’s regulated term. In any case, even if this relationship were found insufficient, Section 3 could be severed under the separability clause in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 12326 without undermining the principal term-setting provisions.

Neither was the effect of Republic Act No. 12326 on the November 2026 BSKE concealed. The legislative record cited by respondents shows that the relationship between the five-year term and the next election date was openly raised and debated, both in the committee and on the floor x x x. Thus, the evils that the one subject-one title rule seeks to prevent are absent here.

9. Is Macalintal entitled to the issuance of a TRO, SQAO, and/or WPI? — No.

Whatever its form, interim injunctive relief issues only upon a showing of the following requisites: (a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (d) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

The burden is heavier still when what is sought to be restrained is the enforcement of a law. Every law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, in that “to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.” Thus, the Court has cautioned that the suspension of the operation of a law “is a matter of extreme delicacy” because it interferes with the official acts of the duly elected representatives of the people, and that “[t]he possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Petitioner alleges no bad faith or harassment in the enforcement of Republic Act No. 12326.

x x x

Urgency is a reason to act quickly. It is not, by itself, a reason to act.

x x x

Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution leaves the term of office of barangay officials to be “determined by law.” In 2025 Macalintal, the Court read this provision as establishing that “Congress possesses the discretion to fix, modify, and extend the term of office of barangay officials as circumstances and public welfare dictate,” including the power “to determine when the new term of office starts, provided that such determined period is reasonable and should not be unduly long from the time of the enactment of the law setting the new term of office.”

Measured against these pronouncements, a claimed right to an election on a particular statutory date (one that Congress has since reset under its express constitutional authority) is not a right in esse. At the very least, it is a right in serious dispute.

x x x

However, interim relief must rest on the law as the Court declared it. The doctrine of stare decisis counsels against treating its holding as though it did not exist.

x x x

When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.

x x x

In 2023 Macalintal, petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, alleging that the COMELEC had already stopped its preparations for the December 5, 2022 BSKE. That date passed while the case remained pending. The Court nonetheless held that “despite the lapse of the originally scheduled date of the BSKE, i.e., December 5, 2022, the case has not been rendered moot as to preclude the exercise by this Court of its judicial review power.”

x x x

Neither is the continued service of the incumbents in a hold-over capacity an irreparable injury. Whatever injury the hold-over may cause is temporary and reparable. A hold-over lasts only until successors are elected and qualified. x x x This is what the Court did in 2023 Macalintal: even after declaring Republic Act No. 11935 unconstitutional, it allowed the sitting BSK officials to “continue to hold office until their successor shall have been elected and qualified.”

x x x

Injunctive relief cannot be employed to protect a right that is merely contingent or disputed, nor may it serve as a means to prejudge the merits of the principal action.

Discussion: The case turned on how to classify the law. Under 2025 Macalintal, a law whose primary purpose is to fix the term of barangay officials is not a postponement law, even if it moves the election date. Republic Act No. 12326 bore the same markers as Republic Act No. 12232: a term-fixing title, an amendment of a term-setting law, a new term structure, and a new election cycle. The Court therefore applied stare decisis and declined to measure the law against the “sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling” standard of 2023 Macalintal. Press headlines and the sponsor’s admission that the law would move the election did not change its primary character.

The only limit left was the one 2025 Macalintal itself preserved: the new term must begin within a reasonable period that is not unduly long from enactment. The Court acknowledged that the gap here was longer than under Republic Act No. 12232. It still upheld the November 2028 date because it is fixed by law, matches the five-year term measured from the October 2023 BSKE, and is supported by reasons of electoral administration: avoiding collision with the 2028 and 2031 national and local elections. Because the election stays on a fixed, recurring cycle, the right of suffrage was not violated. Substantive due process was satisfied because effective local governance is a lawful subject and the five-year term is a reasonable means to it. The Constitution does not require Congress to pick the least disruptive option or to commission a study first.

On the remaining issues, the hold-over rests on Section 4 of Republic Act No. 12232. It extends tenure, not the term, so it is not a legislative appointment. Section 5 merely counts terms for the new two-term limit. All provisions were germane to the single subject of a five-year term. Section 3 on SK vacancies was the closest call, but it could be severed if needed. Larida was denied intervention because no one has a vested right to public office. Interim relief failed because Macalintal’s claimed right to a November 2026 election, which rested on a statutory date that Congress had since changed, was disputed rather than clear.

Discussion:

1. Direct resort and judicial review

Direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed when the issues are pure questions of law. The government said there were factual issues, such as waste of funds and the lack of studies. The Court held that these facts were not needed to decide the case. Whether the law is constitutional can be determined from the law’s text, the legislative record, and jurisprudence alone.

