MANILA, Philippines — The Supreme Court (SC) En Banc has reaffirmed the constitutional prohibition against double compensation, ruling that ex-officio members of government boards are not entitled to additional pay for duties that are legally considered part of their principal office.
In a Decision promulgated on March 4, 2025, and penned by Associate Justice Jafar B. Dimaampao, the Court dismissed the petition filed by the Philippine Guarantee Corporation (formerly TIDCP), upholding the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of PHP 260,000.00 in compensation paid to a board member.
The Case: Extra Pay for Committee Membership
The dispute centered on compensation granted to Rogelio C. Lombos, who served as an ex-officio member of the Board of Directors of the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCP). In 2003, the TIDCP Board approved a monthly allowance of PHP 20,000.00 for members of its Marketing and Oversight Committee. As a member of this committee, Lombos received the additional payments.
In 2012, COA auditors disallowed the payments, citing a violation of the constitutional ban on additional or double compensation for public officers. The COA argued that since Lombos sat on the board by virtue of his primary office, his committee work was part and parcel of his existing duties.
The Doctrine: Ex-Officio Roles and Double Compensation
The Supreme Court emphasized that the position of an ex-officio member is not a separate office but merely an imposition of additional duties upon a person already in public service. Consequently, these officials have no right to receive any compensation beyond what is explicitly provided for in their agency’s charter—usually limited to a per diem for meetings attended.
The Court cited Article IX-B, Section 8 of the Constitution, which prohibits elective or appointive public officers from receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. The SC clarified that this restriction applies to all government employees, not just high-ranking Cabinet officials.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the COA is not required to issue a “Notice of Suspension” before issuing a “Notice of Disallowance.” While a suspension is an optional step to gather more information on doubtful transactions, the issuance of a disallowance is mandatory once a transaction is found to be illegal.
Accountability: Who Must Return the Funds?
Applying the “Madera Rules” on the return of disallowed funds, the Court modified the COA’s ruling regarding the specific officials held liable:
Rogelio C. Lombos (Recipient/Approver): The Court held Lombos liable to return the full amount. The SC noted a “patent conflict of interest,” as Lombos was part of the board that approved the very benefits he received. Under the principles of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti, the Court ruled he must refund the money regardless of whether he acted in good faith.
Approving/Certifying Officers: The Court sustained the solidary liability of the senior officers who approved the disbursement, finding that they could not feign ignorance of the corporation’s own charter, which only allowed per diems.
Marilou A. Medina (Excused): The Court absolved Medina, the OIC of Financial Services, from liability. The SC found that her role was purely ministerial—certifying that funds were available—and that she acted in good faith as she was not involved in the policy-making decision to grant the illegal compensation.
The ruling serves as a stern reminder to government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) that the power to fix compensation schemes is strictly limited by constitutional and statutory boundaries, particularly regarding officials serving in ex-officio capacities.