The Court found all four requisites of judicial review present:

• (a) Actual case or controversy. Present. The law was already in effect, and the COMELEC had already stopped the November 2026 BSKE.
• (b) Standing. Present. Macalintal sued as a voter, taxpayer, and lawyer. The Court had already recognized his standing in the same capacities in 2025 Macalintal, where it held that postponing the BSKE is an actual or imminent threat to the right of suffrage.
• (c) Earliest opportunity. Present. He filed the petition within days after the law took effect.
• (d) Lis mota. Present. The constitutionality of the law is the very issue of the case.

Bar takeaway: When asked whether the Court may rule on a law’s validity, go through the four requisites one by one and match each to a fact.

2. Intervention

The two requisites of intervention are (a) a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and (b) no undue delay or prejudice to the original parties.

• (a) Legal interest. Absent. The interest must be direct and immediate, meaning the intervenor gains or loses by the direct legal operation of the judgment. Larida said only that the ruling “could” affect his status as barangay captain. That interest is contingent. Public office is a public trust, not property, and no one has a vested right to it, much less to an expectancy of holding it. The Court followed 2025 Macalintal, where it denied the same kind of intervention by the Liga and by incumbent punong barangays.
• Other considerations. Because the first requisite failed, the Court did not need to rule on the second. It noted, however, that Larida’s arguments repeated what the OSG had already raised, so his intervention “would add a party to the case, but not an issue.” His points on budgeting and development plans were policy matters for Congress.

Bar takeaway: An incumbent official’s interest in staying in office is not a legal interest that supports intervention.

3. Political question

The Court split this issue in two:

• Wisdom of the term length. This is a political question. Under COMELEC v. Cruz, what Congress decides on the term of barangay officials is beyond judicial scrutiny.
• Constitutionality. This is justiciable. The petition alleged violations of specific constitutional limits: suffrage, due process, the requirement that barangay officials be elected, and the one subject-one title rule. The Court must resolve these under its expanded power of judicial review.

Bar takeaway: Courts review whether Congress stayed within the Constitution, not whether its policy choice is wise.

4. Is Republic Act No. 12326 a postponement law?

This was the pivotal issue because it decides which test applies. A postponement law is subject to the strict 2023 Macalintal guidelines, which require “sufficiently important, substantial, or compelling” reasons. A term-setting law is subject only to the reasonableness test of 2025 Macalintal.

The Court applied the four markers from 2025 Macalintal:

• (a) Title. The law is titled as one “fixing” the term, not “postponing” an election.
• (b) Law amended. It amends Republic Act No. 12232, a term-setting law, and not Republic Act No. 9164, which the postponement laws amended.
• (c) Term structure. It changes the term from four years to five, and the consecutive-term limit from three to two.
• (d) Election interval. It sets a new five-year interval between elections.

All four markers were present, so the law is a term-setting law. The Court rejected the opposing arguments:

• Sponsor’s admission and media reports. The sponsor admitted that the law’s “natural effect” is to postpone the election, and the media described it the same way. The Court held that this shows only an incidental effect, which does not change the law’s character.
• Amendment only a year after Republic Act No. 12232. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution sets no minimum period before Congress may change a statutory term.
• Treating the term and the election date separately. Under 2025 Macalintal, the power to fix a term includes the power to fix when it begins and ends. The term and the election date cannot be separated.
• Revisiting 2025 Macalintal. Under stare decisis, the Court refused. The same argument had been rejected less than a year earlier, and no compelling reason to depart from that ruling was shown.

Bar takeaway: First classify the law by its primary purpose, then apply the matching test.

5. Is the November 2028 date reasonable?

The test from 2025 Macalintal is that the new term must start within a period that is reasonable and not unduly long from the law’s enactment. The Court gave three grounds for finding the date reasonable:

• (a) The date follows from the term. The last BSKE was held in October 2023. November 2028 is about five years later, which is exactly the new term. As the Court put it, “the interval is not remote from the term—it is the term.”
• (b) Congress gave reasons. Starting the five-year cycle in 2026 would make the BSKE fall on the 2031 national and local elections. Holding it in 2027 would conflict with the COMELEC’s preparations for the May 2028 elections.
• (c) The date is fixed in the law. It recurs every five years, which is the opposite of an indefinite postponement.

The Court openly acknowledged that the gap from enactment here (September 2026 to November 2028) is longer than under Republic Act No. 12232. It held that this weighs against the law but does not make it unconstitutional, because the standard is reasonableness, not a fixed number of months. The fear that Congress might keep moving the BSKE was not a ground to strike down the law. The Court decides on laws that have been enacted, not on future abuses.

Bar takeaway: Measure the new date against the new term, and look for a definite date and stated reasons.

6. Substantive due process and the right of suffrage

Substantive due process has two requisites:

• (a) Lawful subject. Present. The law’s purpose is effective local governance: continuity of barangay and SK programs, multi-year development planning, and efficient use of limited public resources. These benefit the public, not just incumbents.
• (b) Lawful means. Present. A uniform five-year term with a fixed election cycle is reasonably related to those goals and is not unduly oppressive. Congress considered terms of three to 10 years, heard the Liga, the DILG, and the NYC, and rejected applying the new term only to officials elected in 2026.

The Court rejected the following arguments against the law:

• Congress should have chosen a less disruptive option. The Constitution does not require Congress to choose the least disruptive option.
• No study showed the four-year term was inadequate. Congress does not need a study before changing a law.
• The reasons given at a media briefing were weak. The law is judged by its text and the legislative record, not by a spokesperson’s remarks.

Right of suffrage. Under 2025 Macalintal, an election is “regular” if it is held at fixed, predictable intervals set by law. The law sets a definite date and a recurring five-year cycle, so the right of suffrage is not violated. That the date was moved twice does not make the election irregular, because any election set by statute may be changed by a later statute within constitutional limits.

Bar takeaway: Recite the two requisites of substantive due process, then apply each to the law’s purpose and means.

7. Hold-over as legislative appointment

The Court held that the hold-over is not a legislative appointment, for three reasons:

• Tenure, not term. Under 2023 Macalintal, a hold-over extends the tenure, or actual holding of office, but not the term. The incumbent stays as a de facto officer so that public functions continue.
• Source of the hold-over. The legal basis is Section 4 of Republic Act No. 12232, which remains in force. Under it, incumbents stay until their successors are elected and qualified. The incumbents were themselves elected in October 2023, so Congress did not appoint anyone.
• Section 5 of Republic Act No. 12326. The word “extension” describes the practical effect of the transition. The provision is only a counting rule for the new two-term limit, not a grant of a new term.

The Court also cited Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan: the law abhors a vacuum in public office, and hold-over prevents a gap in government functions.

Bar takeaway: Distinguish term (fixed by law) from tenure (actual stay in office). A hold-over affects only tenure.

8. One subject-one title rule

Under Article VI, Section 26(1), the title need only be broad enough to cover the law’s general object, and the rule is construed liberally. The test is whether each provision bears a fair and reasonable relation to the general subject. The rule is meant to prevent omnibus bills, log-rolling, and hidden provisions.

The general subject of Republic Act No. 12326 is a five-year term and its election cycle. The Court tested each provision against it:

• Section 2 (election date). Germane. Fixing a term necessarily includes fixing when it begins.
• Section 3 (mayors appoint persons to fill SK vacancies). This was the hardest provision to connect. The phrase “and for other purposes” cannot save it. It is upheld because it keeps the SK’s membership complete during the term. Even if that connection were insufficient, the separability clause allows it to be removed without affecting the rest of the law.
• Section 4 (training). Germane. It is expressly tied to the five-year term.
• Section 5 (transition). Germane. It counts terms for the new term limit.
• Section 6 (accountability). Germane. Incumbents remain liable for pending and future cases during the transition.
• Section 7 (appropriations). Germane. It covers funding for the new schedule.

The evils the rule targets were also absent, because the effect on the 2026 BSKE was openly debated in committee and on the floor.

Bar takeaway: Test each provision against the title’s general subject. The phrase “for other purposes” alone cannot save an unrelated provision.

9. TRO, SQAO, and WPI

Interim injunctive relief has four requisites. The burden is heavier when the target is a law, because laws are presumed constitutional and suspending one is “a matter of extreme delicacy.” Macalintal also alleged no bad faith or harassment in the law’s enforcement.

• (a) Clear and unmistakable right in esse. Absent. The right Macalintal claimed was to vote on November 2, 2026. That date came from an earlier statute, and Congress validly changed it under Article X, Section 8. In light of 2025 Macalintal, that right is at best disputed, and a disputed right cannot be protected by injunction.
• (b) Material and substantial invasion. Not separately discussed. It falls with requisite (a), because there is no clear right to invade.
• (c) Urgent need to prevent irreparable injury. Absent, for three reasons:
  • The case would not become moot. In 2023 Macalintal, the Court ruled even after the election date had passed.
  • The hold-over is temporary and can be undone. Even after striking down a law in 2023 Macalintal, the Court let incumbents stay until their successors were elected.
  • Honoraria are definite sums paid for actual services, and the claimed waste of funds was not clearly shown.
• (d) No other adequate remedy. Not separately discussed. The failure of requisites (a) and (c) was enough to deny relief.

Granting the relief would also have decided the merits in advance, which an injunction cannot do.

Bar takeaway: Urgency alone is not enough. Without a clear right, no injunction issues, especially against a law presumed constitutional.